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I. INTRODUCTION 
A primary concern of all models of economic developmene is the condition of 
poverty of the developing countries. However measured, poverty has defmed-absolutely 
and relatively-the living conditions of the people of the world's low-income countries. At 
the end of World War II, the United States had approximately 6.3% of the world's 
population but 50% of the world's wealth.2 More recent estimates show. that while per 
capita income stood at $18,530 in the United States and $14,670 in other high-income 
countries, per capita income for the majority 60% of the world's population stood at a mere 
$290? This startlingly disproportionate pattern of wealth concentration is further reflected 
in global mortality rates that demonstrate the disproportionate impact of poverty on the 
world's poor: an infant mortality rate of 13 for every 1000 live births in the United States as 
contrasted with an infant mortality rate of over 100 for every 1000 live births in the sixty-
three poor nations, whose total population is two billion.4 
Despite this infelicitous state of affairs, a global redistribution of resources is unlikely 
to occur. For reasons discussed in Part V below, exhortations for a transfer of wealth, 
espoused by the United Nations (UN) and other international nongovernmental institutions, 
have been ineffective in restructuring the international order to a more egalitarian line.5 In 
light of the dismal record of international aid, a host of economic development models have 
been pursued in an attempt to extricate the poor countries from conditions of extreme 
poverty. Development economics6 was established as a subdiscipline of economics and 
consists of multiple paradigms for economic development, each generating its own promise 
I. The tenn "economic development" has not been easy to define. It generally refers to some 
transfonnation in the economic structure and the establishment of certain institutions necessary to increase 
wealth, presumably with the hope that increased production will result in more equal distribution. 
2. See Juliet B. Schor, The Great Trade Debates, in CREATING A NEW WORLD ECONOMY: FORCES OF 
CHANGE AND PLANS FOR ACTION 274, 281 (Gerald Epstein et al. eds., 1993) [hereinafter CREATING A NEW 
WORLD ECONOMY]. 
3. See Juliet B. Schor, Global Equity and Environmental Crisis: An Argument for Reducing Working Hours 
in the North, in CREATING A NEW WORLD ECONOMY, supra note 2, at 183, 183. To make matters worse, the 
ratio of income of the richest20% as compared to that of the poorest20%jumped from 30 to 1 in 1960 to 60 to 1 
in 1990. See Gerald Epstein, Power, Profits, and Cooperation in the Global Economy, in CREATING A NEW 
WORLD ECONOMY, supra note 2, at 19, 22-23. Other indicators reveal a similar picture of extreme global 
inequality not just in wealth but in resource consumption. For example, as recent figures show, even though the 
developed countries comprised approximately 26% of the world's population, they consumed 85% of the world's 
paper, 79% of the world's steel, and 80% of the world's commercial energy. See Schor, supra note 2, at 183. 
4. See Schor, supra note 2, at 183. The infant mortality rates quoted above are average rates. The situation 
may in fact be worse if individual countries from the poorest versus the richest regions are compared. For 
example, in 1987, the infant mortality rate was 7 per 1000 live births in Sweden and 174 per 1000 live births· in 
Nigeria. See Epstein, supra note 3, at 22. 
5. For example, the approximately $22 billion spent in the United States in 1984 on cigarettes was greater 
than the combined dollar value of aid granted in 1986 by the three largest donor countries, the United States, 
Japan, and France. See Jessica Nembhard, Foreign Aid and Dependent Development, in CREATING A NEW 
WORLD ECONOMY, supra note 2, at314, 316. 
The low priority placed on correcting global inequality is also reflected in the following figures: the total 
annual value of world aid toward the end of the 1980s was comparable to the combined military expenditures 
spent by the United States and the fanner Soviet Union in one month, at approximately $1.5 billion a day. See 
id. 
6. See generally Albert 0. Hirschman, The Rise and Decline of Development Economics, in PARADIGMS IN 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: CLASSIC PERSPECTIVES, CRITIQUES, AND REFLECTIONS 191 (Raj ani Kanth ed., 1994) 
[hereinafter PARADIGMS IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT]. The focus of economic development theorists·was on 
"firstly the causes of the relative poverty of underdeveloped countries, and secondly the potential way forward 
for these economies, the specification of the route to economic progress in these largely pre-industrial regions." 
DIANA HUNT, ECONOMIC THEORIES OF DEVELOPMENT: AN ANALYSIS OF COMPETING PARADIGMS 7 (1989). The 
tenn "development economics" was coined in 1952 by economic historian Alfred Sauvy. See id. at 80. 
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for the economic betterment of developing countries in Asia, Latin America, and Africa.7 
Even though there are multiplicities of development models,8 they can be analytically 
reduced to two overarching but diametrically opposed schools of thought: the classical 
liberal economic school and the dependency, neo-Marxist radical school,9 both of which 
have spawned a plethora of related subapproaches to the development debate. 10 
One of the most conspicuous and yet unexamined omissions in the development 
debate is a comprehensive analysis of the theoretical foundations that make up the two 
dominant models of economic development. My contention is that the discourse on 
economic development has been circumscribed and distorted by the uncritical acceptance 
of a number of dichotomous premises upon which the development debate has been based. 
One unexamined premise involves the dichotomy between the national market and the 
international market. Like the family or the home, which must be protected from the 
intrusion of the public realm, the national market is viewed as a "private" and separate 
sphere of productive activity apart from and, in many cases, to be protected against the 
international market. This national/international market dichotomy is, in tum, intertwined 
with and inseparable from yet a second dichotomy: the public/private international law 
dichotomy. 
A distinct set of opposing imageries is associated with the first dichotomy-the 
national/international market dichotomy. Compared to the international market, the 
national market is identified as something that is "ours," "in here," and, in that sense, 
"private," and part of our "national sovereignty." In contrast, compared to the national 
market, the international market is associated with something that is "theirs," "out there," 
and, in that sense, "public," and a possible intrusion on and menace to our "national 
sovereignty." 
On the other hand, both "our" national market as well as "their'' international market 
are subsumed under and considered to be part of the "private," as opposed to the "public," 
international order. In that sense, "private" international law11 stands in opposition to the 
more unruly "public" international order of international politics. Thus, there are two 
7. The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations has classified the approximately 40 
countries in North America and Europe and the states of the former Soviet Union, Israel, Japan, and South Africa 
as developed countries. Developing countries comprise all the other· more than 150 countries of Africa, Latin 
America, the Middle East, and Asia. See Country Notes, [1990] 44 U.N. Food and Agriculture Y.B.: Production 
xvii-xviii (1991). 
8. Several key paradigms have emerged: the expanding capitalist nucleus paradigm, the structurist 
paradigm, the neo-Marxist paradigm, the dependency paradigm, the Maoist paradigm, the basic needs paradigm, 
and the neo-classical paradigm. See generally HUNT, supra note 6. . 
' 9. See generally DAVID H. BLAKE & ROBERT S. WALTERS, THE POLITICS OF GLOBAL ECONOMIC 
RELATIONS 4-9 (4th ed. 1992). The classical liberal model is essentially aligned with the economic orientation 
of the advanced industrial nations such as the United States, Europe, and Japan, and the open trade prescriptions 
of the Bretton Woods system. It considers economic growth and efficiency to be a primary objective of 
economic development and aims toward the integration of developing-country markets with the international 
market in accordance with the liberal principle of comparative advantage. The radical model focuses on 
structural and systemic inequities in the international economic system and favors economic autonomy for 
developing countries instead of economic integration with developed-country markets. See infra Part III. 
Articulated by David Ricardo, the theory of comparative advantage essentially states that all "countries will gain 
by each specializing where their advantage lies and then engaging in trade. Production of both products will be 
increased (valuable resources will be put to their best use) by letting the principle of comparative advantage 
work." ALAN C. SWAN & JOHN F. MURPHY, CASES AND MATERIALS IN THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL 
BUSINESS & ECONOMIC RELATIONS 197, § 3.02 (1991). 
10. · For a detailed examination of the various approaches to development, each varying in general purpose, 
analysis, perspective, ideology, and overall focus, see generally HUNT, supra note 6, at41-85. 
tt, While what has been termed "private international law" may include international economic law as well 
as other disciplines such as international family law, as used in this Article, the term "private international law" is 
only intended to mean international economic law. See infra notes 74-75. 
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separate but interrelated dichotomies: on the one hand, the dichotomy between the political 
world of public international law and the commercial world of private international law; 
and, on the other hand, the dichotomy between the national market and the international 
market, both of which are considered part of the private international law system. 
Both dichotomies have produced their respective spheres of consciousness and 
imageries. These spheres have, in tum, been incorporated into the very foundational bases 
of the two currently dominant models of international economic development. Because 
both the classical liberal model and the radical models appear to be blindly unconscious of 
this dual dichotomization, they have accordingly failed in two important respects. First, 
both models have been unable to transcend the radical separation between the national and 
international market, and thus neither model has been able to reconceive the relationship 
between the two. Under both models, the national/international market dichotomy is 
entrenched, not loosened. 
Second, both models have failed to reconceptualize the relationship between public 
international law and private international law. Neither model has reconciled the traditional 
public international law thesis-a thesis characterized by state sovereignty and state 
autonomy-with its traditional private international law antithesis-marked increasingly by 
interdependence between the national and the international market. Thus, under both 
models, the public international law/private international law dichotomy is also reinforced, 
not eradicated or relaxed. Neither model is able to resolve the tensions between 
nationalistic sovereignty and economic nationalism, on the one hand, and globalization and 
economic interdependence, on the other hand. 
By exploring the apparent contradictions presented by the national/international 
market dichotomy and the public/private international law dichotomy, this Article 
challenges the two models of international economic development and argues for the 
removal of both dichotomies in order to articulate a new conceptual synthesis for the 
development debate. 
Part I of this Article examines the ideological demarcation which separates the 
national from the international market. As an illustration, Part I also explores the evolution 
of the American market, the attendant creation of various ideological constructs associated 
with the idea of a home versus foreign market, and the reinforcement of this antiquated split 
in U.S. and international regulation of trade. The ideology of the national versus 
international· market and the host of antagonistic imageries associated with each have 
perpetuated the separation between these two spheres and prevented an effective 
reconceptualization of these two constructs for purposes of international economic 
development. 
Part II explores the ideological division between public international law and private 
international law. This section will provide a brief examination of the history of 
international law, focusing primarily on the evolution of international law in the United 
States and its division into two distinct disciplines-public and private international law. 
With the active complicity of courts, this apportionment of international law into two 
fragments has resulted in the view that public international law is about politics, not law; 
and the corollary view that private international law is about law or economics, not politics. 
Against the backdrop of this context, Part III will demonstrate how the two dominant 
models of international economic development have reproduced and incorporated these two 
dichotomies into their foundational assumptions. Although both models negotiate the 
national/international market dichotomy in their own ideologically specific and distinct 
ways, both models on the whole reinforce the dichotomy and view the national economy 
and the international economy as separate spheres. Similarly, both models also situate 
themselves in diametrically opposed spaces within the public/private international law 
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dichotomy. The classical liberal model is wholly immersed within the "private" 
international economic order of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), 
excludes elements considered part of the "public" international order from its parameters, 
and adopts an apolitical posture toward the national and the international market. By 
contrast, the radical model navigates the nationaVinternational market dichotomy in the 
politically charged language of public international law, inhabits the "political" public 
international order of nation states and of the UN, and excludes elements considered part of 
the "private" international world of commerce from its parameters. 
Part IV will explore the possibility for renewal in the international economic 
development field. This section will examine the decline of the state-dominated system and 
the concomitant transformation of the international economic system from one of economic 
nationalism to one of economic globalization. As every major structure of power in the 
world economy has become increasingly globalized (including the capital, investment, and 
information structures), such globalization has called into question the traditional division 
of the private international law order into a duality of national versus international market 
and similarly, the traditional division of international law into a public and private 
compartment. Part IV will also offer a critique of why the two dichotomies, from both a 
normative and factual standpoint, are obsolete and should be reexamined. 
The fifth and fmal part of the Article will explain why this transformation from 
autonomy and nationalism to interdependence and globalization is important to the 
development of a new theory of international economic development. To the extent that 
the international economic order transcends the narrow constructs of the state and the 
restraints imposed by sovereignty, it contributes to a growing sense of global 
interdependence and economic integration vital for the effective implementation of any 
economic development model. The argument in Part V is based on a number of claims. 
First, I argue that economic globalization has altered the structure of international economic 
relationships and the configuration of economic power, with inadvertent but positive 
ramifications for international economic development. Thus, the vertical top-heavy 
structure of international economic relations, with developed countries at the top and 
developing nations at the base, is being replaced by a web-like structure involving a 
proliferation of nonstate actors unconstrained by the parameters of economic nationalism. 
Although increased foreign competition has resulted in a resurgence of economic 
nationalism and in renewed calls for home market protectionism, 12 I argue that global 
dispersion of economic activities has rendered nonviable economic distinctions founded on 
an "us" versus "them" or a "national" versus "international" market. To the extent that a 
"national" or "home" market can be accurately identified at all, its identification does not 
derive from the traditional conceptions of a "home" corporation or a "home" product, but 
rather a "home" work force. The new sensibility I advocate would alter our notions of a 
nationaVinternational market by enhancing the competitiveness of the "national" work 
force. This new framework would invest in human capital, as opposed to enhancing the 
competitiveness of the "national" product or the "national" corporation, which has become 
increasingly disconnected from the national territory and hence increasingly stripped of a 
"national" identity. 
Second, I suggest that breaking out of the nationaVinternational market dichotomy 
requires a post sovereign, post national sensibility that transcends the public/private 
international law dichotomy by integrating the "private," nonstate orientation of private 
international law and the classical liberal model with the "public," political orientation of 
public international law and the radical model of development. Moreover, this new and 
12. See, e.g., Patrick J. Buchanan, America First, NAFTA Never (last modified Nov. 7, 1993) <http://www. 
buchanan.orgjnever.htrnl>. 
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integrated sensibility should be harmonized with, rather than opposed to, the forces of 
global economic integration. While international law has struggled to achieve a sense of 
global community by creating a strengthened sovereignty at the international level through 
the institutions of the UN, economic integration has in fact already occurred on a global 
level in a way which has called into question the constructs of sovereignty. The sensibility 
which makes sense, given today's international economic reality, is not one which utilizes 
the vertical, top-down command of the UN for the purpose of creating a global economic 
community. Rather, the challenge for developing countries (and developed countries) is to 
institute and maintain the institutional infrastructure necessary to attract the centrifugal 
forces of the global market for the purpose of economic development. Where market 
failures require correction through public regulation, a regulatory regime should be 
carefully crafted to ensure a balance between attracting versus controlling global economic 
activities. 
In sum, my conception of a new sensibility for international economic development 
calls for a completely different orientation than the one that informs the current discourse. 
This synthesis would move beyond the home market focus of both models of economic 
development and, thus, would remove the national/international market dichotomy as 
traditionally understood from the parameters of the development debate. Similarly, 
because it would further the cross-fertilization of seemingly antagonistic norms within the 
public and private components of international law, this perspective would also provide a 
new theoretical framework that encompasses both the political and "public" sensibility of 
public international law with the "private" and market sensibility of private international 
law. Instead of relying on vertical, top-down attempts at global integration through the 
state-centered regime of the UN, the new sensibility would aim to harness the economic 
forces of a global economy that national boundaries no longer constrain by constructing a 
regulatory framework necessary to attract and, at the same time, channel the international 
market for the purpose of economic development. 
II. THE NATIONAL MARKET/INTERNATIONAL MARKET DICHOTOMY 
A. The Ideology of the National Versus the International Market 
Although a "national market'' composed of common national interests linked to a 
nation-state is quite a recent construct, 13 it already seems inevitable. Yet, the notion of a 
national market existing for the good of the nation as a whole is a relatively recent 
phenomenon. Before the eighteenth century and the spread of political democracy, 
"[n]ational wealth pertained only to the wealth of the sovereign-to the kings and queens 
and retainers who contrived, financed, and directed various schemes to accumulate forelgn 
riches in order to wage wars and enhance their power and prestige-rather than to the well-
being of ordinary individuals within the nation."14 However, as Europe made the 
transformation from monarchy to democracy, economic mercantilism designed to 
accumulate wealth for the monarch was replaced with economic nationalism designed to 
13. "The familiar picture of a national economy whose members succeed or fail together would have 
appeared novel to someone living as recently as the seventeenth century-even in Europe, where the idea of the 
nation-state had developed furthest. Before the eighteenth century few kings, statesmen, or political philosophers 
regarded the nation as in any way responsible for, or necessarily connected to, the economic wc11-being of its 
population." ROBERTB.REICH, THEWORKOFNATIONS 13 (1991). 
14. ld. Before the emergence of nation-states, "the international system was a kind of 'club' of princes. 
The move from prince-nations to states, from a club of princes with club rules to a developed political system 
with international law rules, is commonly dated from the Peace of Westphalia (1648) and the emergence of the 
secular state." LOUIS HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW: POLITICS AND VALUES 9 n.** (1995). The wealth of 
prince-nations belonged to the prince, not the nation. 
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"imp'rov[e] the well-being of the nation's population."15 Because the shift from 
mercantilism to economic nationalism was also accompanied by a shift from absolutism to 
democracy, the idea of a national economy and the correlative constructs associated with 
the "home" market were on the whole celebrated. After all, that the economic wealth of the 
nation should be accumulated for the benefit of its citizens rather than its monarch cannot 
be deemed to be a bad thing. 
As economic nationalism surged with a rising sense of national consciousness, 
nurturing the home market became a matter of economic sovereignty. Although Adam 
Smith's logic favoring international trade and condemning mercantilism was founded on 
"universal economic principles, ... his frame of reference was resolutely national. He 
condemned English mercantilism not because it reduced the wealth of other nations but 
because it caused England's citizens to be poorer than they would be otherwise."16 
For nations less powerful than England, such as the young United States, however, it 
was argued that the national economic interest might be furthered by governmental 
activism rather than nonintervention. In the early part of U.S. history, protectionists 
engaged in fervent debates about tariffs. Indeed, American protectionists invoked 
passionately antagonistic imageries of two dueling spheres-the national market in one 
sphere against the international market in a separate sphere-to justify home market 
protection. With the "home" against the "world," and "us" against "them," moral overtones 
were cast upon the debate and references made to various characteristics, supposedly 
natural, of the home market. Thus, advocating in favor of a strong domestic market in 
manufactures, Alexander Hamilton argued that "a domestic market is greatly to be 
preferred to a foreign one, because it is, in the nature of things, far more to be relied 
upon."17 In a similar vein, Henry Clay of Kentucky declared that "[t]he superiority of the 
home market results, first, from its steadiness and comparative certainty at all times; 
secondly, from the creation of reciprocal interest; thirdly, from its greater security; and, 
lastly, from an ultimate and not distant augmentation of consumption (and consequently of 
comfort) from increased quantity and reduced prices."18 
Protectionists imparted a number of traits to the home market on the presumption that 
only a home market could provide the necessary degree of comfort and certainty. Hamilton 
pronounced a connection between the prosperity of the home market and "the wealth [and] 
independence and security of a country .... "19 Clay similarly declared that between the 
national and the international market, "with respect to their relative superiority, I cannot 
entertain a doubt. The home market is first in order, and paramount in importance."20 
In stark contrast to the reliable home market, protectionists deemed the foreign market 
capricious at best and at worst malevolent. Because the foreign market tends to be fickle by 
nature, "foreign demand for the products of agricultural countries is in a great degree rather 
c~ual and occasional than certain or constant,"21 causing "injurious interruptions of the 
demand for some of the staple commodities of the United States."22 As a repository for all 
15. REICH, supra note 13, at 15. 
16. !d. at 18-19 (emphasis in original). 
17. Alexander Hamilton, Report on the Subject of Manufactures, in STATE PAPERS AND SPEECHES ON THE 
TARIFF 1, 22 (F.W. Taussig, ed., 1893). Hamilton also argued that a strong domestic manufacturing sector could 
be a synergistic boost to domestic agriculture because it would absorb surplus in agriculture. 
18. Henry Clay, Speech of Henn; Clay on American Industnj in tl1e House of Representatives, March 30 
and31, 1824, in STATE PAPERS AND SPEECHES ON THE TARIFF, supra note 17, at252, 267. 
19. Hamilton, supra note 17, at 55. 
20. Clay, supra note 18, at 258. According to Clay, the inferiority of the international market as compared 
to the ilational market apparently lies in its inability to provide "an adequate vent for the surplus produce of our 
labor." !d. at259. · 
21. Hamilton,supranote17,at23. 
22. !d. 
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that is undesirable, protectionists saw the foreign market not only as unreliable and 
potentially destructive, but also seemingly omnipotent. Even "without imputing to them 
any sinister design,"23 foreign markets and "the superior advance of skill, and amount of 
capital, which foreign nations have obtained by the protection of their own industry"24 
could easily overwhelm the home market. 
While the national/international market dichotomy produced the imagery of a virtuous 
home market juxtaposed against a formidable but dangerous foreign market, it also 
produced the exact reverse-an inefficient national market that required the rugged 
disciplines of its international counterpart. While the home market was celebrated as a 
national sphere (superior because it was deemed more reliable), it was also devalued as a 
"lesser'' sphere of productivity. Those opposed to protective measures saw the national 
market as essentially incomplete if insulated from its international counterpart. "The home 
market, of itself, is wholly inadequate for [our] products. They must have the fore~n 
market, or a large surplus, accompanied by great depression in price, must be the result." 
The competitive and modernizing forces of the international market, it was argued, 
must be channeled in a positive way. Speaking of the vigors of the American shipping 
industry, Daniel Webster noted that the reason why American shipowners and navigators 
"are able to meet, and in some measure overcome, universal competition" is not "by 
protection and bounties, but by unwearied exertion, by extreme economy, by unshaken 
perseverance, by that manly and resolute spirit which relies on itself to protect itself."26 
International competition and efficiency, forcing rugged self-reliance and discipline onto 
the national market, were all factors positively associated with the international market. 
The national/international market dichotomy has produced an interesting mix of 
diametrically opposed imageries. Like the home itself which is "ours" and intimately 
private, and hence "a haven from the anxieties of modem life,'m the home market has been 
celebrated as "our'' reliable sphere of nationalistic productivity. However, like the home, 
which has also been devalued as a female sphere and thus "the object of yearning, and yet 
of scom,"28 the home market too has been denigrated as an inadequate sphere requiring 
special coddling and protection. Similarly, the international market has also been 
simultaneously exalted and decried-admired for its stimulating effect but maligned for its 
unfair practices and feared for its supremely superior strength. 
Ultimately, the question has been how to negotiate, not reconcile, the divide between 
the national versus the international. U.S. trade law essentially accepts the set of 
antagonistic imageries associated with the national and international spheres and takes for 
granted the existence of the national and international divide. By equating the home market 
with the collective "we,"29 the United States, for example, was able to ignore southern 
farmers who wished to purchase cheap foreign machinery and favor New England 
23. Clay, supra note 18, at 295. 
24. Id. 
25. Robert J. Walker, Report From the Secretary of the Treasury on the State of the Finances, etc., in 
STATEPAPERSANDSPEECHESONTHETARIFF,supranote 17, at214, 236. 
26. Daniel Webster, Speech of Daniel Webster Upon the Tariff in the House of Representatives, April 1 and 
2, 1824, in STATE PAPERS AND SPEECHES ON THE TARIFF, supra note 17, at315, 329-30. 
27. Frances E. Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 HARV. L. 
REV. 1497, 1499 (1983). 
28. NANCY COTT, THE BONDS OF WOMANHOOD 62 (I 977), quoted in Olsen, supra note 27, at 1499-1500. 
29. The reality beneath the facade of a common national fate is more complex. The Nullification Crisis of 
1832 reveals deep divisions along sectional lines, with northerners and westerners favoring, and southerners 
opposing, tariff protection. By 1832, southern Opposition to the Tariff of 1828 was so high that South 
Carolinians adopted an ordinance of nullification, which declared the federal tariff nullified in South Carolina. 
See Calvin R. Massey, The Locus of Sovereignty: Judicial Review, Legislative Supremacy, and Federalism in the 
Constitutional Traditions of Canada and the United States, 1990 DUKEL.J. 1229, 1251. 
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manufacturers by imposing an average tariff rate of 50% on all foreign goods entering the 
United States.30 
In the United States, the idea of a common national market and an overarching 
economic fate which melded disparate sectional interests into a cohesive whole reached a 
peak in the latter part of the nineteenth century. With inventions such as the steam engine, 
the locomotive and the railroads, sourcing for raw materials and individual components was 
no longer restricted by mere geography. From parts gathered all over the United States, an 
American product, or more accurately, hundreds of thousands of American products/1 
would emerge. 
Ironically, while the industrial revolution and technological changes contributed to the 
sense of a national economy, they also exposed the home market to foreign threat as 
foreign manufacturers armed with the same high-volume capacity aggressively sought to 
open markets for their products. Foreign overproduction and the quest for new markets 
evoked images of a home market under siege, stimulated home-market protectionism, and 
with it, economic nationalism.32 
Although economic nationalism initially meant home market security and protection, 
over time, economic nationalism meant ensuring not just the well-being of the home market 
but also the well-being of the home players. To provide a united front at home to better 
defend the home market from high-volume production in the international market, domestic 
co·mpetition had to be reduced by consolidating "production within large, nationally-based 
corporations"33 and streamlining the production process in a few centralized facilities. The 
alliance in the United States between the national corporation and its citizens reached a 
peak in the 1950s, when high-volume production was accompanied by both high-volume 
consumption and high-volume employment. From then on, the health of the national 
economy became intertwined with the health of its corporations, and both the home market 
and the home corporation constituted an entity separate and apart from both the foreign 
market and the foreign corporation. 
B. International Trade and the National/International Market Dichotomy 
Indeed, U.S. and international trade laws are founded on the premise that an 
ideological divide characterized by opposing imageries exists between the national and the 
international market. Under the rubric of protecting our home market and nurturing our 
home corporation from the international market, the United States has instituted an arsenal 
of national trade laws. At the same time, because the international market is also admired 
for the efficiency benefits it bestows, the United States has designed an international trade 
regime to balance national protection with international liberalization. The national and 
international regime thus consists of an interlocking network of rules and norms, which 
exhibit both nationalist, protective tendencies as well as internationalist, liberalizing 
tendencies. 
On the one hand, U.S. trade law, for instance, consists of basic import-restraining 
measures, such as the tariff and the quota, to limit the entry of foreign products into the 
30. See REICH, supra note 13, at21-22. 
31. Mechanical industries and more technologically advanced processes made high-volume output possible. 
American corporations of all kinds, such as Proctor & Gamble, Diamond Match, Standard Oil, American Sugar 
Refining, Carnegie Steel, International Harvester, and Singer Sewing Machine all experienced huge surges in 
production. See id. at 26. Manufacturing investment increased from $2.7 billion in 1879 to $8.2 billion in 1899. 
See id. 
32. See id. at 28-29. 
33. !d. at 34. 
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national market. The Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States consists of a 
complex set of tariff rates depending on the type and value of imported goods and the 
origin or source of the goods.34 At the same time, multilaterally-based commitments, 
designed to limit the level of tariffs through tariff bindings negotiated through a series of 
GATT rounds, have curbed nationalist tendencies?5 However, such GATT bindings, which 
impose a limit on the extent to which a national market may be protected against other 
GATT partners, are in tum subjected to a number of exceptions, such as escape clause 
proceedings to soften the impact of increased imports or antidumping and countervailing 
duty proceedings to counteract so-called unfair trade practices. Hence, what this triad of 
protectionism, liberalization, and "cushioning" mechanisms reveals is the fact that the 
international economic system is defined by a set of competing tensions marked along 
national versus international lines, which require constant balancing and rebalancing. 
One of the measures utilized by the United States as a buffer against imports is the 
escape clause contained in section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974.36 Under section 201, a 
plaintiff must demonstrate proof of an increase in imports37 which substantially causes38 or 
threatens to cause serious injury39 to domestic industries producing like or directly 
competitive articles.40 
Under section 201, only imports, rather than a multiplicity of other interlocking 
.c: h h . . 41 t d . . ak' 42 d 1actors-suc as c anges m consumption pattern, managemen ectsiOn-m mg, an 
34. See JOHN H. JACKSON ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 374-75 (1995). 
35. Commitments to limit the level of tariffs are contained in the tariff bindings or tariff concessions. 
Contracting parties to the GATT are prohibited from raising their tariff levels on particular products above their 
GATT binding, although tariff levels lower than the bindings are allowed. See General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade, Oct 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-19, T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATT]. Where a nation has not 
negotiated a GATT binding for a particular product, it may impose any tariff level it chooses. See JOHN H. 
JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 119 (1989). 
36. Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, Title II, § 201, 88 Stat. 2011 (1975), amended by Trade 
Agreements of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, §§ 106(b)(3), 1106(a)(l)-(7), 93 Stat 193, 312, and Trade and Tariff 
Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-573, §§ 248(a), 249, 98 Stat. 2998 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2251 (1980 and Supp. 
1988)). 
Section 201 is the U.S. domestic statute which implements American obligations under Article XIX of the 
GATT. See JACKSON, supra note 34, at 597. 
37. The first prerequisite for section 201 escape clause relief is proof of increased imports. Similarly, 
Article XIX of GATT requires "increased quantities" of imports. However, the International Trade Commission 
(lTC) has interpreted section 201 to require a relative, not absolute increase in imports. Even if the total volume 
of imports has decreased, an increase in the import share of the domestic market would suffice for a section 201 
action. The Uruguay Round Agreement on Safeguards has essentially adopted the ITC's position for GATT 
Article XIX purposes. See JACKSON, supra note 34, at 612. 
38. Substantial causation is defined in 19 U.S.C. § 2252(b) (1993) as "a cause which is important and not 
less than any other cause." GATT Article XIX and the Uruguay Round Agreement only require that the 
increased imports "cause or threaten to cause" serious injury. See id. at 629. 
39. Among the factors to be considered by the lTC for injury determination are the following: "the 
significant idling of productive facilities in the domestic industry, the inability to profitably carry out domestic 
production operations, significant unemployment or underemployment within the domestic industry." Trade Act 
§ 202(c)(1)(A). 
40. In determining the identity of the domestic industry, GATT Article XIX requires that the Increased 
imports injure producers of"like or directly competitive products." GATT art. XIX. The same requirement can 
be found in section 201. Trade Act§ 201. 
41. The circularity of the causation criterion can be illustrated in the following hypothetical. Consumers of 
video games in the United States change their consumption pattern, switching to foreign video games to the 
detriment of domestic video game producers. As a result, purchases of imported video games increase. As the 
demand for imports increase, so does the supply. Hence, the dramatic increase in imports coincides with the 
economic decline of U.S. manufacturers. Although increased imports occur in conjunction with domestic 
decline, both can be traced back to the change in consumer tastes. The law, however, treats imports as the causal 
factor. From an economist's perspective, "this formulation makes little sense because the quantity of imports, as 
in our example, is always an 'effect,' with the forces of supply and demand (tastes, income, technology, input 
prices, and so forth) being 'causal."' JACKSON, supra note 34, at 630. 
42. See RALPH H. FOLSOM ET AL., INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 223 (1995). 
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overall economic factors such as high interest rates or tight credit-<:an be the substantial 
cause of injury to the domestic industry at issue.43 Disaggregating the web of causes and 
separating one cause from another in ·order to determine whether or not imports were the 
"substantial cause" has resulted in vastly inconsistent determinations.44 Nonetheless, 
section 201 not only assumes that there are separate and distinct causes for injury which 
must be parsed through and separated, it also assumes that injury caused by imports is more 
egregious than injury caused by other factors. 
In addition to safeguards such as section 20 1 escape clause proceedings, there are 
other avenues for home market protection which focus not only on the effect of increased 
imports but on the unfairness of the foreign acts. These acts may be either acts by private 
firms, such as dumping, or acts by governments, such as subsidies, both of which may be 
counteracted by the imposition of antidumping or countervailing duties designed to "level 
the playing field" for U.S. companies and products. 
There are several assumptions-both rooted in the national/international market 
dichotomy-that underlie the so-called unfair trade laws. First, because both antidumping 
and countervailing duty proceedings are designed to protect domestic firms, it is assumed 
that the economic well-being of domestic firms is linked with the economic well-being of 
the nation's economy, presumably on the rationale that the national corporation, since the 
days of the "great bargain,"45 acts with the interests of the nation in mind. This assumption 
is itself rooted in the idea of a virtuous home market and a home corporation essentially 
connected to its home economy. Second, because both antidumping and countervailing 
duty actions only protect domestic firms from acts by foreign firms or foreign governments, 
it is assumed that there is something especially insidious when the actor is a foreign entity, 
as opposed to a domestic one. 
Dumping occurs when imports are sold in the United States at less than "fair 
value"46-less than the price for home market or third market sales-and cause or threaten 
43. If imports are the substantial cause of injury and if the President accepts the ITC's advisory opinion 
recommending relief, 19 U.S.C. § 2254(e) (Supp. 1996), a number of import restraining measures may be 
adopted: tariff increase, quotas, or orderly marketing arrangements (OMAs), which will now be subjected to new 
GATT discipline after the Uruguay Round. See JACKSON, supra note 36, at 643. Presidential relief may also 
focus on government assistance to workers and firms injured by import competition, for example, adjustment 
assistance such as training, job search assistance, and relocation payments. See 19 U.S.C. § 2253(a) (Supp. 
1996). Adjustment assistance, however, is contingent on proof that workers of a firm had been injured by 
imports. See JACKSON, supra note 34, at 664. 
44. In Heavy Weight Motorcycles, and Engines and Power Train Subassemblies Therefor, the lTC 
considered but refused to treat economic recession-a non-import factor-to be a more substantial cause for 
domestic injury than the import of foreign motorcycles. See U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N Pub. 1342 (Feb. 1983), 
Inv. No. TA-201-47, 4 INT'L TRADE REP. DECISIONS (BNA) 2469 (1983), reprinted in JACKSON, supra note 34, 
at 635-36. See also FOLSOM, supra note 42, at 223. By contrast, in Certain Motor Vehicles and Certain Chassis 
and Bodies Therefor, although the lTC conceded that there had been an increase in Japanese automobile imports, 
it found that economic recession was a more substantial cause of domestic injury. See Certain Motor Vehicles 
and Certain Chassis and Bodies Therefor, U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N Pub. 1110, lnv. No. TA-201-44, 2 INT'L 
TRADE REP. DECISIONS (BNA) 5241 (1980), reprinted in JACKSON, supra note 34, at 630-35. 
Congress has recently prohibited the use of economic recession or downturn as a substantial cause for 
domestic injury for escape clause proceeding purposes. See 19 U.S.C. § 2252(c) (Supp. 1996). Thus, it will now 
be easier to establish that a domestic industry faced with a recessionary climate and suffering from low sales was 
injured by imports as opposed to other causes. 
45. The "national bargain" struck between the corporation and the nation included: "First, the core 
American corporation would plan and implement the production of a large volume of goods .... A large portion 
of the revenues would be reinvested in new factories and machinery, but a significant share would go to middle 
managers and production workers. REICH, supra note 13, at 67. 
46. Fair value is determined by comparing "normal value" (formerly "foreign market value") with the "U.S. 
price." If the U.S. price is lower than the normal value, the difference is the dumping margin. See David A. 
Gantz, A Post-Uruguay Round Introduction to International Trade Law in the United States, 12 ARIZ. J. INT'L & 
COMP. L. 7, 35 (1995). 
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to cause material injury to a U.S. industry.47 An antidumping duty may be imposed if the 
International Trade Administration of the Department of Commerce determines that the 
"subject" merchandise is being, or is likely to be, sold in the United States at less than "fair 
value" and if the International Trade Commission determines that a U.S. industry is 
materially injured or threatened with material injury.48 
Although the terminology evokes an agenda of malice, as defined, dumping is 
essentially nothing more than price discrimination and does not necessarily entail or require 
any showing of sales below cost or predatory pricing.49 If the price in the United States is 
lower than the "normal value," this difference in dollars constitutes the dumping margin,50 
and antidumping ·duties equal to the amount of the margin may be imposed to counteract 
the impact of dumping on U.S. producers. 51 Although dumping may indeed result in lower 
prices and hence increase consumer benefits, it is considered harmful because dumping 
injures domestic industry, even though it benefits consumers. 
More significantly, dumping law makes no distinction between price discrimination 
and predatory pricing. 52 As long as a price difference exists between the foreign producer's 
market and the u.s. market, and as long as this price differential causes material injury to 
domestic industry,53 the foreign conduct at issue is punishable. This bluntness stands in 
stark contrast to the more refined and precise inquiry mandated for antitrust actions under 
the Sherman Act54 and the Robinson-Patman Act.55 Because dumping law is specifically 
targeted against foreign, as opposed to domestic industry, the tendency has been to cast a 
wide, not restrictive net in order to punish a range of conduct normally not punishable if 
perpetrated by a domestic firm. Where price discrimination by a domestic firm against 
other domestic rivals on the domestic market has been deemed actionable, something more 
than mere price difference has been required to find an antitrust violation. For example, 
proof may be required that a "business rival has priced its product in an unfair manner with 
an object to eliminate or retard competition and thereby gain and exercise control over 
prices in the relevant market."56 
As the Supreme Court declared, even if "below-cost pricing may impose painful 
losses on its target, [it] is of no moment to the antitrust laws if competition is not 
injured .... "57 "Low prices benefit consumers regardless of how those prices are set, and 
47. See Tariff Act of 1930, §§ 731-39, amended by 19 U.S.C. §§ 1673-73h (1980) and Uruguay Round 
Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, §§ 211-34, 108 Stat. 4842-4901 (1994). 
48. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 1673 (1988), amended by Uruguay Round Agreements Act §§ 201-34, Pub. L. No. 
1 03-465, 1 08 Stat. 4809 (1994). Article VI of the GA TI also authorizes antidumping duties to offset foreign 
dumping if it causes or threatens material injury to a domestic industry. 
A countervailing duty proceeding is similarly bifurcated between the International Trade Administration 
and the International Trade Commission. See 19 U.S.C. § 1671(a)(l994). 
49. See Gantz, supra note 46, at I 0. 
50. See id. 
51. See 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (1994). 
52. Predatory pricing generally occurs when a competitor sells a product below cost, at a loss, for the 
purpose of driving other competitors out of the market, with the long-term goal of eventually increasing prices to 
the detriment of consumers. 
53. As in escape clause proceedings, the injury sustained must have been caused by imports, see 19 U.S.C. 
§ 167l(a)(2) (Supp. 1996), as opposed to any other factor which could be attributed to the generally poor 
economic situation of the domestic industry. See JACKSON, supra note 34, at 689-90. Following the Tok')'o 
Round GATI Antidumping Code, although the U.S. standard for determining "material injury" is no longer mere 
"de minimis" injury, the higher threshold is still not difficult to meet and is, in fact, much lower than the "serious 
injury" required for section 201 escape clause relief. See FOLSOM, supra note 42, at 142-47. 
54. Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1994)). 
55. Robinson-Patrnan Act, 49 Stat. 1526 {1936) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 13-13b, 21a (1994)). 
56. Brooke Group v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 222 (1993) (emphasis added). 
57. ld at 224. 
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so long as they are above predatory levels, they do not threaten competition."58 Under 
section 2 of the Sherman Act, the plaintiff must also "prove a dangerous probability that 
[the defendant] would monopolize a·particular market."59 
Clearly, the same meticulous investigation is not accorded an antidumping in2uiry. 
While the objective of antitrust is "the protection of competition, not competitors," 0 the 
objective of the dumping law is the protection of domestic competitors, rather than the 
protection of competition. Unlike an antitrust investigation, which asks whether or not 
predation is likely to be a success because "unsuccessful predation is in general a boon to 
consumers,"
61 there is no analysis in an antidumping investigation of whether or not a 
predator has "a reasonable expectation of recovering, in the form of later monopoly profits, 
more than the losses suffered."62 Because the dumping law is designed with the ultimate 
objective of protecting the national from the international market, it is less concerned about 
precision than protection, and the prerequisites to recovery established by the Sherman Act 
to ensure real injury and to minimize "the costs of an erroneous fmding of Iiability"63 are 
virtually nonexistent in an antidumping action. 
Similarly, where foreign competitors receive unfair advantages from their 
governments, such as subsidies, 64 countervailing duties may be imposed even if the end 
result is an increase in overall competition in the home market. Like antidumping actions, 
the overriding concern of a countervailing duty investigation is not the nature of the 
conduct but the identity of the actor. The assumption seems to be that although successful 
domestic predation is bad, successful foreign predation is worse because in that case, if 
"prices rise above the competitive level, the loss of domestic consumer surplus will not be 
partially offset by an increase in domestic producer surplus-foreign companies will 
capture monopoly profits."65 
These distinctions only make sense if analyzed within the context of the 
national/international market dichotomy. The division between the national and 
58. ld. at 223 (citing Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 340 (1990)). "Even if the 
ultimate effect of the cut is to induce or reestablish supracompetitive pricing, discouraging a price cut and forcing 
firms to maintain supracompetitive prices, thus depriving consumers of the benefits of lower prices in the 
interim, does not constitute sound antitrust policy." Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 224. 
I d. 
59. Jd. at225 (citing Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan 506 U.S. 447,458 (1993)). 
60. Id. at 254. 
61. Jd. at 224; see also Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. 475 U.S. 574, 589 (1986) 
A predatory pricing conspiracy is by nature speculative. . . . [f]he success of such schemes is 
inherently uncertain: the short-run loss is definite, but the long-run gain depends on successfully 
neutralizing the competition. Moreover, it is not enough simply to achieve monopoly power .... 
The success of any predatory scheme depends on maintaining monopoly power for long enough both 
to recoup the predator's losses and to harvest some additional gain. 
62. Jd. 
63. Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 226; see also Matsushita Electric, 475 U.S. at 594. "Cutting prices in order 
to increase business often is the very essence of competition. Thus, mistaken inferences ... are especially costly, 
because they chill the very conduct the antitrust laws are designed to protect." Jd. 
64. There are two types of subsidies: domestic and export subsidies. A domestic subsidy is granted to all 
products produced by an industry regardless of whether the products are exported. An export subsidy is granted 
only to those products produced by an industry for the purpose of exportation. With an export subsidy, the 
subsidized product which is then exported can be sold on the international market at a price level less than the 
price level for the same product sold on the domestic market. 
A domestic subsidy is not actionable unless it is "specific," so that subsidies that are available to the public at 
large are not actionable. Export subsidies are explicitly prohibited. See Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 
Annex lA, arts. 1-3, Apr. 15, 1994, H.R. Doc. No. 316, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 1533 (1994). 
65. Alan 0. Sykes, Countervailing Duty Law: An Economic Perspective, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 199, 242 
(1989). 
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international market explains why a practice is punished if it is perpetrated by a foreign 
actor, and an injury is compensated if the harm is caused by a foreign product. As 
discussed previously, two premises underlie this distinction. First, the distinction is based 
on the idea that a distinctive home economy in fact exists and second, that its fate is 
deemed to be synonymous with the fate of its national players. 
The liberal view of trade, of course, recognizes that "competition from overseas 
producers can disadvantage domestic producers, just as competition from domestic 
producers can disadvantage other producers."66 Yet the distinction maintained between 
domestic-source competition versus foreign-source competition can only rest on the 
assumption that, although competition may create winners as well as losers, "hardship that 
results from competition with subsidized imports ... is ... different from the hardship that 
can result from competition with unsubsidized imports or indeed from competition with 
domestic firms."67 Similarly, if foreign-source injury is presumed to be more injurious and 
hence actionable, any benefit derived from foreign competition is also presumed to be less 
beneficial, even though "benefits of competition arise whether the competition is foreign or 
domestic."68 
Trade law then has been characterized by a constant pas de deux between protection 
and liberalization followed by safeguards and other restrictions. The deeply entrenched 
imageries associated with the "home" versus the "world" and the dichotomy between the 
national versus the international market, which date back to the days of Hamilton and Clay, 
explain the disparate treatment accorded foreign as opposed to domestic competitors. As I 
demonstrate in Part II, the nationaVinternational market dichotomy is also intertwined with 
the dichotomy between public and private international law-both of which are 
reproduced, albeit in distinctly different ways, in the discourse on economic development. 
Ill. THE PUBLIC/PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW DICHOTOMY 
A. International Law Before the Public/Private Dichotomy 
The term "international law" was coined and popularized by Jeremy Bentham to 
describe the newly emerging field of law between and among nations.69 Before the term 
was associated with rights and obligations among states specifically, the "law of nations," 
as it was once called, was considered to be binding not just on states but on all 
"mankind."70 Jus gentium was a Roman term used to describe a universal law common to 
66. /d. at209. 
67. /d. at 211. An argument has been made that "workers displaced by import competition ... may suffer 
greater hardship than other displaced workers." /d. The argument is based on the assumption that workers 
displaced by domestic competition will be able to find another job in another domestic firm, because "the demise 
of one domestic firm is typically accompanied by the expansion or creation of another (more competitive) 
domestic firm in the same line of business." /d. "The same cannot be said of workers displaced by import 
competition since relocation to find employment overseas is rarely an attractive or a viable option." ld. 
(emphasis added). This argument rests on the assumption that direct investment by foreign firms in the United 
States, for instance, would not be available or would not generate the same employment opportunities for 
displaced workers. 
68. !d. at209. 
69. See generally Mark Janis, Comment, Jeremy Bentham and the Fashioning of "International Law," 78 
AM. J. INT'L L. 405 (1984). 
70. David Kennedy, Primitive Legal Scholarship, 27 HARV. INT'L L.J. I, 8 (1986) "[T)he primitives do not 
distinguish municipal law from international law, nor the law which binds sovereigns in their relations with one 
another from that which binds their citizens or themselves in their relations with their citizens. The primitive 
text envisions a single law which binds sovereigns and citizens alike." /d. (emphasis added). 
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alf1 (Romans and foreign).72 Legal scholars, such as Blackstone, defined the law of 
nations as "a system of rules, deducible by natural reason, and established by universal 
consent among the civilized inhabitants of the world ... to insure the observance of justice 
and good faith, in that intercourse which must frequently occur between two or more 
independent states, and the individuals belonging to each."73 
This unified view of international law, as applicable to both states and individuals and 
encompassing both public74 and private international Jaw,75 endured even after the 
emergence of nation-states in the seventeenth century. Although the "vested rights" 
doctrine coined by Dutch publicists in the newly independent Dutch Republic provided the 
theoretical foundation for Dutch courts to defer to notions of territoriality and national laws, 
as opposed to notions of internationality and universal law,76 Dutch scholars nonetheless 
"described a unified field of international law and did not distinguish private from public 
internationallaw."77 
71. See, e.g., MARK JANIS, AN INTRODUCfiON TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 n.2 (1988) (citing The Four 
Commentaries ofGaius on the Institutes of the Civil Law, in 1 THE CIVIL LAW 81 (S. Scotted., 1973)). 
72. See Joel Paul, The Isolation of Private International Law, 7 WIS. INT'L L.J. 149, 155-56 (1988) (citing 
H. JOLOWICZ, ROMAN FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN LAW 38-39 (1957)). 
73. Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Public Law Litigation, 100 YALEL.J. 2347,2351 (1991) (quoting 4 
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *66). 
74. International legal education routinely divides international law into public international law and 
private international law. Public international law generally consists of: 
the sources of international law; the subjects of international law; application of international law by 
domestic and international tribunals; the enforcement of public international law; international 
organizations, including the United Nations, specialized agencies of the United Nations, and regional 
organizations; international dispute settlement, including non-judicial and quasi-judicial methods 
and international courts; the international law of treaties; the laws of war, including the rights of 
neutrals, belligerents and civilians; the law of the sea and the law of outer space; international 
protection of the environment; the rights of individuals under public international law, including the 
law of the U.N. Charter, regional human rights law, and international humanitarian law; state 
responsibility for injury to aliens; foreign relations law; diplomatic recognition; the Act of State 
doctrine; diplomatic and sovereign immunities; the responsibility of states for the acts of their 
nationals; state succession; and the right of states to make claims on behalf of their nationals. 
Paul, supra note 72, at 150-51 n.3. 
75. Private international law is generally considered the law that deals with international business 
transactions. 
Private international law or international business transactions concerns domestic and international 
regulation of foreign investment and the movement of goods and workers across national borders. 
Subjects include export sales, licensing and distributorships, international loans, joint ventures, 
choice of law, the enforceability of arbitral agreements and awards, extraterritorial application of 
taxation, antitrust and securities laws, protecting investors from political risk, the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade and other multilateral organizations concerned with trade, investment, and 
balance of payments, such as the OECD, EC, and IMF. 
/d. at 151 n.4. 
76. See Hessel Yntema, The Comity Doctrine, 65 MICH. L. REv. 9, 9 (1966). "The doctrine of comity, as 
developed in the Netherlands during the last quarter of the Seventeenth Century, for the first time posed in stark 
simplicity the basic dilemma of conflicts law in modem times to mediate between the pretensions of territorial 
sovereignty and the needs of international commerce." /d. (quoting ULRIK HUBER, DE JURE CIVITATIS, Lib. III, 
Sec. IV, Cap. I, 14,607 (3rd ed. 1968) (emphasis added). 
77. Paul, supra note 72, at 158 (1988). It should also be noted while Dutch courts used territoriality and 
vested rights to further Dutch national sovereignty, they did not rule out the fact that "each state may choose to 
apply foreign law within its domestic courts so long as such foreign laws do not conflict with the public policy of 
the forum state." /d., at 157-58; see also Koh, supra note 73, at 2351. 
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This unified and integrated approach to international law was also part of the colonial 
law78 and was later incorporated into the domestic laws of the United States when the 
United States gained its independence from England. Article I of the Constitution granted 
Congress the power to "punish Piracies ... committed on the high Seas; [and] Offences 
against the Law ofNations."79 Upon the Declaration of Independence and the entry of the 
United States into the community of nations, the Supreme Court declared that "the United 
States had, by taking a place among the nations of the earth, become amenable to the law of 
nations."80 
Against this early background of a more unified approach to international law, U.S. 
courts did not feel compelled to reject cases that implicated the law of nations. The 
Supreme Court embraced what we would now term public international law cases and 
appeared to relish the opportunity to parse through the rich interstices of the "law of 
nations" without indulging in the distinctions of public and private cases. Thus, the Court 
heard and decided a wide variety of cases deemed offenses against the law of nations (for 
example, piracy,81 the seizure of ships deemed enemy ships,82 the status of private property 
in case of state succession, 83 and attacks on ambassadors). 84 
In a series of nineteenth-century cases remarkable for their eloquent use of 
international law principles, the Supreme Court unabashedly embraced international law in 
a manner and spirit rarely seen in later decisions. Early courts regularly invoked the law of 
nations to decide eminently "public" or state issues without inhibition. In addition, where 
both "public" and "private" matters were intertwined, the courts made no attempt to 
bifurcate and isolate the public from the private dimensions. The courts did not make an 
attempt either to protect private commerce or to shy from "politically hot" issues. 
In The Peterhoff,85 the Supreme Court was faced with the politically thorny issue of 
the legality of an American blockade of neutral Mexico. Confronted in 1862 by a growing 
78. Intemationallaw had been part of the law of England, and through the "mother'' country, part of U.S. 
colonial law. See Barbuit's Case, 25 Eng. Rep. 777 (Ch. 1735) (the "law of nations ... fonned part of the law of 
Englancf'); Respublica v. De Longchamps, I Dall. Ill (Pa. 1784) (law of nations invoked by the Chief Justice of 
Pennsylvania to hold an individual guilty of attack on a French ambassador). 
79. U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 8, cl. 10. Under Article III, section 2, clause I, Congress extended judicial power 
of Article III courts to cases arising under treaties as well as cases affecting Ambassadors, public Ministers, 
admiralty cases, and cases involving foreign parties. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. I. 
80. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419,474 (1793). 
81. See U.S. v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153 (1820). Justice Story affinned that "piracy ..• [is] an offence 
against the law of nations" and that the individual responsible was liable. !d. at 162-63. 
82. See Thirty Hogsheads of Sugar v. Boyle, l3 U.S. (9 Cranch) 191 (1815). Sugar carried on board a 
·British ship destined for a commercial house in London was seized by the United States during the War of 1812 
as enemy property. However, because the sugar had been manufactured in Santa Cruz, which belonged to 
Denmark but recently fell into British hands, the Danish owner argued that the produce of the plantation could 
not be considered British property. See id. at 195. In detennining that the seizure of sugar by the United States 
was in accordance with "ancient principles" of law which had prevailed in other nations, Justice Marshall held 
that "[t]he law of nations is the great source from which we derive those rules, respecting belligerent and neutral 
rights, which are recognized by all civilized and commercial states throughout Europe and America. This law is 
in part unwritten, and in part conventional." /d. at 198. 
83. See United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51 (1833). In an action against the United States, 
plaintiffPercheman claimed title to land in Florida pursuant to a grant made by Spain in 1815 to his predecessor. 
Despite a peace treaty between the United States and Spain in which Spain ceded Florida with the express 
proviso that private rights previously granted would be respected, a board of land commissioners held against the 
plaintiff. Justice Marshall held that "the modem usage of nations, which has become law," required that private 
rights be protected against successor sovereigns. 
84. See Respublica v. DeLongchamps, 1 Dall. Ill (Pa. 1784). Between the Declaration of Independence 
and the adoption of the Constitution, Chief Justice M'Kean of Pennsylvania invoked the law of nations to find an 
individual guilty of assault on the Secretary of the French Ministers. According to M'Kean, "this is a case of 
first impression in the United States. It must be detennined on the principles of the laws of nations, which fonn a 
part of the municipal law of Pennsylvania .... " /d. at 114. 
85. 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 28 (1866). 
1997] INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 225 
rebellion, the U.S. government responded by declaring that it would "set on foot a blockade 
of the ports"86 of the Confederate states. In response to the argument that trade with the 
Mexican city of Matamoras was made unlawful by the American blockade of the mouth of 
the Rio Grande, the Supreme Court boldly enunciated two principles. First, as the Court 
declared, "[i]t must be premised that no paper or constructive blockade is allowed by 
internationallaw."87 Second, in holding that neutral commerce is to be free and protected 
by the law of nations, the Court reasoned that not only did prior "cases fully recognize the 
lawfulness of neutral trade to or from a blockaded country"88 but "the general doctrines of 
international law [also] lead irresistibly to the same conclusion."89 
The Court concluded "that trade, between London and Matamoras, even with intent to 
supply, from Matamoras, goods to Texas, violated no blockade, and cannot be declared 
unlawful."90 Significantly, although the Court recognized that "[t]rade with a neutral port 
in immediate proximity to the territory of one belligerent, is certainly very inconvenient to 
the other,"91 it nonetheless declared that "we administer the public law of nations, and are 
not at liberty to inquire what is for the particular advantage or disadvantage of our own or 
another country. We must follow the lights of reason and the lessons of the masters of 
international jurisprudence."92 · 
In United States v. The La Jeune Eugenie,93 a decision which similarly embraced the 
rich intersections between "public" international law and "private" prop~rty rights, Judge 
(later Justice) Story did not shy away from applying "public" international law to hold that 
a French vessel engaged in the slave trade could be seized by the United States, even if 
seizure affected private property rights. The Court made no attempt to impose an 
ideological barrier between private and public international law, nor did it try to 
conceptualize the case as a private commercial law case to make it more amenable to 
judicial determination. Instead, the Court implicitly determined that the private or 
commercial nature of the transaction affected under the formal banner of a French vessel 
registered to French residents94 did not convert the conflict into a "private" matter for 
determination by French domestic laws. In fact, the private or commercial nature of the 
transaction could not prevent the United States from asserting jurisdiction because, as the 
Court declared, the slave trade "begins in corruption, and plunder, and kidnapping"95 and 
violates the universal law of nations existing independently from the will of any 
• 96 
sovereign. 
In a case pregnant with state-to-state implications and hence within the core of what 
later became "public" international law issues, the Supreme Court, in the Prize Cases,97 
looked to the law of nations to determine whether the American Civil War constituted a war 
under international law. The Court also determined whether or not the Union had the right 
86. !d. at 50. A merchant ship of neutral British nationality sailing from London to the Mexican city of 
Matamoras was captured by the United States and condemned as a lawful prize of war on suspicion that its true 
destination was to the blockaded coast of the rebellious states. 
87. !d. at 50. 
88. !d. at 56. 
89. !d. at 56. 
90. !d. at 57. 
91. !d. at 57. "Such trade, with unrestricted inland commerce between such a port and the enemy's territory, 
impairs undoubtedly and very seriously impairs the value of a blockade of the enemy's coast." !d. 
92. !d. at 57. 
93. 26 F. Cas. 832 (C.C.D. Mass. 1822). 
94. The French claimants .argued that there was no international law prohibiting the slave trade and 
additionally that the law of nations could not interfere with private commercial transactions, because private 
property rights could only be subjected to domestic laws. See id. at 835-38. 
95. !d. at 845. 
96. See id. at 846. 
97. 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1862). 
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to avail itself of the rights of a belligerent, including the right to blockade the ports of the 
enemy belligerent and the right to seize certain neutral vessels as prizes. After surveying 
the "laws of war, as established among nations,"98 the Court found that a state of war 
existed and that "the President had a right, jure belli, to institute a blockade of ports in 
possession of the States in rebellion, which neutrals are bound to regard."99 In exercising 
"the right of a belligerent,"100 the United States did not violate the laws of war and thus the 
"civil war such as that now waged between the Northern and Southern States is properly 
conducted according to the humane regulations of public law as regards capture on the 
ocean."
101 
As those early decisions reveal, early U.S. courts adopted an unfragmented view of 
international law without distinguishing public from private law. 102 The law of nations was 
truly a universal and comprehensive jus gentium common to all and broad enough to 
encompass "public" state interests as well as "private" commercial interests later associated 
with private international law. In Swift v. Tyson, 103 for example, Justice Story held that a 
federal court sitting in diversity jurisdiction must apply common law-in this case, the 
universal merchant law because "[t]he law respecting negotiable instruments may be truly 
declared ... to be in a great measure, not the law of a single country only, but of the 
commercial world." 
Ironically, the rise of international trade and commerce and the desire for greater 
predictability may have contributed to the eventual distinction by nineteenth-century 
scholars of private international law as a separate discipline. Merchant and maritime laws 
were extricated from their universal realm and domesticated into municipal law. The law 
merchant evolved from customary jus gentium to positive law, codified in the United States 
as domestic law in the form of the Uniform Commercial Code, and on the international 
plane, as international treaty law in the United Nations Conference on Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods. 104 While the law merchant was absorbed into domestic law 
and privatized into the relatively predictable and friction-free system of commerce, public 
international law scholars increasingly disowned private international law as an integral 
part ofinternationallaw,105 and thereby widened the public/private split. 
98. !d. at 667. 
99. Jd. at 671. 
I 00. I d. at 672. 
IOI. Id. at 673. 
I02. The early courts also embraced a monist, rather than dualist, approach to international law. The 
Restatement notes that "[f]rom the beginning, the law of nations, later referred to as international law, was 
considered to be incorporated into the law of the United States without the need for any action by Congress or 
the President, and the courts, state and federal, have applied it and given it effect as the courts of England had 
done." REsTATEMENT (fHIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, eh. 2, introductory 
note, at 4I (I987). 
I03. 4I U.S. (I6 Pet.) I, I9 (1842). "[T]he courts of New York do not found their decisions upon this 
point, upon any local statute, or positive, fixed or ancient local usage; but they deduce the doctrine from the 
general principles of commercial law." Id. at I8. 
104. Apr. 10, I980, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 97/18, Annex I, 19 I.L.M. 668 (1980). The Convention entered 
into force for the United States on January I, 1988, and through the Supremacy Clause, U.S. Const. art. VI, 
overrides the UCC where contracts for the sale of goods are between parties whose places of businesses are in 
different countries, if those countries are contracting parties. 
105. See Morton J. Horowitz, The History of the Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1423, 1423 
(1952); Paul, supra note 72, at I63-72; Paula R. Rhodes, Should We Continue to Distinguish Between Public 
and Private International Law?, 79 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 352, 356 (1985). 
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B. The Po/iticization of Public International Law 
As the twentieth century progressed and the public/private divide widened, public 
international law became associated with the hotly politicized issues of interstate relations 
and, hence, increasingly implicated in questions of state sovereignty and state autonomy. 
The imagery of a public international realm which is so chaotic and politicized and 
implicates so many sensitive interstate issues that no amount of law could tame, explains 
the courts' reluctance to determine the law of nations. Sovereign states themselves, whose 
acts within their territorial boundaries should not be judicially second-guessed by foreign 
courts, can best maintain order within this unruly space. 
The identification of public international law with the discords of politics and 
power106 prodded courts to invoke a number of "abstention" doctrines to refrain from 
proclaiming "what the law is."107 The doctrine of comity, for example, has undergone a 
transformation, from a doctrine empowering courts to recognize (or to not recognize) "the 
legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation,"108 to one obligating courts to 
disempower themselves from any such determination. While comity was originally a 
doctrine of judicial engagement-because courts would, methodically, confront, evaluate, 
and then accept or reject foreign law if it contravened forum law-the doctrine has now 
become a doctrine of judicial evasion. The doctrine provides the judiciary with the shortcut 
needed to sidestep politically charged issues and "to defer to foreign sovereignty and to the 
executive in the conduct of foreign relations."109 
Like comity, the act of state doctrine110 has also increasingly become a vehicle for 
judicial abdication as courts transform the doctrine from a predominantly legal to a 
predominantly political formulation. In what has become a classic articulation of the act of 
state doctrine, the Supreme Court in Underhill v. Hernandez, stated that "[e]very sovereign 
State is bound to respect the independence of every other sovereign State, and the courts of 
one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another done within 
its own territory."111 The act of state doctrine could be and has in fact been conceived as a 
conflicts of law doctrine allowing courts to elaborate upon, apply, or reject the law of a 
foreign state.112 But it has, over the years, transmogrified into a political doctrine in which 
106. This image partly derives from the overemphasis placed on the international rules dealing with force 
and war. Professor Louis Henkin, for example, has noted that most of international law deals with concerns that 
have little to do with force and that, therefore, most nations obey international law most of the time. See 
generally LOUIS HENKIN, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE (1979). 
107. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). 
108. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163--64 (1895). As a doctrine which is "neither a matter of absolute 
obligation, on the one hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will, upon the other," id. at 163, the doctrine of 
comity granted courts a certain degree of latitude. Comity was originally "intended to give domestic courts 
greater latitude to refuse to apply foreign law or enforce foreign judgments . . . ." Joel Paul, Comity in 
International Law, 32 HARV. INT'L L. J. 1, 44 (1991) (emphasis added) [hereinafter Paul, Comity]. For example, 
Justice Story favored the doctrine because "[c]ornity permitted each state to preclude the operation of another 
state's law ifit violated the fundamental rights of its citizens .... Comity would not compel. a free state to apply 
the Jaw of a slave state over a fugitive slave." !d. at 22. 
109. Paul, Comity, supra note 108, at44. 
110. A close relationship exists between comity and the act of state doctrine. See, e.g., Oeljen v. Central 
Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 303-04 (1918). "The principle that the conduct of one independent government 
cannot be successfully questioned in the courts of another . . . rest at last upon the highest consideration of 
international comity." !d. Comity is designed to avoid embarrassment to the foreign sovereign. The act of state 
doctrine is designed to avoid embarrassment to the domestic sovereign or the executive in its conduct of foreign 
affairs. 
Ill. Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897) (emphasis added). 
112. See Michael Zander, The Act of State Doctrine, 53 AM. J. INT'L L. 826, 833-34 (1959) (arguing that 
the act of state doctrine should be conceived as a conflicts of law doctrine, thus allowing the forum court to 
utilize traditional conflicts principles such as the public policy exception to refuse to apply foreign law). This 
conflicts approach has in fact been used by the New York courts to support their refusal to give effect to foreign 
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courts; suddenly incompetent to declare the law of nations, defer to two overriding norms: 
executive authority in foreign affairs and the sovereignty of states. 
The more public international law is deemed to be a zone of politics, the more it is 
thought incapable of legal resolution and the more the judiciary has retreated behind a 
facade of comity, 113 sovereignty, 114 and executive authority. 115 In a series of cases that 
epitomize judicial abdication of its duty to declare law, the Supreme Court, relying on the 
act of state doctrine and executive supremacy in international politics, reversed the New 
York courts' refusal to give effect to a Soviet expropriatory decree.116 The New York 
Court of Appeals, applying traditional conflicts principles, had deemed the act to be 
contrary to New York public policy.117 
Bound by Supreme Court precedent, Judge Learned Hand in Bernstein v. Van 
Heyghen Freres Societe Anoeyme118 used the act of state doctrine to dismiss a complaint 
challenging the validity of the Nazi expropriation of the plaintiffs property. Although 
Judge Hand recognized that a conflicts approach would have invalidated the expropriation 
by the Nazi regime as "utterly odious to the accepted standards of justice of that state,"119 
he believed that this conflicts approach would violate the act of state doctrine as interpreted 
by the Supreme Court.120 Unless and until the executive acted, through the so-called 
Bernstein exception, "to relieve American courts from any restraint upon the exercise of 
their jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the acts of Nazi officials,"121 the Second 
Circuit felt obligated to apply the act of state doctrine to bar itself from determining the 
validity of the Nazi expropriation of a plaintiffs property.122 This new Bernstein twist, in 
effect, turned the act of state doctrine from a doctrine in which courts would negatively 
refrain into a doctrine in which courts would affirmatively act. The courts were to act, 
law. See, e.g., Bernstein v. Van Heyghen Freres Societe Anonyme, 163 F.2d 246, 252 (2d Cir. 1947), cert. 
denied, 332 U.S. 772 (1947); United States v. Belmont, 85 F.2d 542, 543 (2d Cir. 1936), rev'd, 301 U.S. 324 
(1937); United States v. Pink, 32 N.E.2d 552 (N.Y. 1940). 
113. See supra notes 107-08 and accompanying text. 
114. In an antitrust suit in which the actions of the Costa Rican government were directly implicated, 
Justice Holmes declared: "The very meaning of sovereignty is that the decree of the sovereign makes law." 
American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 358 (1909). Judicial elevation of sovereignty can also 
be seen in Justice Marshall's 1825 holding that a sovereign state could not impose and transport extraterritorially 
its domestic laws outlawing slavery on other equally sovereign foreign states, because "[n]o principle of general 
law is more universally acknowledged, than the perfect equality of nations." The Antelope, 23 U.S. (1 0 Wheat.) 
66, 122 (1825) (Marshall, C.J.). 
115. See, e.g., United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304,319 (1936) (Sutherland, J.). 
116. See United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 222-23 (1942); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 330 
(1937). Pursuant to an executive agreement, the U.S. government would exchange American claims against the 
Soviet Union regarding expropriated property for Soviet claims against American nationals regarding debts owed 
to Soviet citizens. The Supreme Court reversed the New York courts' refusal to recognize and enforce the Soviet 
decree because of the supremacy of foreign policy and executive authority. 
117. See United States v. Pink, 32 N.E.2d 552 (N.Y. 1940) (per curiam decision in accord with Moscow 
Fire Ins. Co. v. Bank ofNew York and Trust Co., 20 N.E.2d 758, 764 (N.Y. 1939), rev'd 315 U.S. 203 (1942)). 
The New York Court of Appeals relied on traditional conflicts principles, in which nations are allowed to refuse 
recognition and enforcement of a foreign law under the public policy exception. A number of proposals have 
been made to convert the act of state doctrine into a conflicts of laws rule. See Zander, supra note 112, at 826. 
In addition to the public policy exception, an international law violation exception would be created to allow 
nations to refuse to recognize and enforce acts of state which violate international law. See id. at 833-34, 840. 
118. 163 F.2d 246 (2d Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 772 (1947). 
119. Id at249. 
120. !d. at 249-50. 
121. Department of State, Jurisdiction of U.S. Courts Re Suits for Identifiable Property Involved in Nazi 
Forced Transfers, 20 DEP'T ST. BULL. 592, 593 (1949). 
122. Upon receipt of the State Department's letter authorizing judicial review, the Second Circuit reversed 
itself and directed the district court to trY the case on the merits. Bernstein v. N.V. Nederlandsche-Amrikaanschc 
Stoomvaart-Maatschappij, 210 F.2d 375, 376 (2d Cir. 1954). 
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however, as a mere rubber stamp of an executive deemed eminently more competent to 
negotiate the realm of politics. 123 
Similarly, in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 124 in a suit by Cuba for proceeds 
from the sale of sugar that had been expropriated by the Castro government, the Supreme 
Court, in an eight-to-one majority, declared that "the Judicial Branch will not examine the 
validity of a taking of property within its own territory by a foreign sovereign government, 
extant and recognized by this country at the time of suit, in the absence of a treaty or other 
unambiguous agreement regarding controlling legal principles, even if the complaint 
alleges that the taking violates customary international law. " 125 Other parts of the opinion 
further suggest that because there was no law and there was only ideology, judicial 
declaration of law would be impossible. As the majority reasoned, "[i]t is difficult to 
imagine the courts of this country embarking on adjudication in an area which touches 
more sensitively the practical and ideological goals of the various members of the 
community ofnations."126 Against Justice White's vehement dissent-that "the executive 
of no other government seems to require such insulation from international law 
adjudications in its courts; and no other judiciary is apparently so incompetent to ascertain 
and apply international law"-the majority held that lack of consensus meant that it is 
incumbent upon the executive, rather than the judiciary, to define the law of 
expropriation. 127 
Sabbatino could be read to mean simply that in the absence of a clear international 
law principle governing a particular issue, 128 the Court will apply the aet of state doctrine. 
However, what is interesting about the opinion is that the majority identified as evidence of 
no standard law the fundamental tensions "between the national interests of capital 
importing and capital exporting nations and between the social ideologies of those countries 
that favor state control of a considerable portion of the means of production and those that 
adhere to a free enterprise system."129 
The Sabbatino majority thus equated an absence of consensus with an absence of the 
rule of law. To the dismay of Justice White, political differences and ideological rifts 
seemed to have provided the Court with the occasion to "declare the ascertainment and 
123. In First National City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759 (1972), a number of justices 
found the Bernstein exception to be problematic. Justice Powell characterized the exception as requiring the 
·~udiciary to receive the Executive's permission before invoking its jurisdiction." 406 U.S. at 773 (Powell, J., 
concurring). 
The four dissenting justices held that acceptance of the Bernstein exception "would require us to abdicate 
our judicial responsibility to define the contours of the act of state doctrine so that the judiciary does not become 
embroiled in the politics of international relations." ld. at 778 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Although the dissenting 
opinion rejected the Bernstein exception as executive encroachment on the judiciary's autonomy, it was in favor 
of the act of state doctrine overall as a foreign policy/political question doctrine barring review of the foreign act 
of state. Id. at 785-90, 795-96 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
124. 376 u.s. 398 (1964). 
125. !d. at428 (emphasis added). 
126. ld. at 430-31. A more benign reading of Justice Harlan's majority opinion would emphasize as the 
decisive factor the absence of a clear international law standard for expropriation and compensation. Had there 
been a "greater ... degree of codification or consensus concerning [this] particular area of international law," id. 
at 428, the Court could have and would have applied international law. In fact, the Court cautioned that its 
decision should not prohibit U.S. courts from determining international law issues ''which do not represent a 
battleground for conflicting ideologies." ld. at 430 n.34. Under that hypothetical scenario, the Court would have 
essentially engaged in a conflicts analysis; the Court could either recognize the foreign act of state, in essence, 
applying the foreign law, which would leave the expropriatory decree as is, or it could invoke either a public 
policy exception or an international law exception and refuse to recognize or enforce the decree. Under the facts 
of Sabbatino, however, that scenario was thwarted by the impossibility, according to the majority opinion, of 
ascertaining the international law of expropriation. 
127. !d. at432-33. 
128. See supra note 126. 
129. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 430. 
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application of international law beyond the competence of the courts."130 This idea is in 
stark contrast to the fact that historically, as Justice White observed, "[p]rinciples of 
international law have been applied in our courts to resolve controversies not merely 
because they provide a convenient rule for decision but because they represent a consensus 
among civilized nations on the proper ordering of relations between nations and the citizens 
thereof."131 
Judicial abstention because of a vague dislike of international politics is different from 
a legitimate use of the political question doctrine. "Inevitably, of course, international law 
cases will be politically charged. But as Baker v. Carr reminds us, the doctrine is 'one of 
'political questions,' not one of 'political cases,' and political heat alone does not a 
separation-of-powers violation make."132 A more narrowly tailored question would thus 
ask whether a case poses a legitimate political question, rather than assume that an act by a 
foreign state-the quintessential public international law scenario-automatically creates 
an impenetrable zone of political questions.133 Similarly, it would ask whether a particular 
case has been constitutionally committed to the political branch, as opposed to the judicial 
branch, rather than assume that any foreign policy implication triggered by an act of state 
incapacitates the judiciary from a determination of the law. 134 
Comity and executive authority have indeed been invoked by courts to abstain from 
applying public international law. But comity and executive authority have not been 
invoked as doctrinal barriers to force courts to abstain from adjudicating private 
international law. This is attributable to, as I argue, the separation of public and private 
international law and the concomitant view that private international, but not public 
international law, is amenable to judicial review. Where the essential logic of a case is 
determined by reference to "private" or market considerations, as opposed to "public" 
considerations, courts have not been so restrained. 
C. The Domestication of Private International Law 
Unlike public international law, which has become one big political question doctrine,. 
private international law has not been politicized but rather, privatized. Although a 
130. !d. at 439 (White, J., dissenting). 
131. !d. at 453 (White, J., dissenting). 
132. Koh, supra note 73, at 2386 (citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962)). Upon a detennination 
by the court that the case touches upon a political question, in other words, that "the Constitution has textually 
committed to another governmental branch the power to make the detennination now requested from a court," id. 
"the court would not 'abstain,' but rather, interpret the Constitution and find the political branch's detennination 
to be conclusive." !d. at 2386 n.200. 
The Supreme Court's decision in W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co., Inc. v. Env. Tectonics Corp., lnt'l, 493 U.S. 400 
(1990) has reduced the number of cases in which the act of state doctrine would be applicable. While the 
doctrine should no longer bar courts from deciding cases properly before them because those cases "may 
embarrass foreign governments," it still means that "in the process of deciding, the acts of foreign sovereigns 
taken within their own jurisdictions shall be deemed valid." !d. at 409-10. 
133. See Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 727 (1976) (Marshall, J., 
dissenting). "The act of state doctrine reflects the notion that the validity of an act of a foreign sovereign is, 
under some circumstances, a 'political question' not cognizable in our courts." !d. The dissenters argued that 
Cuba's "retention of and refusal to repay" the expropriated funds should therefore qualify as an act of state and 
that Sabbatino should bar review. !d. at 728-30. Under this view, the act of state doctrine would be 
indistinguishable from, and collapse into, the political question doctrine. 
134. See, e.g., Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 823 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Robb, J., 
concurring) (action by Israeli plaintiffs alleging multiple tortuous acts by the Palestine Liberation Organization 
and other defendants should be dismissed due to "the inherent inability of federal courts to deal with cases such 
as this one." (emphasis added)); Chicago & S. Air Lines Inc. v. Watennan S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948) 
(the nature of any act implicating foreign policy is "of a kind for which the Judiciary has neither aplilude, 
facilities nor responsibility .... "(emphasis added)). 
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public/private dichotomy exists between the national and the international market-so that 
the national market is generally deemed "private" if compared to the more "public" 
international market-both national and international markets as a whole are considered 
part of the private, rather than public international order. The depoliticization of market 
relations and private international law and the simultaneous extrication of the private from 
the public have created an interesting paradox. On the one hand, courts have relegated 
private international law from the public domain of international politics to the more 
sanitized private domain of international commerce. On the other hand, they have also had 
no hesitation enforcing private international transactions, precisely because private 
international law is viewed as consensus-driven, noncontentious, and hence more 
susceptible to the rule of law. 
Even as public international law constitutes "a battleground for conflicting 
ideologies,"135 private international law is considered to be remarkably uniform. 
Commenting on the multiplicity of culturally specific legal rules, for example, Professor 
Phillipp Trimble noted that "[t]here are many examples of different interpretations of 
linguistically identical treaty norms in different national courts, even in nonpoliticized 
commercia/law, which is itself well rooted in a genuinely common subculture."136 Indeed, 
some suggest that the market as a whole is even more consensus-driven than the family: 
"uniformity is easier in trade law than family law, precisely because the subculture of 
international trade is more homogeneous than the multitudinous cultures offamilies."137 
At the same time, however, the assumptions that private international law is undivided 
by politics and inhabits a nonpublic sphere have allowed courts to sidestep the politically 
charged zone of state sovereignty138 without invoking either the doctrines of comity or act 
of state. Not only is commerce deemed to be essentially apolitical, but even commerce 
undertaken by sovereign states is deemed to be similarly private and freed from the difficult 
public law issues of sovereignty. 
There are early cases, of course, that refused to uphold this private/public distinction 
and that held, for example, that the public law doctrine of sovereign immunity applied as 
much to a merchant ship owned by a foreign government as a warship owned by a foreign 
government, because commerce carried on by a state entity is as "public" a purpose as any 
other sovereign "public" acts. 139 The Supreme Court declared in Berrizi Bros. Co. v. 
Steamship Pesaro that sovereign immunity applied to "all ships held and used by a 
government for a public purpose, and that when, for the purpose of advancing the trade of 
135. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 430 n.34. 
136. Phillip Trimble, International Law, World Order, and Critical Legal Studies, 42 STAN. L. REv. 811, 
836-37 (1990) (reviewing LUNG-CHU CHEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW: A 
POLICY ORIENTED PERSPECTIVE (1989), RICHARD A. FALK, REVITALIZING INTERNATIONAL LAW (1989), and 
DAVID KENNEDY, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STRUCTURES (1987)) (emphasis added). 
137. ld. at 837-38. 
138. See supra note 114 and accompanying text. As Chief Justice Marshall declared, "[t]he jurisdiction of 
the nation within its own territory is necessarily exclusive and absolute. It is susceptible of no limitation not 
imposed by itself. Any restriction upon it, deriving validity from an external source, would imply a diminution 
of its sovereignty to the extent of the restriction .... " The Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 
116, 136 (1812); see also United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304,316-17 (1936). "Rulers 
come and go; governments end and forms of government change; but sovereignty survives. . . . Sovereignty is 
never held in suspense." !d. 
139. See Berrizi Bros. Co. v. Steamship Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562, 574 (1926). After a thorough analysis of 
Justice Marshall's decision in The Schooner Exchange, II U.S. at 116, holding that a French warship in U.S. 
waters was immune from attachment, the Berrizi Court concluded that the decision "cannot be taken as excluding 
merchant ships held and used by a government .... " Be"izi, 271 U.S. 562, 574. Sovereign immunity attached 
whether the foreign government's property was used for a military or a commercial purpose. 
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its people or providing revenue for its treasury, a government acquires, mans and operates 
ships in the carrying trade, they are public ships in the same sense that war ships are."140 
Over time, however, as more states entered the field of commerce as commercial 
actors, the reasoning in the Berizzi court became increasingly less common and the 
public/private distinction accordingly expanded. Given the surge of state actors in the 
"private" realm of international commerce, it was deemed necessary to modify certain 
"public" law doctrines, such as the doctrine of sovereign immunity, from absolute to 
restrictive immunity to limit instances in which liability can be disclaimed by the foreign 
state. Given the pre-existing dichotomy between the public and the private, Congress 
decided that "a foreign state's immunity is 'restricted' to cases based on its public acts, and 
does not extend to cases based on its commercial or private acts."141 The enactment of the 
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976142 thus represented the codification of 
commerce as private and essentially sealed the public/private distinction in international 
law. Courts are now deemed competent to judge the commercial conduct of a foreign 
sovereign for two reasons without embarrassing the executive or offending the foreign 
sovereign. First, a commercial act is now considered a private, not public, act. Second, it is 
now presumed that sovereignty is shed when a sovereign enters the market. 143 
Perhaps even more significantly, the commercial activity exception has been 
increasingly relied on by courts to insulate the market from political conflicts and to 
prevent public international law from unleashing, as the Supreme Court termed it, 
"potential injury to private businessmen-and ultimately to international trade itself."144 In 
Russian Reinsurance Co. v. Stoddard, 145 the New York Court of Appeals was faced with 
the question of how to resolve private commercial claims between a New York trustee and 
a Russian corporation whose corporate status and property had been extinguished by the 
new Soviet government, an entity unrecognized by the United States. The court's dilemma 
was thus the quintessential public/private dilemma: how to resolve a commercial private 
international law dispute that was inextricably intertwined with a foreign sovereign's 
noncommercial public act. 
To decide whether the New York trustee was legally obligated to tum trust property 
over to the Russian corporation, the court confronted the "public" international law issue of 
whether an expropriatory decree issued by a government unrecognized by the executive of 
the United States had the legal effect of dissolving the corporation and confiscating its 
property. Although public issues such as recognition were implicated, the court simply 
declared that the status of the trust property itself "does not concern our foreign relations. 
It is not a political question, but a judicial question."146 
While the Russian corporation may be deemed to continue to exist despite a decree 
issued by an unrecognized government; the corporation, according to the court, "exists here 
140. Berrizi, 271 U.S. at 573. 
141. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Hearings on H.R. 11315 Before the Subcomm. on Adm. 
Law and Gov't Relations of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 24, 26-27 (1976) (festimony of 
the Legal Adviser of the Dep't of State) (emphasis added}. 
142. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602-II (1994). 
143. A plurality of four Supreme Court Justices in Alfred Dunhi/1 of London, Inc. v. Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 
(1976}, argued that the commercial activity exception to sovereign immunity, a jurisdictional doctrine, should be 
equally applicable to a prudential doctrine such as the act of state doctrine because of the innately non-political 
nature of commerce: "more discernible rules of international law have emerged with regard to the commercial 
dealings of private parties," id. at 704, and "subjecting foreign governments to the rule of law in their 
commercial dealings presents a much smaller risk of affronting their sovereignty than would an attempt to pass 
on the legality of their governmental acts." Id. at 703-04. 
144. Id. at 703. 
145. 147 N.E. 703 (N.Y. 1925). 
146. Jd. at 705. 
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solely by force of the juridical conception which ... should not be carried beyond the limits 
of common sense and justice."147 The court refused to order the New York trustee to tum 
trust property over to a corporation whose existence has been terminated by the Soviet 
government. The Russian Reinsurance court thus went out of its way to prevent the 
political ambiguities of recognition or nonrecognition from infecting private commercial 
expectations. 
The public/private split in international law has thus created a number of interesting 
paradoxes. Once sovereignty becomes its leitmotif, public international law is deemed to 
be less about rationality and law than power and politics, provoking judicial retreat from 
the realm of State Department politics into a safer realm of comity and act of state. While 
politics dominates public international law, its counterpart, the market, dominates private 
international law and gives it the appearance of neutrality and consensus-thus, in effect, 
marginalizing it from the "politically hot'' zone of international politics. 
IV. PARADIGMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
International economic development has been profoundly influenced by the 
intersections between the national/international market dichotomy and the public/private 
international law dichotomy. While the two dominant models of economic development 
appear diametrically opposed, both inherit a set of assumptions rooted in an atavistic 
division of the international world. Although the classical liberal model and the radical 
model adopt different postures toward the international and the national market, both accept 
the imageries and the ideological rifts caused by national/international market dichotomy. 
Similarly, although both models occupy different spaces within the international order-
one occupying the space of private international law and the other the space of public 
international law-both are in fact uncritically entrenched within the public/private 
dichotomy. 
The divisions in international law are replicated in a post-war order consisting of two 
institutions, the UN and the Bretton Woods systems, both of which are divided along the 
public/private line. Therefore, the conceptual framework inherited by the two dominant 
paradigms of international economic development has been similarly fractured by the same 
public/private split. It is thus not a surprise that the classical liberal model occupies the 
private component of international law governed by Bretton Woods in general and the 
GATT in particular. With its emphasis on commercial activities, market actors, and a more 
or less nonpolitical process, the model attempts to negotiate the international/national 
market d~vide in a manner that is as nonconfrontational and apolitical as possible. By 
contrast, the radical model occupies the public component of international law governed by 
the United Nations Charter, and accordingly incorporates the national/international market 
dichotomy with the characteristically state-oriented and politically charged sensibility of 
the public international sphere. 
Equally significant, because the public international system has been characterized as 
chaotic and volatile, public international law has had to affirm sovereignty148 as an antidote 
to disorder. By contrast, the Bretton Woods system and its constituent organs of the 
GATT, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (ffiRD) were designed less to enshrine sovereignty than 
to facilitate economic liberalism and interdependence. The domestication of commerce and 
the traditional identification of private international law with the rational, ordered, and 
147. /d. at 707. 
148. See U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 1. "The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign 
equality of all its Members." /d. 
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depoliticized nature of the public/private split have meant that the goal of private 
international law is not to maintain but to surmount sovereignty in order to integrate the 
national with the international market. Hence, while the post-war public order is supposed 
to prevent the recurrence of the natural tendency toward the abnormality and disorder of 
politics, the postwar private order is supposed to manage and maintain its natural tendency 
toward the normality and order of the market.149 Toward this end, each constituent organ 
ofthe Bretton Woods system was assigned a different but interrelated task, each designed 
to maintain an equilibrium between the national and the international market. 150 
The Bretton Woods regime restricts state behaviors deemed destructive. However, 
unlike the UN regime, its governing sensibility is not state, but market-oriented. As I 
discuss below, the developmental model that has essentially adopted the Bretton Woods 
regime is the classical liberal model. It is guided by the norms of private as opposed to 
public international law described in Part II. 
A. The Classical Liberal Model of International Economic Development 
The classical liberal model is founded on premises identical to those that define the 
"commercial activity" exception in public international law. In the two core areas that 
comprise the heart of the development debate-the cause of underdevelopment and the 
conditions necessary for economic growth-the model's analysis and prescription are 
founded on an essentially "private" conception of market activities. First, the model 
assumes that economic development is synonymous with modernization, which consists of 
defmable and historically determined stages through which all countries proceed. As a 
result, development is viewed as a relatively noncontentious process. Second, while the 
model assumes that a divide exists between the national and the international market, it 
attempts to reconcile the division by resort to a "private" logic. The model begins with the 
premises of liberal development economics, 151 applies neoclassical market principles to the 
particularities of Third World underdevelopment, and utilizes the decidedly nonstate 
regime of the GATT to construct the requisite framework for economic growth. 
1. Development Economics 
According to the liberal school of development economics, the cause of 
underdevelopment lies in the isolation of developing countries from the international 
economic order. While the developed world consists of modem, industrial nations 
economically linked to one another and to the international market, the developing world 
consists of traditional, agrarian countries isolated from one another and from the 
international economic sphere. The objective of development is to transform isolation into 
integration and stimulate economic growth in the process. Through greater linkages of 
capital, technology, and production, developing countries can catapult themselves from "a 
149. See Daniel K. Tarullo, Beyond Normalcy in the Regulation of International Trade, 100 HARV. L. REV. 
546, 549 (1987). 
1 SO. The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development was charged with the financing of post-
war reconstruction and development, the IMF with supervising the free flow of capital, and the GATT with 
maintaining the free flow of goods. 
151. Development economics rejects the universalism of economics and claims that because 
"underdeveloped countries as a group are set apart, through a number of specific economic characteristics 
common to them, from the advanced industrial countries . . . , traditional economic analysis, which has 
concentrated on the industrial countries, must therefore be recast in significant respects when dealing with 
underdeveloped countries." Hirschman, supra note 6, at 192. 
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traditional, stagnant, subsistence-oriented economy into a dynamic, capitalist economy 
based on wage-labour, capable of self-sustained growth and ... rising real wages."152 
In his classic and highly influential work Economic Development with Unlimited 
Supplies of Labour, Arthur Lewis discussed the causes of and solution to 
underdevelopment within a highly private, nonpolitical framework that emphasizes market 
as opposed to state action as the solution to underdevelopment. The model's focus rests on 
factors generally considered to be quintessentially commercial in nature: distribution, 
accumulation, and growth. 153 
At the heart of Lewis' theory is his observation that subsistence economies with 
unlimited supplies of labor are characteristically low-productivity, low-income economies. 
The solution, according to Lewis, lies in the ability of such economies to produce an 
accumulation of capital and to create a capitalist class with the capacity to engage in the 
investment of capital surplus. Lewis identifies several strategic themes that continue to 
inform the development debate in general and the contours of the liberal strand of 
development economics in particular-for example, rural underemployment, mobilization 
of surplus rural labor, cap.ital accumulation, economic growth, and industrialization.154 
Lewis analyzes the traditional agricultural sector of many developing countries and 
finds as the first and foremost problem, not necessarily its low productivity, 155 but its 
unlimited supplies of labor and low subsistence wages. 156 Although surplus labor exists in 
all sectors of agrarian economies, this surplus is exceptionally large in the subsistence as 
opposed to the capitalist sector.157 Because surplus labor in the subsistence sector, in turn, 
has a depressing effect on wages in the capitalist sector, 158 the capitalist is able to take 
advantage of low wages by adding but a small margin above the minimum bottom to coax 
workers from the subsistence into the capitalist sector. 
Low wages caused by unlimited labor present the most significant obstacle to 
economic development because, according to Lewis, they impede the very process which 
stimulates economic growth-capital accumulation. Because low wages mean no savings 
and no capital accumulation, Lewis' thesis on the root cause of underdevelopment has 
provided the classical liberal model with its standard diagnosis: how to induce an increase 
in domestic savings and hence increase capital accumulation.159 
The transformation of surplus capital into investment capital constitutes an additional 
prerequisite for development. Because the majority 90% cannot save and the remaining 
10%--which include the traditional class of landlords, traders, and moneylenders-save 
152. HUNT, supra note 6, at 62. 
153. W. Arthur Lewis, Economic Development with Unlimited Supplies of Labour, in PARADIGMS IN 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, supra note 6, at 59, 60. 
154. Id. at 95-97. 
155. Lewis noted also that the subsistence sector "is not fructified by capital" and hence its output per head 
is much lower than the capitalist sector. Id. at 64. 
156. Id. at 61-62. 
157. Lewis defined the capitalist sector as "that part of the economy which uses reproducible capital, and 
pays capitalists for the use thereof." I d. at 64. 
158. "Earnings in the subsistence sector set a floor to wages in the capitalist sector .... " Id. at 67. 
159. As Lewis states: 
The central problem in the theory of economic development is to understand the process by which a 
community which was previously saving and investing 4 or 5 per cent .. of its national income or less, 
converts itself into an economy where voluntary saving is running at about 12 to 15 per cent of 
national income or more." 
ld. at72. 
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but cannot productively invest, the only class with the ability to "tempt capital into 
productive channels rather than into the building ofmonuments"160 is the capitalist class. 
The model is thus startlingly provocative at the most basic level. Economic 
development entails first and foremost the creation of an indigenous capitalist class. Once a 
capitalist base exists, under Lewis' model, closed economies typical of developing-country 
economies--characterized by a capitalist core and a large supply of labor-will reinvest a 
portion of its profits, create new capital, and expand its capital base. In other words, 
according to Lewis, poverty then is not the original cause of underdevelopment. 
Developing countries fail to save "because their capitalist sector is so small' and 'not 
because they are so poor."161 
Thus, the process of capital accumulation, which is the very engine of economic 
development, will continue as long as a capitalist nucleus exists. The capitalist will reinvest 
surplus, and the capitalist sector will expand. The capitalist sector will draw laborers from 
the subsistence into the capitalist sector until the unlimited labor supply eventually 
disappears, 162 and the subsistence sector is supplanted by a more modern, more dynamic 
capitalist sector.163 
Once the model identifies the absence of capital surplus and the absence of investment 
capability as a basic cause of underdevelopment, it is not a surprise that the model also 
prescribes the market and market activities as the predominant vehicle through which 
capital can be created and invested. Similarly, given the identification of international 
market activities with private international law, it is no surprise that the model views the 
market-based process of development as essentially uncoercive, apolitical, and, in fact, as 
Walter Rostow explains, predetermined by a historical process comprised of five stages of 
growth: first, traditional society marked by pre-modern agrarian subsistence;164 second, the 
preconditions for takeoff, which may be triggered by various encounters with external 
forces; 165 third, the takeoff, characterized by the establishment of some industry and some 
economic growth;166 fourth, the drive to maturity, marked by sustained economic 
productivity and increased integration with the international economy;167 and finally, the 
age of high mass-consumption, in which consumption patterns transcend basic subsistence 
and resources shift to meet welfare and security needs.168 While most developing nations 
are destined toward this fmal stage of growth, most developed nations are currently at or 
past this stage of economic development. The United States, Western Europe, and Japan, 
for example, experienced this particular sequence of growth in the 1950s. 169 
I60. Id. 
I61. Jd. at 75. For a discussion of the various factors which either aid or impede the forma!ion mid 
expansion of the capitalist core, see id. at 76-87. Government may expand the supply of credit to aid in the 
finance of capital formation or use tax policy to contain the rise in income and productivity in the agrarian sector 
to ensure that agricultural improvements do not result in a resurgence of the agrarian sector. See id. 
I62. See id. at 68. 
I63. A crisis may occur when the economy reaches the point where labor is no longer infinite. See /d. at 
87. A safety valve may be available if the capitalist exports capital "to countries where there is still abundant 
labour at a subsistence wage." !d. 
I64. Because "a ceiling existed on the level of attainable output per head [traditional societies] had to 
devote a very high proportion of their resources to agriculture." W.W. Rostow, The Five Stages-of-Growth-A 
Summary, in PARADIGMS IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, supra note 6, at 99, IOO. 
I65. Encounters with more advanced societies may set in motion modern economic activities such ns 
banking, investment, and manufacturing. See HUNT, supra note 6, at 99. For Western Europe, preconditions for 
takeoff occurred in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, "as the insights of modern science began to be 
translated into new production functions in both ·agriculture and industry, in a setting given dynamism by the 
lateral expansion of world markets and the international competition for them." Rostow, supra note I64, at I 0 I. 
I66. See id. at I02-03. 
I67. See id. at I03-04. 
I68. See id. at I 05. 
I69. Some form of post-high mass-consumption, termed beyond consumption, also exists. See id. 
1997] INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 237 
Like Lewis, Rostow also identifies an increase in the rate of savings-"from 5% to 
10% of the national income"170-and productive investment of surplus savings in new 
industries171 (in essence, industrialization) as some of the more significant indicators of 
economic takeoff. Capital accumulation and investment remain the basis upon which 
stages of growth could be financed. 
By presenting a theory of development as stages of growth culminating in a stage 
which most Western industrialized economies have either begun to reach, have already 
reached, or from which they are beginning to emergtl, the model equates development with 
Western modernization and Western modernization with the condition of universality. 
Additionally, the delineation of economic development as stages of growth is further 
premised on the view that development is governed by a nonpolitical logic and hence 
predetermined along a linear, if not natural, progression.172 The classical liberal model, in 
effect, tends to bypass the ideological tensions that exist between the national markets of 
developing and developed countries, on the one hand, and the national market of 
developing countries and the international market, on the other hand. 
2. The Neoclassical Market and GA TI 
The theoretical contours articulated by development economists such as Lewis, 
Rostow, and others173 who saw rural underemployment as a cause of underdevelopment and 
the takeoff174 toward industrialization as a solution, have in recent years been supplemented 
by a market-based approach. The model combines the diagnosis provided by the liberal 
strand of development economics with the market orientation of private international law. 
Although there was some question initially as to whether free market principles could be 
effectively transposed into developing-country economies, the model soon adopted as one 
of its primary objectives the creation of an efficient market for the purpose of achieving the 
objectives identified by economists such as Lewis and Rostow. Consequently, the classical 
liberal model typically urges the following: first, minimal state intervention in national 
markets; and second, reliance on the law of comparative advantage to negotiate the 
national/international market divide. 
Although some scholars initially raised questions regarding the effectiveness of the 
market in developing countries entrenched in traditionally "backward" institutions not 
prone to economically rational behaviors, development economists now believe that 
producers in developing countries will act as rationally as their counterparts in developed 
countries to maximize profits and accumulate savings.175 Thus, even "people in 
, underdeveloped countries are generally well aware of such alternatives as are open to them 
170. /d. at 102. Besides capital surplus, growth can also be induced by nurturing a leading or primary 
sector of the economy. Examples ofleading sectors and their contributions to economic development include the 
textile industry in Britain, the railway industry in the United States, and the timber industry in Sweden. See 
HUNT, supra note 6, at 99. 
171. See Rostow, supra note 164, at 103. 
172. Rostow's "laws of motion" is eerily similar to Karl Marx's prediction that the "industrially most 
developed country does nothing but hold up to those who follow it on the industrial ladder, the image of its own 
future •... " Hirschman, supra note 6, at 194. Thus, Marx extolled British colonialism in India because he 
hoped the shock effects would propel India from backwardness toward a similar progression of economic growth: 
modernity and industrialization. · 
173. For a discussion of subsequent refinements of Lewis' and Rostow's theses, see HUNT, supra note 6, at 
101-12. 
174. Development economics has emphasized the "deliberate, intensive, guided effort" required to achieve 
the "big push," "takeoff," "great spurt," "minimum critical effort," or "backward and forward linkages." See 
Hirschman, supra note 6, at 198. 
175. See HUNT, supra note 6, at297. 
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as sellers or buyers" and as a result, "many are prepared to take a long view and to 
postpone consumption for several years if the prizes are considered satisfactory."176 Recent 
studies have in fact found that economic activities in "un-marketlike" informal economies 
are among the most entrepreneurial and dynamic of all economic activities in developing 
nations.177 
As a result, one of the objectives of the model is to put in place the apparatus 
necessary to allow the market in developing countries, like the market in developed 
countries, to function efficiently with minimal state intervention. Additionally, to the 
extent that the national market is to be integrated with the international market, the GA TI 
provides the model with an established framework for the regulation of 
national/international market trade. Thus, contracting states, for example, are supposed to 
ensure that their tariff structures are not distorted by rates "diverging wildly and apparently 
irrationally between products,"178 and that more intrusive forms of national market 
protection, such as quotas and other nontariff barriers, be eliminated to the greatest extent 
possible. The objective is to secure "an efficient deployment of available resources"179 in 
order to achieve the goals of development through the establishment of a balanced national 
and international economic regime. 
The state orientation of the UN and the rules of public international law thus have had 
a relatively minimal impact on the model. The impact is minimal precisely because the 
model essentially incorporates the norms of private international law and the assumptions 
of normality that defme both the liberal strand of development economics and the liberal 
orientation of the GATI. These assumptions are the following: ftrst, there is a normal 
progression of growth consisting of relatively well defmed stages aimed at transforming 
subsistence economies into advanced, capitalist, industrial societies; and second, there is a 
normal balance to be struck between and maintained by the national and the international 
markets. 
The model is quintessentially "private" in both its diagnosis of the causes of and 
solutions to underdevelopment. The focus on generating the right conditions for capital 
formation to catapult developing economies from one stage of growth to the next-by 
using the nonstate, market-oriented sensibility of the Bretton Woods, as opposed to the UN 
regime-places it within the very center of activities governed by private international law. 
B. The Counterreaction: The Radical Model of Development 
In response to liberal assertions of neutrality, normalcy, nonintervention, and 
integration, the radical model lays claim to the exact opposite sensibility: politicization, 
intervention, and extrication of the national from the international market. Because the 
structuralist and the dependency schools, which are both associated with the radical model, 
adopt the language of public international law, they embrace a notion of development that 
promotes ftrst and foremost economic nationalism and economic sovereignty. 
Furthermore, because the model identifies the systemic and highly politicized tensions of 
176. ld. (quoting PETER T. BAUER & BASIL S. Y AMEY, THE ECONOMICS OF UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES, 
97, 159 (1957)). 
177. Hernando deSoto studied the informal economy in Peru and found that whereas the formal economy 
is marred by a government bureaucracy which favors the elites and hampers the growth of entrepreneurial 
activities, the informal economy is characterized by informal trades remarkable for their high degree of 
ingenuity. See generally HERNANDO DE Soro, THE OTHER PATH (1989). Instead of seeing the informal sector as 
a problem to be suppressed, De Soto sees that "the problem itself offers the solution-to use the energy inherent 
in the phenomenon to create wealth and a different order." ld. at 239. 
178. HUNT, supra note 6, at 304-05. 
179. Id. at296 (quotingBAUER,supranote 176, at 154). 
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the international market as barriers to economic development, the model is fiercely 
dedicated to the construct of an autonomous national market and fiercely hostile to what it 
considers to be the zero-sum nature of international commerce. Meanwhile, to the extent 
that the radical model attempts to alter the rules governing the relationship between the 
national and the international markets, the international regime it relies upon is not the 
private international law regime of the Bretton Woods; rather, it is the public international 
law regime of the UN. 
1. The Structuralist Orientation 
Associated with the developmental strategies of Latin America, the structuralists 
perceive the neoclassical tradition of a noninterventionist free market as inapplicable to the 
economic conditions facing developing countries in general and Latin American countries 
in particular. Instead of emphasizing capital accumulation, surplus, and investment, the 
structuralists emphasize the politics of structural inequality that permeates the international 
economic system. 
A study conducted by Raoul Prebisch, who questioned comparative advantage as an 
effective development strategy, found that the terms of trade for Latin America declined the 
more Latin America traded its primary· commodity exports for Europe's manufactured 
imports.180 According to Prebisch, the reasons behind such export-earning declines were 
purely structural. International demand for agricultural commodities tends to fluctuate in 
wild swings and, because Latin American countries exported goods in which they had a 
comparative advantage (agricultural goods), their economy fluctuated whenever 
agricultural commodity prices fluctuated in the international market. 
Other factors cast similar doubt on the liberal theory of comparative advantage. 
Prebisch found that despite an overall increase in manufactures produced by manufacturing 
countries, a concomitant decline in the price Latin America paid for manufacturing goods 
did not occur. There was no decline because productivity increases were internally 
absorbed by the more powerful manufacturing countries to create higher wages and profits 
for their own nationals. Higher wages then prevented lower prices for Latin American 
importers. 181 To make matters worse, while the prices of manufactured imports rose, 
earnings from exports of agricultural products declined.182 Additionally, primary 
commodities tend to be faced with low-income elasticities of demand while manufactured 
products tend to enjoy high-income elasticities of demand.183 According to Prebisch, such 
180. The 1949 study, entitled "The Economic Development of Latin America and Its Principal Problems," 
was prepared for the Economic Commission for Latin America, an organization founded in 1948. See HUNT, 
supra note 6, at 130. 
The structuralist school has been promoted by a number of theorists. See, e.g., CELSO FURTADO, 
DEVELOPMENT AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT (Ricardo W. de Aguiar & Eric Charles Drysdale trans. 1964); HANS 
\V. SINGER & JAVED A. ANSARI, RICH AND POOR COUNTRIES (4th ed. 1988). 
181. See HUNT, supra note 6, at 131. 
182. See id. at 130. Because of the lack of technological progress in developing nations, there was little 
increase in productivity. Hence, one should have seen no significant decrease in the price of primary products. 
Nonetheless, declines in the terms of trade meant that developing countries had to export more and more primary 
commodities to earn more and more foreign exchange needed to purchase the same amount of manufactured 
goods. See WALTERS & BLAKE, supra note 9, at 45. 
For a critique of Prebisch's theory, see David Osterfe1d, The Liberating Potential of Multinational 
Corporations, in PERPETUATING POVERTY284-93 (Doug Bandow & Ian Vasquezeds., 1994). 
183. Low income elasticity of demand for most primary commodities means that 
the percentage increase in quantity demanded will rise by less than the percentage increase in 
national income. On the other hand, for fuels, certain raw materials, and manufactured goods, the 
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structural inequities, resulting from the very nature of primary commodity production and 
manufactured goods production, call into question the universality of the law of 
comparative advantage.184 
As a result of Prebisch's conclusions, a number of development strategies were 
pursued, each based on a ~eliberate separation of the national from the international market. 
Instead of aligning their national economies in accordance with their comparative 
advantages to accommodate the needs of the international market, developing countries 
decided to shift from outward strategies relying on exports to inward strategies relying on 
import substitutes. At the same time, given the declining terms of trade in primary product 
exports, countries shifted from producing raw commodities to producing manufactured 
goods. Industrialization would be pursued in order to move beyond commodity production, 
although not by export promotion, but by import substitution. 
Thus, although the structUralist school, like the liberal school, favors transforming 
subsistence agrarian economies into industrial ones, the structuralist strategy was decidedly 
different. The structuralist strategy advocated insulation from, rather than integration with, 
the international economy. Import substitution, however, also involved the deliberate 
development of certain domestic industries regardless of whether a comparative advantage 
existed or whether the industry could be efficiently established and managed. Thus, 
import-substitution industrialization tends to be marked by a highly protectionist posture 
involving high tariffs, quotas, extensive licensing requirements, as well as some form ·of 
state subsidization of and financing for state-planned investments. 185 In addition, besides 
the normative preference in favor of a state-oriented economic framework, given the 
general dearth of private domestic capital in most developing countries, the model places its 
emphasis on state actors. 
A major paradox, however, existed for the structuralists. Import-substitution 
industrialization "is itself heavily import-dependent. Increased self-sufficiency in the long 
term requires, as a precondition, increased imports and, hence, increased access to foreign 
exchange."186 Import substitution required active state involvement in the economy as well 
as heavy mobilization of capital resources, primarily debt, to finance the new industrial 
infrastructure. 187 
Import-substitution industrialization had several ramifications. In the absence of 
either private or state capital reserves, state-led development meant a "borrowing-for-
growth"18s strategy that culminated in the Latin American debt crisis of the 1980s. As a 
result, a strategy designed to lessen the dependence of the national economy exacerbated 
national dependence on the international market. The model in effect deepened the 
national/international market divide to the detriment of the national market it was supposed 
to protect. 
income elasticity is relatively high . . . . Consequently, when incomes rise in rich countries their 
demand for food, food products, and raw materials from the Third World nations goes up relatively 
slowly whereas their demand for manufactures, the production of which is dominated by the 
developed countries, goes up very rapidly. 
Enrique R. Carrasco, Law, Hierarchy, and Vulnerable Groups in Latin America: Towards a Communal Model of 
Development in a Neoliberal World, 30 STAN. J. INT'L L. 221, 232 (quoting MICHAEL P. TODARO, ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT IN THE THIRD WORLD 375 (4th ed. 1989)). 
184. See HUNT, supra note 6, at 132-33. 
185. See Carrasco, supra note 183, at 229. 
186. HUNT, supra note 6, at 133. 
187. See Carrasco, supra note 183, at 234. 
188. Id. at 244 (quoting RIORDAN ROETT, BRAZIL: POLITICS IN A PATRIMONIAL SOCIETY 166 (4th cd. 
1992)). 
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Second, active state involvement in industrialization and foreign investment meant 
increased potential for the politicization of conflicts with multinationals. Consequently, 
economic development began to look more like international politics, and both national and 
international markets became a battleground for Third World assertion of sovereignty. 
Developing country governments began issuing regulations designed to control 
multinationals. Governments mandated joint ventures with foreign minority ownership, 
prohibited excessive repatriation of profits, required certain levels of technology transfers, 
or permitted nationalizations of foreign-dominated industries.189 A number of states 
additionally claimed that concession agreements between a foreign investor and a state with 
long-term stabilization clauses should be removed from the private international law realm 
and placed into the public international law realm. In a public international law realm, a 
host of "public" international law principles such as the principle of permanent state 
sovereignty over natural resources190 would permit state nullification of the contract term. 
Although the structuralists embraced a state-oriented sensibility that promotes home 
market nationalism and sovereignty, the structuralist school was ultimately oriented toward 
adaptation, not total rejection, of the international market. Prebisch himself had been 
trained as a neoclassical economist, and the structuralists did not downplay the importance 
of international economic relations as a long-term development strategy. Thus, 
structuralists were interested in national autonomy and insulation of the national frbm the 
international market primarily as a temporary measure. 
2. The Neo-Marxist Dependency Orientation 
In stark contrast to both the classical liberal model and the structuralists, the 
dependency school completely rejects a positive-sum view of international economic 
relations. Because the private international order is as politicized and coercive as the public 
international order, long-term insulation of the national market from the politics of the 
international market is deemed preferable to international economic integration. Moreover, 
due to the overwhelming political and economic force that exists in the international order 
in general and in the developed world in particular, the dependency school also assumes 
that the only force that could potentially act as a countervailing presence is the force of an 
intensely nationalist, state-dominated, and state-fmanced economic regime. 
Under this logic, the causes of and solutions to underdevelopment are both politically 
rooted and historically discrete. "Underdevelopment is not a phase through which every 
·growing economy passes, but a specific historical condition."191 According to dependency 
theorists, European capital accumulation (credited with creating the preconditions for 
economic development and industrialization in Europe) is not an apolitical "process of 
capital accumulation" but rather, "plunder thinly veiled as trade"192 in which "the treasures 
captured outside Europe by undisguised looting, enslavement and murder flowed back to 
the mother-country and transformed themselves into capital."193 
While Europe went through the cycle of capital accumulation and the necessary 
progressions of economic growth, the now developing nations went through a reverse 
process of deliberate underdevelopment. According to Paul Baran, a neo-Marxist theorist, 
189. See id. at 235. 
190. See G.A. Res. 1803, U.N. GAOR, 18th Sess., Supp. No. 17, at 15, 15, U.N. Doc. A/5217 (1963). 
191. HUNT, supra note 6, at 123. 
192. Paul Baran, On the Roots of Backwardness, in PARADIGMS IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, supra note 6, 
at 131. 
193. /d. (quoting KARL MARx, CAPITAL 826 {Kerr ed.)). 
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only the violent destruction of traditional economies waged by European colonialists as 
they hurried to accumulate capital matched the massive transfusion of capital into Europe. 
As Baran notes, "[b]y breaking up the age-old patterns of their agricultural economy, and 
by forcing shifts to the production of exportable crops, Western capitalism destroyed the 
self-sufficiency of their rural society that formed the basis of the pre-capitalist order in all 
countries of its penetration, and rapidly widened and deepened the scope of commodity 
circulation."194 In other words, the economies of the colonized were deliberately 
underdeveloped in order to benefit the economies of the colonizers.195 
Besides viewing underdevelopment as historically unique, rather than simply another 
sequence in an apolitical and predetermined sequence of growth, dependency theorists also 
view colonialism as being a similarly unique and "specific mode of production, neither 
feudal nor capitalist though 'resembling' both at different levels."196 Unlike Marx, who 
predicted that colonial penetration would break up traditional feudalistic structures, 
unleash the productive forces of capitalism, and lay the foundation for capitalist 
development, 197 dependency theorists generally consider colonialism to be a particularly 
negative mode of production. According to dependency theorists, colonialism failed to 
create the preconditions for true capitalism and instead "transmitted to the colonies the 
pressures of the accumulation process ... without unleashing any corresponding expansion 
in the forces of production."198 As a result, colonialism became a vehicle for "thwarted 
industrialisation," in which nonproductive modes of investment, such as money lending and 
trade, along with foreign industries, were nurtured and favored. 199 
For dependency theorists, the colonial mode of production produced "a backward 
dependent capitalism whose own horizon of reproduction is infmitely more restricted than 
that which faced the nascent bourgeoisie of Europe."200 Even though low per capita 
income and low savings in developing nations are significant barriers to economic growth, 
dependency theorists see the objective condition of dependency-dependent capitalism-as 
a more primary cause of underdevelopment. For Baran, for example, low savings can be 
traced not simply to poverty, but to the neo-colonial mode of production reproduced in 
developing country economies even after independence. This mode of production includes 
the establishment of an indigenous but dependent capitalist class which squanders surplus 
capital for nonproductive uses?01 
While liberal development economists such as Lewis saw the establishment of an 
indigenous capitalist as the key to economic development, dependency theorists view this 
capitalist core as antithetical to development because it is highly dependent on and tightly 
controlled by the international market. According to Andre Gunder Frank, a well-known 
dependency theorist, dependent capitalism is characterized by an ongoing and continuing 
194. ld. at 131-32. 
195. To protect and develop England's nascent textile industry, Indian silk and cotton products were not 
allowed to enter England unless subjected to prohibitive tariffs. To underdeveloped Indian manufacturers, 
English goods were allowed to enter India either duty free or upon the payment of a nominal tariff. See id. at 
134. 
196. Jairus Banaji, For a Theory of Colonial Modes of Production, in PARADIGMS IN ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT, supra note 6, at 179-80. 
197. See S. Amin, The Origin and Development of Underdevelopment, in PARADIGMS IN ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT, supra note 6, at 162; see also Banaji, supra note 196, at 186. 
198. Banaji, supra note 196, at 183. 
199. See id. at 185. 
200. !d. at 187. Neo-Marxist characterization of capitalist development in developing nations as backward 
and incapable of productive growth has been critiqued by more orthodox Marxists. See generally BILL WARREN, 
IMPERIALISM: PIONEER OF CAPITALISM (1980). Warren sought to revive Marx's thesis that in spite of its 
destructiveness, colonial capitalism would set in motion the preconditions for capitalist grovlth and in the 
process, set the stage necessary for socialism. 
201. See HUNT, supra note 6, at 166. 
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process of extraction, whereby the indigenous capitalist class actively and continually 
transfers surplus capital to the core of world capitalism.202 
The only way out of dependency is complete severance of developing country 
markets from an international market dominated by developed nations?03 Instead of 
integration with the international market in order to effectuate a transfer of capital, 
resources, and technology from the developed core to the underdeveloped periphery, 
dependency theorists argue that "in the underdeveloped countries economic development 
can now occur only independently of most of these relations of diffusion."204 
Thus, while dependency theorists embrace structuralist skepticism of the classical 
liberal model, their understanding of the historical as well as current causes of 
underdevelopment has meant that complete de-linkage from the international market 
constitutes the only effective exit from perpetual dependency. But at the same time, both 
schools-structuralist and dependency-are united in their determination that the rules of 
international economic relations should be shifted from the Bretton Woods system, 
dominated by the developed world, to the UN regime which is more sympathetic to the 
needs and concerns of the newly independent states. To that extent, the radical model has 
attempted to transform the very terms of the economic development debate-from private 
to public international law and from the market orientation of GATT to the state orientation 
of the ON and to various UN constituents such as the United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development (UNCTAD)?05 
3. The United Nations and UNCTAD 
Because the radical model assumes that the state is the only entity capable of 
protecting the home market from a hostile international market, the state occupies a central 
position and is accordingly charged with the task of transforming the national economy 
from a dependent, subsistence economy into an autonomous industrialized one. As I 
previously discussed, as economic development became synonymous with state plans and 
state directives, it began to take on the characteristics of "acts of state"-public commands 
issued by a foreign sovereign-and thus the sensibility of public as opposed to private 
international law. 
To the extent that this state-centered orientation is projected from the national to the 
international level, it has similarly induced a paradigmatic shift-from the apolitical 
market-based norms of private international law to the more politicized state-based norms 
of public international law. Thus, UNCTAD, founded in 1964 as a conceptual alternative 
to GATT, functioned as the "international sovereign" or the international counterpart to the 
"national sovereign" that dominates the domestic economic plane. 
Through UNCTAD, a group of approximately 120 developing nations endeavored to 
alter the terms of the development debate by proposing an agenda of positive rights and 
202. See id. at 65. 
203. Hence the following observation: "[M]anufacturing within colonies developed most rapidly only in 
periods of world capitalist crisis, when the bonds tying the colonial nations to imperialism were temporarily 
relaxed. As long as these bonds remained firm, due partly to their reinforcement by the colonial modes of 
production, the accumulation process suffered a permanent blockage .... " Banaji, supra note 196, at 185. 
204. Andre Gunder Frank, The Development of Underdevelopment, in PARADIGMS IN ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT, supra note 6, at 150. Frank claimed that Latin America experienced its greatest levels of growth 
when it was most isolated from the metropolis-during the Napoleonic Wars, World War I, the Depression of the 
1930s, and World Warn. See id. at 154-55. 
205. For a discussion of UNCTAD, see Robert E. Hudec, GATT and the Developing Countries, 1992 
COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 67 (1992). 
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obligations designed to alter structural barriers to development. With the support of the UN 
General Assembly/06 UNCTAD was able to utilize its authority as a UN organ to undertake 
a number of affirmative structural reforms that would not have been permissible under the 
more noninterventionist norms of GA IT?01 
Because export earnings constitute the primary source (75%) of foreign exchange for 
developing countries,208 improvement of the terms of international trade became a 
prominent issue within UNCTAD. To that extent, UNCTAD played a major role in 
highlighting the structural barriers faced by developing countries. For example, GAIT's 
inequitable tariff structure has reduced the average level of tariffs on manufactured 
products to less than 5%, while leaving intact the high tariff levels imposed on agricultural 
commodities primarily exported by developing countries?09 
At UNCTAD's urging, a new Part IV entitled "Trade and Development" was added to 
GAIT in 1965210 to address the development-specific needs of developing nations. 
GAIT's adoption of a Generalized System of Preferences (GSP),211 for instance, gave 
developed countries discretionary authority to grant duty-free treatment to developing 
country exports without requiring the latter to grant reciprocal concessions "inconsistent 
with their individual development, financial and trade needs, taking into consideration past 
trade developments."212 
However, more sweeping calls for a new international economic order (NIEOi 13 did 
not succeed to the extent that they represented a radical and complete departure from 
GAIT's norms of liberal trade. Aimed at removing politically rooted barriers that have 
worked to the disadvantage of developing nations, the NIEO issued a number of demands 
designed to redistribute global resources through state, as opposed to market mechanisms. 
206. U.N. CHARTER art. 9, para. I. "The General Assembly shall consist of all the Members of the United 
Nations." !d. Because developing countries constitute a numerical majority, they constitute a numerical 
majority in the General Assembly. 
207. As Raul Prebisch remarked, the GATT 
does not reflect a positive conception of economic policy . . . . On the contrary, it seems to be 
inspired by a conception of policy which implies that the expansion oftrade to the mutual advantage 
of all merely requires the removal ofthe obstacles which impede the free play of these forces in the 
world economy. These rules and principles are also based on an abstract notion of economic 
homogeneity which conceals the great structural differences between industrial centres (sic) and 
peripheral countries with all their important implications. 
UNITED NATIONS ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL, TOWARD A NEW TRADE POLICY FOR DEVELOPMENT: 
REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, at 
6, U.N. Doc. E/Conf. 46/3 (1994) (Raul Prebisch, Secretary-General of the United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development). 
208. See WALTERS & BLAKE, supra note 9, at 40. 
209. See id. Tariff levels imposed on such products are two to four times the 5% average for manufactured 
goods typically exported by developed nations. /d. 
210. Protocol Amending the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade to Introduce a Part IV on Trade and 
Development, Feb. 8, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1977, 572 U.N.T.S. 320. 
211. See Generalized System of Preferences, June 25, 1971, GATT B.I.S.D. (18th Supp.) at 25 (1972) 
(temporary waiver), clarified in Differential and More Favourable Treatment Reciprocity and Fuller Participation 
of Developing Countries, Nov. 28, 1979, GATT B.I.S.D. (26th Supp.) at 203 (1980) (GATT Decision). 
212. PATRICK LOW, TRADING FREE: THE GATT AND US TRADE POLICY 181 (1993) (citing art. XXXVI, 
para. 8). However, a number of factors might have diluted GSP benefits. First, the authority to grant GSP 
benefits resides in the developed nations themselves, is not legally binding, and has become increasingly 
politically motivated. See Gregory 0. Lunt, Graduation and the GAIT: The Problem of the NICs, 31 COLUM. J. 
TRANSNAT'L L. 611 (1994). Second, maximum quotas have been imposed on developing-country imports that 
can enter under the GSP program. And third, certain products, for example, textiles and others in which 
developing countries have a comparative advantage, have been exempted from GSP treatment. 
213. See Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, G.A. Res. 3201, 6th 
Spec. Sess., Supp No. 1 at 3, U.N. Doc. A/9559 (1974). 
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The NIEO, for example, called for an absolute increase in developing countries' share of 
the world's industrial output to 25% by the year 2000;214 greater access to IMF and 
commercial loans, with more liberal repayment terms and less conditionality; more 
technology at less than market cost; and greater international regulation of multinational 
corporations. 
The attempt by developing countries to shift the economic development debate from 
the GATT to the UN system represents an effort to exercise greater influence over 
international economic matters in a forum more accommodating to their numerical 
advantage.215 It also represents an attempt to transform the terms of the debate away from 
the apolitical sphere of private international law to the more political sphere of public 
international law. The politicization of economic conflicts represents an attempt by the 
radical model to utilize the political and economic power of the state as a sword against the 
international market, by catapulting the discourse from the "idyllic" world of private 
international law to the ideologically messy world of public international law described by 
Justice Harlan in Sabbatino.216 The radical model thus represents a complete rejection of 
the liberal model's premise that economic development could be achieved by maintaining a 
proper balance between the national and the international market. 
V. FOUNDATIONS FOR A NEW MODEL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT 
As I discussed, the public/private dichotomy has profoundly influenced the manner in 
which both development models view the relationship between the national and the 
international market. This public/private fault line has endured and, in many respects, 
impoverished the normative framework that guides the interaction between the national and 
international markets and hence the conduct and management of international economic 
development itself. In other words, both models take for granted the nationaVinternational 
market dichotomy and simply negotiate the divide according to either a "public" or a 
"private" sensibility without much cross-pollination of norms. 
Ironically, the reconfiguration of the international order has not had any significant 
impact on the terms of the development debate or the way in which either model views the 
interaction between the international and the national market. Nor has it led to any 
meaningful reassessment of the two dominant paradigms of economic development. 
In this section, I revisit both the nationaVinternational market dichotomy and the 
public/private international law dichotomy incorporated by both models of development to 
explain why both have been unsatisfactory from a normative standpoint and why both have 
214. Developing countries accounted for only 9% of the world's industrial output in 1979. See WALTERS & 
BLAKE, supra note 9, at 218. 
215. By contrast, decision-making in the IBRD and the IMF, for example, is heavily influenced by a system 
of weighted voting formula which in effect grants greater authority to economically stronger states, since a 
member's voting power corresponds proportionately to its financial contribution. See Stephen Zamora, Voting in 
· International Economic Organizations, 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 566, 577 (1980). 
Similarly, although the GATT's requirement of a two-thirds majority for any amendment or addition 
appears to benefit developing nations to the extent that they could withhold their assent, this has been eroded as 
developed nations increasingly relied on side codes to resolve their own trading concerns. See ROBERT E. 
HUDEC, DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THE GATT LEGAL SYSTEM 81-90 {1987). The implementation of side codes 
and "conditional MFN" meant that adherence to a particular code was not only optional, it was also applicable 
only to code signatories, not non-code-signatory GATT members. For instance, the separate Tokyo Round side 
code to cover dumping, subsidies, and countervailing duties resulted in the codification of developed country 
trading norms outside the conventional GATT framework, without having to address the needs or objections of 
developing countries. See Low, supra note 212, at 159. 
216. See supra notes 124-31 and accompanying text. 
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failed in their understanding of the international order. In Part A, I examine the global 
transformation of national production and the diffusion of control from national economies 
to more globalized structures and explore why such transformations should alter our 
conception of the dichotomy between the national and the international market. In Part B, I 
examine the public/private international law dichotomy and explore why this dichotomy 
has impeded the development of a more integrated approach to international economic 
development. 
A. The Decline of Nation-State Hegemony and the National/International Market 
Dichotomy 
Recent transformations should call into question any discourse on economic 
development that uses the state as its foundation for distinguishing the national from the 
international.217 Despite protests to the contrary,218 the state-based system has constituted 
the ontological foundation for international law. Since the Treaty of Westphalia of 1648, 
the state has displaced the supremacy of the church and asserted itself as the absolute 
authority within its territorial boundaries.219 
The crisscrossing of transnational economic forces, however, has radically altered the 
relationship between the national and the international market and transformed the 
traditional statist order into a "multi-centric world composed of diverse 'sovereignty-free' 
collectivities ... apart from and in competition with the state-centric world of 'sovereignty-
bound' actors."220 International economics has become less influenced by territorial 
tendencies than by globalizing tendencies. "While the former is discernible in activities 
intended to upgrade the state and other organizations which promote the well-being of a 
territorially proscribed area, the latter is manifest in a large array of activities that extend 
across territorial jurisdictions in response to the world's greater interdependence."221 
In recent years, "almost every factor of production-money, technology, factories, 
and equipment-moves effortlessly across borders .... "222 Hence, the prediction is made 
that "[t]here will be no national products or technologies, no national corporations, no 
national industries. There will no longer be national economies, at least as we have come 
to understand that concept."223 Consequently, neither the classical liberal model of 
development nor the radical model, both of which are premised on some dichotomy 
between the national and the international market, is fully equipped to accommodate the 
globalization of international economics. The radical model, which is dedicated to the 
insulation of national sovereignty from the intrusions of the international market, is based 
217. My analysis in this section is not applicable to the "security structure," which Susan Strange defines as 
"the framework of power created by the provision of security by some human beings for others." SUSAN 
STRANGE, STATES AND MARKETS 45 (2d. ed. 1994). Given the continued need for a "security structure,'' the 
state is still considered the entity most suited to protect citizens within its borders from external threats posed by 
other states in an international system. 
218. See, e.g., Fernando R. Teson, The Kantian Theory of International Law, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 53 
(1992). 
219. See Mark W. Zacher, The Decaying Pillars of the Westphalian Temple: Implications for International 
Order and Governance, in GOVERNANCE WITHOUT GOVERNMENT: ORDER AND CHANGE IN WORLD POLITICS 59 
(James N. Rosenau & Ernst-Otto Czempiel eds. 1992) [hereinafter GOVERNANCE WITHOUT GOVERNMENT]. The 
decline of the state system has been marked by a concurrent erosion of several factors underlying the system: 
high toleration for wars, insignificant contacts among states, limited extraterritorial damage due to extraterritorial 
contacts, authoritarian governments, and a high degree of heterogeneity among states. 
220. James N. Rosenau, Citizenship in a Changing Global Order, in GOVERNANCE WITHOUT 
GOVERNMENT, supra note 219, at 282. 
221. /d. at 281. 
222. REICH, supra note 13, at 8. 
223. /d. at 3. 
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on a territorial logic that is clearly antithetical to the emerging global logic. Nonetheless, 
even the classical liberal model that incorporates liberal trade norms of the GA TI fails to 
keep up with the global norms that defme the "increasingly borderless economy."224 
In recent years, "the development of a global production system, gradually taking 
over and supplanting separate national production structures"225 has transformed home 
corporations into global corporations that produce for and invest in both the home and the 
global markets.226 Development strategies espoused by both the classical liberal model and 
the radical model are aimed in varying degrees at improving the competitiveness of 
national industries. This aim is based on the deeply ingrained "notion that products have 
national origins"227 and that corporations have territorially based nationalities tied to the 
territorial boundaries of the home market. These models no longer reflect the global 
reality. 
Globalization of production, or "world-wide sourcing,"228 has had several 
decentralizing effects on the international economic regime. First, increased mobility of 
productive capacities cross-border meant that the economic order had become more 
globally based. As the state loses its ability to control the movement of national actors both 
inside and outside its territory, sovereignty-the classic construct of public international 
law-is becoming increasingly obsolete.229 Foreign markets once served by exports from 
the United States or from another developed nations are increasingly served by a locally 
based corporation that is a foreign subsidiary of a parent corporation headquartered 
elsewhere. Other countries confront the same global reality. Asea Brown Boveri, Inc., the 
electrical engineering company (owned jointly by a Swedish and a Swiss entity) considers 
itself "as a company without any regard to national boundaries"230 and thus equally 
committed to its global web of operations worldwide. Even among Japanese corporations, 
which historically have tended to be more territorially tied to the Japanese economy than 
U.S. or European corporations/31 the realities of the global economy have meant an 
increasing erosion between Japanese corporations and the Japanese economy. Increasingly, 
even Toyota Motor Corporation and Sony are waving the global flag, moving operations 
224. KEN! CHI OHMAE, THE END OF TIIE NATION STATE: THE RISE OF REGIONAL ECONOMIES 8 {1995). 
225. STRANGE, supra note 217, at 73. 
226. See id. A number of theories have been developed to explain transnational production. According to 
the "product cycle" theory, although a company's monopoly over a new product allows it to extract a rent, this 
ability is lost once competition in the home market increases, forcing the company to export the product abroad, 
then produce the product abroad in order to extract a rent with each new cycle. See id. at 77. Other theories 
focus on preferences granted by most countries to locally produced products over imports, thus encouraging 
producers to adopt a global production strategy. See id. at 78. Increased competition has also been cited as one 
factor for the globalization of production. Investment in the home country of one's competitor may cause the 
competitor to retract inward to defend its home market rather than expand outward into international markets. 
See WALTERS & BLAKE, supra note 9, at 115. 
227. REICH, supra note 13, at 118. 
228. STRANGE, supra note 217, at 82. 
229. Although my discussion is focused on globalization ofthe production structure, globalization of other 
structures, for instance, the financial and information structures, has contributed equally to the erosion of state 
sovereignty and the state's ability to control activities within its territory. Capital markets are not only mobile 
but intensely intertwined with other capital markets. See OHMAE, supra note 224, at 2. Indeed, the foreign 
exchange market in one day alone has been estimated to be worth approximately $600 billion. See Zacher, supra 
note 219, at 85. 
Similarly, technical innovations as well as the development of advanced modes of electronic 
communication have led to the unification of national markets into an instantaneously accessible global market 
unconstrained by the limits of national geography. See STRANGE, supra note 217, at 131. No longer can the 
state exercise authority over the type of information that can or cannot be allowed to cross its territorial 
boundaries. 
230. Charlene Marmer Solomon, Transplanting Corporate Cultures Globally, PERSONNEL J., October 
1993, at 78, 80 (statement by Richard P. Randazzo, ABB's vice-president of Human Resources). 
231. See Brenton R. Schlender, Japan Hits the Wall, FORTUNE, Nov. 1, 1993, at 128. 
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and jobs out of Japan. Toray, Japan's largest synthetic fiber manufacturer, has adopted the 
label "Made in Toray" to suggest the multinational nature of its product.232 
Globalization has had an impact on the economies of developed nations as well. The 
corollary to the export of American jobs abroad of course, is the export of foreign jobs into 
the United States, although this phenomenon has not been as widely noted. For example, 
while General Motors and Chrysler laid off 18,063 U.S. autoworkers between 1987 and 
1990, Japanese car manufacturers with plants in the United States hired 11,050 American 
workers.233 By 1990, Sony, for example, exported its various products from its plants in 
Dotham, Alabama and Fort Lauderdale, Florida; Sharp exported approximately 100,000 
microwave ovens annually from Memphis, Tennessee; Toshiba America exported 
television sets to Japan from Wayne, New Jersey; while Matsushita exported cathode-ray 
tubes from Ohio.234 By 1990, 25% of all products officially considered exports from the 
United States came from "foreign" corporations.235 
Outsourcing236 and the globalization of production have meant that traditional 
distinctions used to distinguish the national market from the international market are no 
longer accurate. Increased mobility of productive capacities has meant that the very 
concept of nationality itself, the very foundational division used to distinguish the national 
from the international sphere, is becoming increasingly meaningless. A product can no 
longer be unambiguously categorized as the product of a particular state because of the 
simple fact that its component parts are likely to be internationally sourced and produced. 
For example, the vice president of Caterpillar Tractor Corporation, as early as the 1970s 
described Caterpillar as a global corporation with a global orientation, owned by 
approximately 48,000 shareholders, with stocks traded on all major stock exchanges of the 
world, and employing 65,000 employees, 22% of whom worked abroad.237 
'Thus, while we export from the U.S., our views as to transportation, markets, 
and product are worldwide. For example, there is no U.S.-made Caterpillar 
tractor. A Caterpillar product-wherever it is built-is just that-a Caterpillar 
product-graphic evidence that people of different national origins and political 
interest can achieve common objectives. ' 238 
Thus, the fact that precision ice hockey equipment was "designed in Sweden, financed in 
Canada, and assembled in Cleveland and Denmark for distribution in North America and 
Europe, respectively, out of alloys whose molecular structure was researched and patented 
232. See Andrew Pollack, Breaking Out of Japan's Orbit, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 1996, at Dl. 
233. See REICH, supra note 13, at 128 (citing Joseph White, Chrysler to Shut St. Louis Plant, Third Since 
1987, WALL ST. J., Feb. 21, 1990, at A3); see also Constantinos C. Markides & Norman Berg, Manufacturing 
Offshore Is Bad Business, HARV. Bus. REV., Sept.-Oct. 1988, at 113 (noting that as of 1988, there are more than 
600 Japanese automotive plants in the United States); John Greenwald, Toyota Road USA: Business, TIME, Oct. 
7, 1996, at 73, 73-74 (the "Americanization of Toyota" has revitalized communities in Kentucky by creating 
22,000 jobs in the state and pumping $1.5 billion into the state's economy). 
234. See REICH, supra note 13, at 128-29. 
235. Id. 
236. International sourcing can be either inter- or intrafirm. See Paul M. Swamidass & Masaaki Kotabe, 
Component Sourcing Strategies of Multinationals, in J. OF INT'L Bus. STUDIES, Mar. 22, 1993, at 81, 81. See 
also Solomon, supra note 230, at 81. Each division of Asea Brown Boveri, the electrical engineering 
conglomerate, composed of 1,300 national companies, is directed to act "locally in response to customers and 
employees .... But managers are required to think globally about sourcing. For example, if the dollar is strong 
relative to the Swedish krona, then the company sources more from Sweden because goods and services are 
cheaper there. When that changes, sourcing also changes." ld. 
237. WALTERS & BLAKE, supra note 9, at 112-13 (citing U.S. Multinationals: The Dimming of America, 
report prepared for the AFL-CIO Maritime Trades Department, Executive Board Meeting, February 15-16, 1972, 
at 12). 
238. ld. at 112-13. 
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in Delaware and fabricated in Japan"239 means that regardless of its official "nationality," it 
is in fact a global product resulting from global composites. Similarly, a Pontiac Le 
Mans-an ostensibly General Motors product of American nationality-is in fact a product 
generated bY. a global process involving South Korean assembly, advanced Japanese 
components such as engines, transaxles and electronics, West German design and style 
engineering, Taiwanese, Singaporean and Japanese small components, British advertising 
and marketing, and Irish and Barbadian data processing?40 
· This confounding combination of cross-nationalities means that neither the classical 
liberal nor the radical model of development, both of which are premised upon bright-line 
distinctions between the national and the international market, reflects the global shift. To 
the extent that the radical model aims to force a separation between the national and the 
international market, its objective is anachronistic. To the extent that the classical liberal 
model aims to negotiate a balance between the national and the international market, it 
represents an awkward attempt to reconcile the two by resorting to conceptual premises that 
are increasingly obsolete. The global nationality of a product, for example, has stymied the 
efforts of trade specialists to administer import-restraining measures on products 
originating from the international market.241 Both a liberal regime founded on a constant 
balancing between the national and the international market and a radical regime founded 
on furthering the national/international market dichotomy are anachronistic in the face of a 
global economy where the national and the international can no longer be distinguished 
with precision or accuracy. 
Following an investigation of an antidumping action, the U.S. Department of 
Commerce confessed that "strictly speaking, there was no such thing as a U.S. forklift, or a 
foreign forklift for that matter."242 The Department nonetheless decided that a forklift 
would be considered a U.S. forklift if its frame is manufactured in the United States, even if 
the remainder of its parts is made abroad.243 Similarly, when France tried to limit Japanese 
239. REICH, supra note 13, at 112; see also Murray Weidenbaum, The Business Response to the Global 
Marketplace, WASH. Q., Winter 1992, at 173, 180 (observing that United Technologies' French division was 
responsible for the company's elevator door system; its Spanish division handled small-geared parts; the German 
subsidiary handled the electronics; the Japanese division worked on the special motors drives; the Connecticut 
group was in charge of the systems integration). 
240. See REICH, supra note 13, at 113; see also Pico Iyer, The Global Village Finally Arrives, TIME, Sept 
22, 1993, at 86. "When an Iowan purchases a Pontiac from General Motors, 60% of the money goes to South 
Korea, Japan, West Germany, Taiwan, Singapore, Britain and Barbados." /d. See also Shelby D. Hunt & Robert 
M. Morgan, Relationship Marketing in the Era of Network Competition, MARKETING MANAGEMENT, Winter 
1994, at 19, 19. The Mazda MX-5 Miata, a global product, "was designed in California, financed in Tokyo and 
New York, and prototyped in Worthing, England. It currently is assembled in Michigan and Mexico from 
components produced in both the United States and Japan." /d. 
241. It has also resulted in the proliferation of intrafirm trade, which also means that trade statistics, for 
example, those on American trade deficits, create the misimpression that such deficits are caused by an 
imbalance between the national and the international markets: that more "foreign" products were sold to "us" 
than "American" products were sold to "them." See Weindenbaum, supra note 239, at 173. 
In fact, the American trade deficit can be partially explained by the fact that American-owned firms have 
been outsourcing globally-producing outside the United States what they once produced within-and then 
exporting from abroad such products back into the United States. Such outsourcing by American firms was 
responsible for more than one-third of Taiwan's trade surplus and more than 20% of Mexico, Singapore, South 
Korea and Japan's trade surplus with the United States. See REICH, supra note 13, at 134; Swamidass & Kotabe, 
supra, note 236, at 82 (noting that in 1988, intrafirm trade constituted about 30% of United States exports and 
40% of United States imports); Weindenbaum, supra note 239, at 173 (observing that 50% of all imports and 
exports, officially considered "foreign trade," is in fact internal transactions between domestic or foreign 
parents). 
242. REICH, supra note 13, at 115-16 n.4 (citation omitted). 
243. See id. With similar irony, an "American" manufacturer with plants already in Malaysia and 
Singapore, announced that it would move even more of its assembly work from New York to Mexico, because it 
did not get the help of the Bush administration in its efforts to have antidumping duties imposed on a "Japanese" 
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automobile imports to 3% of the French market, it faced the wrath of Margaret Thatcher, 
who came to the defense of the Nissan Bluebirds, a product assembled in Britain, from 
parts 80% of which came from Europe?44 When Taiwan included Toyotas assembled in 
the United States in its ban on Japanese auto imports, it was the Bush administration who 
came to Toyota's defense and forced Taiwan to back down?45 
The concept of nationality has been further muddled by the tendency toward cross-
ownership among transnational producers. Like product nationality, corporate nationality 
has also become increasingly globalized, creating what has been called a "mixed-
nationality corporation."246 By the 1990s, Chrysler, for example, owned 12% ofMitsubishi 
Motors and, indirectly, through Mitsubishi Motors, a part of South Korea's Hyundai 
Motors. By 1990, Ford owned 25% of Mazda, and both Ford and Mazda owned part of 
South Korea's Kia Motors; General Motors owned more than 40% of Japan's lsuzu and 
50% of South Korea's Daewoo Motors and Sweden's Saab.247 Similarly, rapid 
globalization has also led to a shift from the traditional tendency toward "establishing 
dominance in all of [a] business system's critical areas"248 to a new tendency among 
corporate players to forge "genuinely strategic alliances"249 that transcend traditional 
notions of corporate nationality. 
The result of such globalization of "product nationality" and "corporate nationality" is 
a convoluted crisscross of cross-ownership, cross-production, and cross-border intrafirm 
transactions in which the traditional distinctions between a domestic and a foreign product, 
a domestic or a foreign corporation, or a national and a non-national market are becoming 
increasingly blurred. Because globalization has fundamentally transformed the two 
traditional preoccupations of the international order-sovereignty and nationality-as long 
as the question that guides economic development remains "[i]s it a 'foreign' or a 
'domestic' producf'250 or "is it a foreign or a domestic corporation," the end result will be a 
strategy based on favoring a "domestic" product or a "domestic" corporation that can no 
longer be defmed with precision and may no longer exist in the current global reality. For 
example, the liberal model imposes a separate and unequal treatment standard against 
foreign players in an attempt to ease the injury sustained by the home market. But its 
efforts on behalf of the home corporation against the foreign corporation would not 
necessarily benefit the home market, if the home corporation is global rather than nationally 
typewriter company with manufacturing operations in Bartlett, Tennessee. See Keith Bradsher, Smith Corona 
Plant Mexico Bound, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 1992, at D11. 
244. See REICH, supra note 13, at 118. 
245. See id. 
246. John M. Kline, Inter-MNC Arrangements: Shaping the Options for U.S. Trade Policy, WASH. Q., Fall 
1985, at 57, 57. 
247. REICH, supra note 13, at 126-27. In April 1996, Ford raised its interest to a third, giving Ford 
effective control of Mazda. See Keith Bradsher, Ford Moving to Tighten Control Over Mazda Motor, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 12, 1996, at D1; Kline, supra note 246, at 57 (46% of American Motors owned by Renault); 
Weindenbaum, supra note 239, at 180 (describing General Motor's partial ownership of Sweden's Saab, Korea's 
Daewoo, Japan's Isuzu and Suzuki). 
248. Kenichi Ohmae, The Global Logic of Strategic Alliances, HARV. Bus. REV., Mar.-Apr. 1989, at 143, 
143. 
249. !d. (alliances for distribution purposes as well as research and development in diverse industries 
ranging from automobile and pharmaceutical to semiconductor and construction industries). See also Hunt & 
Morgan, supra note 240, at 19. In addition to global cross ownership, the trend toward global cross alliances 
among companies also means an increase in webs of "[n]etwork competition" among networks of entities, each 
independently owned and each specialized in "such areas as marketing, production, finance, purchasing, nnd 
R&D." Although each firm is independently owned, the extent of cooperation and coordination among the firms 
is so great that company boundaries become "fuzzy." !d. See also Weindenbaum, supra note 239, at 179 (noting 
that strategic alliances include those between: Philips N.V. (Dutch) and Matsushita (Japan); Sweden's Volvo nnd 
France's Renault cooperating in parts purchasing, transportation, and product development; and American 
Digital Equipment Corp. and Italian Olivetti & Co.). 
250. REICH, supra note 13, at 118. 
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based. Similarly, the radical model remains hostile to foreign corporations and foreign 
goods and attempts to impose barriers to keep out the international market. But it will in 
essence attempt to preserve a nationally based economy that does not or could not truly 
exist in the current global age. 
Additionally, as the global economy shifts from the traditional high-volume to the 
more cutting-edge, high-value mode of production,251 the very structure of the corporation 
has also become less territorially bound and more decentralized and diffused. Hence it is 
more in accord with a global, as opposed to a territorial logic. Once intellectual property 
displaces real property as the new global currency, high-volume production of standardized 
commodities requiring relatively immobile machineries and factories has been supplanted 
by high-value production of nonroutine, specially tailored products and services requiring 
neither fixed machinery nor factory.252 Just as globalization of production resulted in a 
proliferation of subsidiaries and branches outside the corporate home base, this diffusion of 
high-value economic activities has also resulted in a proliferation of decentralized corporate 
webs composed of globally dispersed independent or semi-independent entities, each 
engaged in high-value activities.253 Thus, the corporation (no longer confmed to its 
traditional pyramid-like structure of headquarters and subsidiaries)254 is now composed of 
an aggregation of small, mobile webs that are increasingly less vertical and more 
decentralized. 
To the extent that globalization represents the pull outward toward internationalism 
and economic interdependence, it constitutes a countervailing force to the territorial pull 
inward toward economic nationalism and autonomy, which have, in varying degrees, 
contributed to the distinctions between "home" and "world" adopted by both the classical 
liberal model and the radical model of international economic development. The "building 
block concepts appropriate to a 19th-century, closed-country model of the world no longer 
hold."255 It has become increasingly difficult to distinguish between "us" and "them." 
Taken together, these emerging tendencies have begun to create a globally based network 
251. See Peter F. Drucker, Management and the World's Work, HARV. Bus. REv., Sept.-Oct. 1988, at 65, 
65 (describing the decline of full-time farming and blue-collar manufacturing and the corresponding rise of 
information industry in the United States); Siew Meng Leong & Chin Tiong Tan, Managing Across Borders, 24 
J. INT'L Bus. STUDIES 449, 449 (describing the shift in "volume to value production"). 
252. Even in traditional manufacturing industries such as steel, the cutting edge lies not in the production of 
standard steel ingots, but the production of particular types of steel designed to meet the needs of particular 
subsectors, for instance, corrosion-resistant steel or specific types of alloys designed to withstand high 
temperature. See REICH, supra note 13, at 82; see also Solomon, supra note 230, at 80 (describing the federation 
of national companies that make up Asea Brown Boveri and its "matrix structure with worldwide business 
activities grouped into seven business segments that comprise 65 Business Areas ... responsible for regional 
profits, research and development, capacity, product design and more."). 
253. See William W. Lewis & Marvin Harris, Why Globalization Must Prevail, MCKINSEY Q., Mar. 22, 
1992, at 114 (describing "the web-like interconnectedness of modern transnational firms"). The traditional 
corporate structure-the pyramid composed of a base at the bottom and a corporate headquarters at the top-has 
been replaced by a host of decentralized corporate webs: independent profit centers (problem solvers supported 
by headquarters but granted a high degree of independence); spin-off partnerships (independent businesses 
partially owned by headquarters after the spin-oft); spin-in partnerships (independent units spinning into 
partnership with headquarters); licensing (headquarters contracting with independent businesses to license its 
trademark and technology); brokering (purely contracting relationships involving headquarters and independent 
units of problem solvers). See REICH, supra note 13, at 92-93; Leong, supra note 251, at 449 (noting the 
transformation of 1970s-type global corporations composed of an aggregate of "overseas subsidiaries" to truly 
"stateless organizations operating in a borderless world"); see also WNET Special (network television broadcast 
Dec. 21, 1993) (transcript available from Journal Graphics Transcripts, WNET Educational Broadcasting Co.), 
[hereinafter Broadcast] (describing the global/local synergy of a globally-designed product). 
254. See Statement by Percy Barnevik, CEO, Asea Brown Boveri, in Broadcast, supra note 253. "I don't 
believe in headquarters. You have, of course, to have some sort of coordination center in a country or in the 
world, but ... I've seen so many big headquarters which cost money ... , and we made up our mind to keep this 
down to an absolute minimum." !d. 
255. OHMAE, supra note 224, at viii. 
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or web of interests that transcend the nation-state and the division between the national and 
the international market. As I discuss in Part V, by weakening the territorial foundation of 
nationalism, these global changes provide inadvertent but potentially positive openings for 
international economic development. 
B. The State and the Market: The Public/Private International Law Dichotomy 
While the nationaVinternational market dichotomy no longer makes sense given the 
global transformations described above, the public/private international law dichotomy is 
also inaccurate, though for different reasons. As I demonstrated in Part II, as a result of the 
public/private international law dichotomy, public international law is deemed to be about 
politics, not law, and private international law is deemed to be about markets, not politics. 
One of the core assumptions of private international law and the classical liberal model is 
that an efficient, competitive market is capable of insulating market activities from the 
irrationalities of nonmarket institutions and behaviors. With a correct framework, national 
and international market activities could be balanced and at the same time maintained 
within a separate and differentiated sphere of activity separate from the sphere of 
international politics. By contrast, one of the core assumptions of the radical model is that 
the market, whether national or international, could not be segregated from nonmarket 
institutions. As a result, only the state could protect the national market from international 
politics. As I demonstrate below, neither assumption captures the complex realities of the 
international economic order. 
According to the classical liberal model, once a market is birthed, its progression is 
marked by a tendency toward autonomy and normality and away from the irrational 
constraints of nonmarket structures. The assumption is that even though economic 
. activities in premarket societies are heavily influenced by and embedded in social relations, 
with modernization, the market has the capacity to be an autonomous sphere defined less 
by social and political relations than by the self-interested calculations of rational economic 
behaviors. 256 
As a result, ensuring that the market in developing economies functions in truly 
competitive-market conditions neutralizes the potential for disorder that afflicts the public 
international order. In other words, in a Hobbesian state of nature, "repressive political 
structures are rendered unnecessary by competitive markets that make force or fraud 
unavailing."257 Whereas kinship relations in traditional societies might provide a breeding 
ground for noncompetitive behaviors such as price-fixing, the market, by contrast, will 
attract a congregation of strangers more interested in profits than social obligations.258 The 
model aims to construct the right institutional structure in order to reinforce the autonomy 
of the market259 and introduce economically rational behaviors into developing-country 
societies. 
256. According to the model, the development of a market allows "large numbers of price-taking 
anonymous buyers and sellers supplied with perfect information .•. [to] function without any prolonged human 
or social contact . . . . Under perfect competition there is no room for bargaining, negotiating, remonstration or 
mutual adjustment and the various operators that contract together need not enter into recurrent or continuing 
relationships as a result of which they would get to know each other well." Albert Hirschman, Rival 
Interpretations of Market Society: Civilizing, Destructive, or Feeble?, 20 J. OFECON. LIT. 1463, 1473 (1982). 
257. Mark Granovetter, Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness, 91 AM. J. 
OF SOCIOLOGY 481, 484 (1985). 
258. See ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 195-210 (R.H. Campbell et al. eds., Clarendon Press 
1976). 
259. Various institutional arrangements can be instituted to limit the potential for force and fraud. Contract 
Jaw enhances the likelihood that agreements between strangers will be honored, or else penalties will be 
imposed; rules of corporate governance ensure that managers will be subjected to the discipline of non-
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The model is thus founded on an atomized market that should be insulated from the 
complications of tradition and politics. Indeed, it is precisely the assumption that insulation 
is possible and desirable that has led to both the depoliticization and universalization of 
development itself. The model's assumption of certain norms of economic development 
and the model's prescription for greater integration between the national and the 
international market within the GATT order have two premises. First, the model is 
premised on the institution of an autonomous market at both the national and the 
international level. Second, it is premised on the implementation of a "normal" progression 
of economic development through the market. "Markets are studied in economics on the 
assumption that they are not going to be disrupted by war, revolution, or other civil 
disorders,"260 or that they will not be embedded in a broader background of structural 
power.261 
GATT rules, for example, represent the epitome of what sociologists have called an 
"undersocialized conception ofhuman action [that] disallow[s] by hypothesis any imgact of 
social structure and social relations on production, distribution, or consumption."2 2 The 
principle of nondiscrimination, enshrined in Article XIII, requires contracting parties to 
treat imports and exports alike. The principle of national treatment, enshrined in Article III, 
prohibits contracting parties from treating the products of other contracting parties less 
favorably than their own products. The principle of reciprocity grants contracting parties 
which offer trade concessions the right to expect reciprocal concessions from other 
contracting parties. And finally, the principle of most favored nation treatment, enshrined 
in Article I, ensures that contracting parties treat like products of all other contracting 
parties alike.Z63 
On a micro level, the above norms seem perfectly neutral and have been instrumental 
in the establishment of a relatively predictable rule-oriented economic order. On a macro 
level, power relations have emanated from GATT from its very inception. The fact that the 
International Trade Organization (ITOi64 and its prodevelopment agenda ~as displaced by 
the GATT is indicative of the intensely political reality of the post-World War II world. 
managerial owners; and international agreements are designed to enhance economic cooperation, tame the 
tendency toward force and fraud and minimize the extent of its externalization into the transnational sphere. 
260. STRANGE, supra note 217, at 14. The economist K.W. Rothschild, for example, remarked: 
[a]s in other important social fields we should expect that individuals and groups will struggle for 
position; that power will be used to improve one's chances in the "economic game;" and that 
attempts will be made to derive power and influence from acquired economic strongholds. 
Power should, therefore, be a recurrent theme in economic studies of a theoretical or applied 
nature. Yet if we look at the main run of economic theory over the past hundred years we find that it 
is characterized by a strange lack of power considerations. 
K.\V. ROTHSCHILD, Introduction to POWER IN ECONOMICS 7 (K..W. Rothschild ed., 1971). 
261. Structural power ... 
is the power to shape and determine the structures of the global political economy within which 
other states ... have to operate . . . . Structural power, in short, confers the power to decide how 
things shall be done, the power to shape frameworks within which states relate to each other, relate 
to people, or relate to corporate enterprises. 
STRANGE, supra note 217, at 24-25. 
262. Granovetter, supra note 257, at 483. 
263. Thus, goods of one contracting state have the right to enter the markets of all other contracting states 
at tariffs no less favorable than those imposed on similar goods from any other contracting state. See GATT, 
supra note 40, art. I. 
264. See Havana Charter for an International Trade Organization, Mar. 24, 1984, arts. 8-10, U.N. Doc. 
E/Conf. 2/78 (1948) [hereinafter ITO Charter]. 
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The ITO specifically included provisions that would have required the organization to 
address development issues, "especially of those countries that are still relatively 
underdeveloped."265 The ITO adopted a benevolent view of economic intervention "to 
promote the establishment, development or reconstruction of particular industries or 
branches of agriculture ... "266 and allowed special treatment for developing-countries 
industries such as primary commodity .production.267 
Although the ITO was initiated by the United States, "a mixture of economic and 
nationalistic considerations"268 led to its demise in the U.S. Congress. As the unintended 
successor of the IT0/69 GATT stands in stark contrast to the prodevelopment agenda of the 
ITO. Despite the unrelenting rhetoric about normal trade and the virtues of trade 
liberalization, until the conclusion of the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade 
negotiations,270 the GATT in fact institutionalized a number of exemptions (agriculture in 
particular) that have had a disproportionately negative impact on developing countries. 
While GATT does allow national markets to take protective measures by invoking 
escape valves271 and other exceptions based on balance of payment difficulties,272 such 
exceptions are supposed to be used sparingly, narrowly, and nondiscriminatorily.273 
However, from the outset, GATT exempted agriculture from two of its most basic 
prohibitions: the Article XI prohibition against quantitative restrictions and the Article XVI 
prohibition against export subsidies.274 
Both subsidies and quantitative restrictions have been used by developed nations to 
protect their domestic farm policies, with severe long-term consequences for developing 
nations. Because subsidies generate surplus that must be artificially protected from a 
decline in price, developed countries have resorted to comprehensive price support 
programs to ensure a minimum floor. As a result, such farm products tend to be "priced too 
high to compete freely in international agricultural markets"275 and must be disposed of 
either as food aid to developing nations or simply dumped on the world market.276 
Subsidies and quantitative restrictions have thus caused a severe depression of international 
prices with disastrous consequences for rural communities.277 
265. ITO Charter, art. I0(3). 
266. ITO Charter, art. 13(I). 
267. ITO Charter, arts. 55-65. 
268. LOW, supra note 2I2, at 42. 
269. The GATT was created in I947 in Geneva, following an American suggestion that a multilateral tariff 
negotiation be pursued outside the framework of the ITO, to be subsequently incorporated into the trade charter 
of the much more comprehensive ITO. Although it could have been shelved pending ratification of the ITO, it 
was decided that the GATT should be swiftly implemented to preempt protectionist sentiments. It came into 
force on January I, I948. 
270. Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 
I994, 33 I.L.M. II40 (I994). 
271. Members may withdraw or renegotiate tariff concessions if imports cause injury to domestic 
industries. See GATT, supra note 40, arts. XIX, XXVIII. 
272. To ensure that a contracting party is in fact facing true balance-of-payments difficulties, the IMF is 
assigned the task of balance of payments determinations. See GATT, supra note 40, art. XV(2). 
273. See GATT, supra note 40, arts. XIII, XIV. 
274. GATT, supra note 40, arts. XI, XVI. Although Article XVI, as supplemented by the I979 Tokyo 
Round Code on Subsidies and Countervailing Duties, prohibits export subsidies on manufactured goods, there 
was no prohibition on export subsidies for primary goods such as agricultural commodities. Indeed, a I955 
amendment permits export subsidization of primary product exports, unless they cause the subsidizing nation to 
have "more than an equitable share of world export trade in that product." GATT, supra note 40, art. XVI(B)(3). 
275. WALTERS & BLAKE, supra note 9, at 21. 
276. See Jonathan Carlson, Hunger, AgriCllltural Trade Liberalization, and Soft International Law: 
Addressing the Legal Dimensions of a Political Problem, 70 IOWA L. REV. 1187, I211 & n.90. 
277. See id. at I2Il. Surplus fqod production and subsidized disposal have been rationalized on at least 
two grounds. First, that developing nations pay less to import agricultural commodities; and second, that a world 
reserve could be used as food aid and price stabilization. Despite their short-term benefits, in the long run, 
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Equally important, while developed nations have managed to achieve comparative 
advantages in a wide variety of industries, developing nations have only gained their 
comparative advantages in a limited number of industries?78 The persistently 
interventionist regime of agricultural supports established by the developed world are 
notable not just because they flagrantly contravene GAIT norms, but, more importantly, 
because they were designed to reverse the one narrow but important sector in which 
developing countries have the comparative-advantage upper hand. Instead of 
accommodating themselves to structural changes in the international economic regime that 
has bestowed certain comparative advantages on developing nations, developed countries 
have taken the exact opposite path-interference with the operation of market forces to 
reverse the law of comparative advantage for political purposes. 
The public/private international law dichotomy has essentially created two radically 
separate spheres, each with its own insular and sharply distinguished norms deemed 
antagonistic to and separate from the other. Lack of dialogue between the two spheres has 
prevented an effective synthesis of the public and the private, so that the market, 
"undersocialized" and idealized by the classical liberal model as essentially autonomous, 
"could be imagined to suppress force and fraud'~279 in the public political sphere. 
In a similar vein, the public/private international law dichotomy has also produced 
what sociologists call an "oversocialized" conception of the market, in which social and 
political relations are so overwhelming and pervasive that market institutions are essentially 
irrelevant. Despite their apparent differences, however, the two views are in fact similar in 
their mechanistic analysis of the interaction between state and market. By exaggerating the 
degree in which the market can neutralize the politics of brute force in the political sphere, 
the classical liberal model presents social and political structures as more or less irrelevant. 
Similarly, by exaggerating the degree in which the market is embedded in social and 
political institutions, the radical model presents an equally narrow, deterministic conception 
of political behaviors, in which competitive and well-regulated markets are similarly 
irrelevant. 
From the basic starting point that economic development is essentially politicized, the 
radical model proceeds to remove the market and replace it with the state. In essence, by 
adopting wholesale the logic of public international law, the radical model could propose 
only one antidote to international politics-neutralization of the politicized market through 
the assertion of state sovereignty. The model's answer to globalization and to international 
politics is, in essence, a return to economic nationalism and the territorial state. 
There are several fundamental flaws with the radical model. First, while the classical 
liberal model sees mechanistic sequences of economic progression, the radical model sees 
only nonsequences and nonprogression. It generally assumes a static, nonmaneuverable 
system in which power exists in essentially the same form today as in the nineteenth-
century colonial era, when developed nations produced manufactured goods and 
developing nations produced raw materials. Second, it also assumes that the only entity 
capable of confronting the international market is the state. Thus, the state is viewed not 
just as the opposite of the market but also as a panacea for market flaws. By presenting the 
process of development as either structurally flawed or permanently dependent, the only 
doctrinally honest solution the radical model can prescribe is delinkage from the 
artificially depressed prices for agricultural commodities and circumscribed access to the agricultural market of 
the developed nations have injured the development of rural communities and adversely affected the efforts of 
developing countries to achieve self-sufficiency in local food production. See id. at 1215. 
278. For a discussion of developed nations' deviation from GATT norms in the textile-industry, see Henry 
R. Zheng, Defining Relationships and Resolving Conflicts Between Interrelated Multinational Trade 
Agreements: The Experience of the MFA and the GAIT, 25 STAN. J. INT'L L. 45, 77 (1988). 
279. Granovetter, supra note 257, at 488. 
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international economy. As a result, the model is simply incapable of reconciling its basic 
premises with the growing body of accumulated evidence that points to the possibility of 
economic development for a growing number of developing nations?80 
The economic success of a number of newly industrialized countries (NICs)-
including South Korea, Indonesia, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Singapore, based on an export-
oriented model of development281 antithetical to the radical model's import-substitution 
orientation-directly contradicts radical prescription that economic development is 
impossible without fundamental structural changes in the national and the international 
markets. Moreover, it also demonstrates that the international economic system is less 
static and more open to the possibility of change than the radical model would allow. 
Many developing nations, for example, have moved beyond primary commodity 
production to higher levels of industrialization, and as a result, the "old notion of 
developing countries as exporters of raw materials from which they earned the revenue to 
pay for imports of manufactured goods from the West"282 has become inaccurate. While 
manufactured goods constituted 5% of developing country exports in 1955, they accounted 
for 60% of developing country exports in 1994 and 22% of the world's export in 
manufactured goods in 1993?83 
Furthermore, in stark contrast to the radical premise that development, if at all 
possible for developing countries, will be mere dependent development, "developing 
countries have become an independent source of growth in the world economy."284 
Developing-country growth, which at one time closely mirrored and reflected developed-
nation growth, took a significantly independent tum. For example, developing countries 
experienced an economic boom even as the industrial, developed world was struck with a 
severe economic recession?85 A relatively strong domestic market as well as an increase in 
trade among developing nations themselves accounted for the continuing growth in the 
developing nations despite the drop in demand in the developed countries' economies.286 
Faced with the empirical fact that many developing countries have been relatively 
successful in their outward-oriented, export-promotion economic development strategies, 
the radical model now predicts that changes in the structure or system of world capitalism, 
which have occurred subsequent to the achievements of some NICs, have once again made 
development impossible for the remaining developing nations. The prescription, again, is 
the same recycled prescription for economic autonomy that has been tried and failed: 
280. Due to better technology and increased communications, the pace of economic development appears 
to have accelerated over the years. It took Great Britain fifty-eight years from 1780, after the industrial 
revolution occurred, to double its real income per capita. It took the United States, from 1839, forty-seven years 
to do the same. From 1884, it took Japan thirty-four years; from 1966, it took South Korea eleven years; and for 
China, it took less than ten years. It has been estimated that by 2020, China, India, and Indonesia could rank 
among the world's five biggest economies. See War of the Worlds, A Survey of the Global Economy, 
ECONOMIST, Oct 1, 1994, at 1, 6 [hereinafter War of the Worlds]. 
281. Critics of the classical liberal model have argued that although "the rates of growth achieved through 
export promotion were superior to those achieved under import-substituting regimes," STEPHAN HAGGARD, 
PATHWAYS FROM THE PERIPHERY: THE POLITICS OF GROWTH IN THE NEWLY INDUSTRIALIZING COUNTRIES 13 
(1990), the state has been more involved than contemplated by the classical liberal model. State involvement in 
the East Asian NICs' development, however, has been "less extensive than in Africa, South Asia, and Latin 
America," and the sensibility that characterizes the development path of the NICs is one that accommodates 
rather than opposes the current global logic. See id. at 13-14. 
282. War of the Worlds, supra note 280, at 4. 
283. See id. 
284. Id. at 10. 
285. See id. 
286. See id. 
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"[r]ather than increase their reliance on a hostile world environment, developing countries 
should try to reduce this dependence and diversify trading partners and products."287 . 
To the extent that there is any international trade at all, the radical model's strategy is 
founded on a notion of hierarchy of acceptable trade. 
What cannot be produced locally is produced nationally. What cannot be 
produced nationally is purchased from regional partners-which suggests the 
importance of revitalizing regional integration institutions. Only for those 
products for which regional producers cannot satisfy demand is trade necessary 
with countries on the other side of the globe?88 
Economic nationalism and home market autonomy constitute the highest level and most 
preferred form of economic development. But to the extent that inter-nation trade is 
utilized at all, it should be conducted at the regional level. The one acceptable concession 
to a loss of sovereignty, then, is a concession to regionalism, with international trade a 
measure of last resort. 
One of the more significant indicators that developing nations could indeed develop 
economically can be found in the dramatic shift in the way developing nations themselves 
are viewed-as a potential threat to the economic prosperity of the developed world.289 
Indeed, "the fact that people in rich countries now fret about developing countries' success, 
not their poverty, is itself a-remarkable tribute to those countries' economic reforms."290 
Similarly, although comparative advantage would seem to dictate that developing nations 
would now engage in high-volume manufacturing while developed nations would 
specialize in high-value production, it would be an oversimplification to think that 
developing countries will "make only low-tech, labour-intensive goods while industrial 
countries keep the high-tech goods."291 Computer programming and equipment-design 
centers have proliferated in developing countries such as China, India, Singapore, Hong 
Kong, and Taiwan. American banks, accounting firms, and insurance firms have also 
begun to explore ways in which they too can globalize the preparation and handling of tax 
287. Robin Broad & John Cavanagh, No More NICs, in CREATING A NEW WORLD ECONOMY, supra note 2, 
at386-87. 
288. Id. at 388. 
289. Indeed, anxieties expressed by the developed world about trade with developing countries resemble, 
paradoxically, developing nations' anxieties in the 1950s and 1960s regarding trade with developed nations. 
War of the Worlds, supra note 280, at 5. 
290. Id. This anxiety has also been colorfully expressed by Ross Perot, who described the loss of jobs from 
high to low-wage countries as a "giant sucking sound." The cheap-labor comparative advantage, however, has 
been exaggerated. Labor has become but one factor in a company's decision to relocate. With the increasing 
significance of capital costs, research and development costs, and marketing costs, labor costs constitute only 3% 
of total costs in the production of semiconductors, 5% of color television . production, and I 0 to 15% in 
automobile production. See id. at 23. Indeed, corporations still employ 61 million workers in the developed 
world, as compared to 12 million in developing countries. See id. at 20-21. Almost 50% of all foreign direct 
investment in developing countries can be found in two sectors, mining and services, which by their nature, 
cannot be "exported" and thus cannot be blamed for the relocation of jobs from the rich to the poor world. See 
id. at 23. Moreover, globalization has occurred fastest not in the traditional sectors such as the extractive or 
manufacturing industries, but in the service industry, such as banks, insurance, advertising, Consultancy and 
databank services. See STRANGE, supra note 217, at 77. 
291. War of the Worlds, supra note 280, at 24. It was assumed in the 1960s, for example, that Japan would 
produce only cars and consumer durables as America and Europe moved on to the production ofmore high-tech 
products. Japan, of course, is now producing high-tech goods as well. Similarly, as competitive pressure is 
being exerted by newcomers such as China, the NICs, for example, have had to move the chain of production 
"upward," into the computer sector, for example. Taiwan is now the world's second-biggest maker of notebook 
computers. See id. 
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returns and insurance claims.292 Sealand Services, Inc., for example, has announced plans 
to shut down its Elizabeth, New Jersey division and subcontract the work performed by its 
325 New Jersey employees to programmers in India and the Philippines. Texas 
Instruments has announced plans to expand its operation by 40% in Bangalore, India, 
which has also attracted high-tech companies such as the Digital Equipment Corporation, 
the Hewlett-Packard Company, IBM and the Compaq Computer Corporation.293 
The international economic system, then, is much more fluid and much less static than 
the radical model assumes. Similarly, although the market is not an "undersocialized" 
sphere of rational "interests" separate from the nonrational political sphere where the 
"passions" are located/94 it is also not the case that the market is so "oversocialized" that 
economic transactions are overwhelmed by ideological and political struggles. In that most 
fundamental sense, the radical model is the exact opposite of the liberal model. While the 
radical model sees politics at the international level and argues for depoliticization through 
a retreat from the international into the sovereign boundaries of the national, the classical 
liberal model sees no politics at all and argues for the incorporation of the national 
economy into an international economic system defined by normal rules of conduct. At the 
same time, the radical model is also quite compatible with the classical liberal model. The 
assumption that there is no possibility for either independent development or even 
economic growth within the structure or the "system" as it currently exists, reveals a static, 
essentially ahistorical understanding of economic development. Ironically, this 
understanding is not much different from the liberal model's view of development as 
ahistorical progressions of growth. 
Both models thus are essentially mirror images of one another. Both uncritically 
accept the public/private international law dichotomy and the national/international market 
dichotomy. As a result, their only difference lies in the way that they navigate the divide 
between the national and the international market. Both, however, remain out of touch with 
the global logic of the international economic system. While the radical model is clearly 
incapable of reconciling its preference for sovereignty over interdependence with the 
increasing globalization of the market (as discussed in Part III), even the liberal model is 
unequipped to accommodate the rapid transformations that are taking place in the new 
global order. 
292. See Keith Bradsher, Skilled Workers Watch Their Jobs Migrate Overseas, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 1995, 
atAl. 
293. See id.; Sanjoy Hazarika, An Indian City of the Future With the Lure of the Past, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 
28, 1995, at D6. "Where physical contact with customers is not essential, there is increasing scope for 
outsourcing to countries with cheap, but relatively well-educated workforces. People can be employed anywhere 
to carry out labour-intensive computer programming and data processing, keeping in touch with head office by 
computer network and satellite. Routine accountancy work, for example, could be subcontracted to developing 
countries." War of the Worlds, supra note 280, at 24. 
Lower wages alone, however, do not account for the globalization of intellectual property sites in 
developing countries. The fact that the project can be worked on during the day in the United States and then 
sent electronically to another part of the world while American workers sleep also accounts for the exodus of 
white collar jobs to developing nations. Equally, if not more significant, is the change in the once-dominant 
attitude that foreigners cannot be trusted with certain high-skilled jobs. As Edith Holloman, a representative of 
the American Engineering Association said, "The arrogance that we used to have, that nobody could be as good 
as we were, except maybe a European, is all going away now." Bradsher, supra note 292, at D6. 
294. The public/private dichotomy arose "in part on account of the arbitrary separation that arose 
historically •.• in the 17th and 18th centuries, between the 'passions' and the 'interests,' the latter connoting 
economic motives only." Granovetter, supra note 257, at 506 (quoting ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, THE PASSIONS 
AND THE INTERESTS (1977)). 
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As discussed in Parts I through IV, the international order is divided into a national 
and an international market. Both markets are generally deemed to be part of the private 
international order separate from the public international law order. As a result, the two 
dominant paradigms of international economic development are each separately divided by 
a public and a private international law sensibility. Neither sensibility is fully capable of 
synthesizing the divisions between the national and the international market with the 
diffusion of economic power in the current international economic system. My proposal 
suggests first, that the national/international market dichotomy should be transformed, and 
second, that this transformation be undertaken by embracing a sensibility that is neither 
"public" nor "private," but a cross-fertilization of the two. 
Because globalized production and the crisscrossing of economic forces have made it 
difficult to defme with precision the nationality of a corporation, a product, and 
consequently a national economy, the current international economic order is clearly more 
in keeping with a global, rather than a territorial logic. Additionally, this global logic keeps 
with the notion of a free flow of market forces more than with the notion of either the 
territorial state or its corollary construct, sovereign authority. Where narrow national 
interests that centered around the construct of sovereignty have prevented the formation of 
an integrated, postwar international order, the erosion of nationalism and of a state-centered 
orientation constitutes a fundamental change. That change is crucial for the economic 
development of the developing nations. I base my proposal on the premise that a new 
sensibility for international economic development must work with, rather than go against, 
the direction of the new global order. 
Currently, however, neither model of economic development encompasses the 
sensibility required to fully take advantage of the global diffusion of economic power. On 
the one hand, the radical model-with its state-oriented sensibility aimed at severing the 
national from the international market-is in direct opposition to the market logic of the 
international economic order. On the other hand, the classical liberal model-which 
continues to resort to traditional but obsolete indicators to distinguish between the national 
and the international and to protect the national from "too much" international 
competition-is similarly, although less obviously, out of touch with current global 
transformations. My argument is that by using orthodox but obsolete indicators (corporate 
nationality and product nationality) to shore up the national market, the classical liberal 
model continues to regulate international economic activities by navigating a 
national/international market dichotomy that no longer in fact exists. 
The assumption of normal trade that remains at the core of the classical liberal model 
prevents the model from fully reconciling the division between the national and the 
international market. The notion of an international economic order is defined by an 
archipelago of separate or insular "national" economies and national industries, each to be 
protected by its respective nation-state and balanced against the demands of the 
international market. This notion constitutes yet another example of anachronistic thinking 
that associates the economic activities of corporate entities with the economic prosperity of 
their state of incorporation. 
The erosion of bright-line boundaries, which have been used to identify "our 
interests" and "our industries,"295 has resulted in a resurgence of nationalistic cries for 
quotas and tariffs to keep out foreign goods or retaliatory actions to punish "unfair'' foreign 
295. See OHMAE, supra note 224, at 7. 
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acts?96 As a result, a new paradox has emerged in which developed nations now call for 
home market protection or home market retaliation against the international market with the 
frequency and vehemence once reserved for newly independent developing nations. And 
yet, given the ease with which goods and capital move across national boundaries, "it is no 
easy matter to attach to them an accurate nationallabel."297 As a result of the global logic, 
the traditional linkage presumed between the home corporation (or its products) and the 
home market is becoming increasingly tenuous, and hence the national/international market 
dichotomy is becoming increasingly obsolete. 
Nevertheless, the prevailing discourse on economic development remains essentially 
unaffected by transformations in the international market. Given the increased global 
mobility of almost every factor of production, the only factor in the production process that 
does not regularly move across national boundaries is the national work force.298 Indeed, 
the competitiveness of the home market is becoming less linked to its home corporation 
than to its people and their productivity. To that extent, any new model of economic 
development should aim at not simply oscillating between the competing demands of the 
national and the international market but at truly integrating the two in order to institute a 
regime that would in fact ensure economic development in a manner productive to and 
beneficial for the home work force. 
The national/international market dichotomy should be reconceptualized in the 
following way. Given a new global order characterized by an increasing divergence 
between the national corporation and the national economy, the role of the state must 
change from its more traditional objective of protecting the competitiveness of national 
industries to protecting the competitiveness of its national labor force. National regulation 
of economic activities should not be designed to keep out "foreign" economic activities or 
even to open up foreign markets for home corporations, but rather, to draw in "foreign" 
economic activities of the sort best suited to the economic needs of their respective citizens. 
This conceptual shift would create at least three different scenarios from the one 
cirrrently prevailing in the development debate. First, eradicating the national/international 
market dichotomy would cause a different "litmus" test to emerge. The "litmus" test would 
focus less on the relationship between foreign competition and domestic industry and more 
on the relationship between foreign competition and the domestic citizenry. Unlike current 
trade laws, which allow the national market, for instance, to take retaliatory measures such 
as antidumping actions based on the presumption that foreign-sourced competition is 
simultaneously more injurious and less beneficial than domestic-sourced competition, the 
shift I propose would transform the debate from one mired in the identity of the 
competitor299 to one more concerned with the general impact of competition on the 
domestic consumers. Intricate fmetunings such as those mandated by the antitrust statutes 
296. See Craig Gordon, Protectionist Poised to Pounce, NEWSDAY, Mar. 5, 1996, at A37. And yet, "the 
growth of M-NCs [mixed-nationality corporations] will make it increasingly difficult to apply discriminatory 
nationalistic policies, thereby helping to check the harsher forms ofneo-mercantilism." !d. 
297. See OHMAE, supra note 224, at 13. 
298. See Kenichi Ohmae, The Perils of Protectionism in Kenichi Ohmae, et al., The Boundaries of 
Business: Commentaries from the Experts, HARV. Bus. REv., July-Aug. 1991, at 127, 128. [hereinafter 
Boundaries of Business]. "In a borderless world, only a well-educated population can be economically strong." 
!d. Similarly, among the three primary factors needed for business, "technology, capital, and competent 
employees[,) ... well-educated workers are not only the most important but also the one [resource] that 
developing countries can create on their own." James E. Austin, The Developing-Country Difference, in Ohmae, 
supra, at 135; see also REICH, supra note 13, at 8. 
299. See supra notes 52-68 and accompanying text; see also Karen Handelsman, Russia: State Regulation 
of Foreign Trade Activity, E. EUROPEAN Bus. L., Dec. 1995, at 12, 12. Russia, for example, allows the 
imposition of antidumping duties to protect domestic industry upon a mere showing of "material damage" 
without even the need to satisfy a fair-value test. 
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should be adopted so that price discrimination, even if undertaken by a foreign firm, is not 
outlawed if it benefits consumers without injuring competition overall. 
Second, this conceptual shift: would also force a reexamination ofthe objective behind 
national economic policies. Are they broadly designed to aid national industries in opening 
up foreign markets for national products, or should they be narrowly tailored to ensure that 
public resources utilized for market-opening or any other economic purposes be linked to 
some benefit that such measures would bring to the home economy? The fact that the 
United States under the Bush Administration used the threat of Section 30eoo to force 
Japan to open up its market to Motorola,301 an "American" corporation, demonstrates the 
extent to which formalistic categorization continues to dominate our thinking. Even though 
Motorola officially carries American corporate nationality, its production facilities and its 
production workers (at least as of 1989 when the threat of Section 301 was issued) were in 
Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. Thus, the direct beneficiaries of United States action were 
Malaysian engineers, Malaysian workers, and Motorola shareholders in the United States 
and abroad?02 
Third, the conceptual shift I advocate would cause nationai economic policies to be 
focused on "market-opening" measures for all corporations, whether national or foreign, 
that undertake to perform productive economic activities in the home economy and 
generate investment, employment, and economic growth. As discussed in Part IV, cross-
border linkages have resulted in cross-ownerships and multiple alliances among corporate 
entities. If the objective is to develop the home economy, the granting or withholding of 
public benefits on the basis of formal corporate nationality would not accomplish this aim. 
For nation-states today and for developing countries in particular, the development strategy 
that reflects the global reality and at the same time constitutes an effective "home" market 
"protection" is one which . exposes the home market to economic units of whatever 
"nationality," as long as they constitute a vehicle for employment/03 on-site training/04 
capital, technology, and know-how. 
Given the capital shortage faced by developing countries and the necessity of using 
privatization as a revenue-raising mechanism for countries with an inefficient, bloated, and 
bankrupt state sector, "[t]he prospect of too little rather than too large capital inflows is the 
300. See Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 301, 88 Stat 2011 (1975). 
301. See REICH, supra note 13, at 164. 
302. See id.; see also Louis Uchitelle, U.S. Businesses Loosen Link to Mother Country, N.Y. TIMES, May 
21, 1989, at Al. 
303. The two top auto exporters from the United States in 1995, for example, were Honda Motor Co. and 
Toyota Motor Corp. See Keith Naughton & Amy Borrus, America's No. I Car Exporter is ... Japan?, Bus. 
WK., Feb. 26, 1996, at 113, 113. Japanese companies shipped 167,000 cars from North America while General 
Motors, Chrysler and Ford exported a combined 162,553. More than half of the Japanese North American 
exports-manufactured in the United States employing American workers-are exported to the Japanese market. 
And yet, because the spotlight continues to be focused solely on market-opening measures for American 
companies in foreign markets, this trend has been downplayed by United States trade officials, despite the 
beneficial impact on the United States economy. As Marjory E. Searing, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Japan at 
the U.S. Commerce Department stated, "We did not get into a trade negotiation [with Japan) to make sure the 
Japanese market would be open to Toyota and Honda." Id. 
304. When Bridgestone, a Japanese company, took over Firestone's factories, it planned to invest more than 
$1 billion in its American factories-an investment which could only benefit U.S. ·workers-prompting 
Firestone's chairman to declare that "[t]he order of magnitude is close to twice what Firestone could have 
invested as an independent company." Jonathan P. Hicks, Foreign Owners are Shaking Up the Competition, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 1989, at F9. 
Japanese automakers in the United States have determined that they could utilize the American workforce 
more productively and efficiently than U.S. automakers could. Under Toyota management, productivity in 
General Motor's factory in Fremont, California increased by 50% while absenteeism fell from 25% to 3 to 4%. 
See REICH, supra note 13, at 146-47 (citations omitted). 
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worrisome prospect."305 A foreign investment law, for instance, should be less concerned 
about keeping global capital from the national markee06 than on attracting foreign capital 
and, if control is a- concern, controlling it through means other than limiting equity 
h. 307 owners 1p. 
By contrast, public subsidies for private research and development routinely granted 
to home companies on the presumed links between the home corporation and the home 
economy should be challenged if such companies fail to demonstrate a credible intention to 
perform value-added work in the home economy. As the U.S. government searched for 
American corporations to grant some of its $30 million in annual subsidies to American 
companies willing to engage in research and development of high-definition television, it 
refused to include Japan's Sony, Holland's Philips, and France's Thomson in the research 
project. The rationale was that "[i]t is vitally important for us to be in the forefront of this 
emerging technology."308 Zenith, who was the only remaining American television 
manufacturer by 1989, employed a mere 2500 Americans because most of its assembly 
operations had been moved to Mexico.309 By contrast, 15,000 Americans, employed by 
Sony, Matsushita, Philips, and Thomson, were in fact involved in television manufacturing 
and designing in the United States that same year. Only recently, however, has the United 
States begun "to grapple with such questions as whether to give research and development 
incentives to an American company that is likely to manufacture the resulting product 
abroad"310 or engage in research and development outside ofthe United States. 
The above examples serve as an illustration of the type of economic development 
policy that should not be implemented by developing countries because they are premised 
on a certain construct of the national economy which has become antiquated. Developing 
countries eager to draw in foreign capital, technology, and know-how should learn from the 
experiences of developed nations so that ineffective and flawed regulations based on a 
doomed national/international market dichotomy will not be replicated. Instead of 
agonizing over the "takeover" of one's national economy by "foreign" entities, whose 
nationalities cannot be truly determined in any meaningful sense, states should instead 
invest in enhancing the capabilities of their citizens311 to become productive workers, 
305. Ulrich Hiemenz, Comment on Andras Inotai, "Experience with Privatization in East Central Europe," 
in PRIVATIZATION: SYMPOSIUM IN HONOR OF HERBERT GIERSCH 183,184 (Horst Siebert ed., 1992). 
306. As part of its indigenization policy, Nigeria once enforced Nigerian majority ownership of most 
foreign-invested enterprises, which foreign investors were able to counteract quite easily by maintaining "silent" 
Nigerian owners acting as "fronts" for foreign investors. See MARGARET M. PEARSON, JOINT VENTURES IN THE 
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 12 (1991). Other developing countries such as Mexico also prohibited foreigners 
from owning over 49% of certain enterprises because of the fear that foreign majority ownership would mean 
undue foreign control. See FOLSOM, supra note 42, at 752. India limited foreign equity to 40% except in "core" 
sectors, in which 74% was allowed. See PEARSON, supra, at 285 n.3. By contrast, in order to attract as much 
needed foreign currency as possible, China preferred "foreignization" to "indigenization," and "the Chinese 
government began to press for a greater percent of foreign equity in the late 1980s." !d. at 94. 
307. See China's Equity Joint Venture Law, in which no limit is set on foreign equity ownership. In order 
to prevent foreign majority equity interest from exercising undue control, Chinese law requires that certain major 
actions undertaken by a foreign-invested enterprise be subjected to unanimous consent by the board of directors. 
See PEARSON, supra note 306, at 168. 
308. REICH, supra note 13, at 161 (quoting Robert Mosbacher, Secretary of Commerce, at a news 
conference held Dec. 18, 1988) (emphasis added). 
309. Philips had constructed a $100 million facility in the United States and was working jointly with NBC 
and France's Thomson to develop a high-definition television system for the United States. Philips, Matsushita, 
and Sony had created, separately, research and manufacturing facilities for high-definition technologies in the 
United States. See REICH, supra note 13, at 162; see also Hobart Rowen, Thinking of 'Us' As U.S. Workers, Not 
as U.S. Firms, WASH. POST, Mar. 25, 1990, at HI. 
310. Andrew Pollack, Breaking out of Japan's Orbit, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 1996, at D7. 
311. In many cases, educational levels will be more decisive than low wages in the overall decision 
processes of most multinationals. Where the average worker in developed nations has had eleven years of 
schooling, her or his counterpart in China and Mexico has had only five. Where there are 85 scientists and 19 
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therefore attracting the highest-value "foreign" economic activities into their territorial 
boundaries. 
Because cross-national linkages among corporations have contributed to an increasing 
dispersion of economic activities, the challenge for developing countries is to institute a 
regime capable of attracting as well as channeling this global propensity. Most 
significantly, the current international economic order would, in fact, accommodate and 
even facilitate such a policy. Although multinational corporations have always had 
multinational operations, "most of their high value-added activities-such as product 
design, manufacturing, and R&D-took place in the headquarters' nation."312 The 
proliferation of "national local compan[ies],"313 however, has meant that "all of the 
activities of the emerging global corporations, including high value-added activities, are 
disbursed worldwide"314 and can be attracted to any territory, including developing-country 
territory, which meets the strategic needs of the global corporation and the global 
economy.315 
In other words, enhancing the standard of living of a nation's citizen's no longer 
depends on the competitiveness of "home" corporations vis-a-vis foreign corporations, but 
on the competitiveness of its home workers. The key to a new sensibility for international 
economic development, then, is to enhance the living standards of the nation by investing 
in human resources. Investment in human resources will ensure that one's home workers 
have sufficient educational and skill levels necessary to attract the global economy?16 
The competitiveness and the type of skill levels that one's home work force would 
require to draw in the global economy will necessarily correspond with the level of 
economic development of different nations. For some developing nations, competitiveness 
requires the maintenance of skill levels necessary to perform routine production or 
assembly-line jobs at comparatively lower costs;317 for more developed nations, 
university graduates for every 1000 people in developed countries, there are only nine scientists and one graduate 
per 1000 in developing nations. See War of the Worlds, supra note 280, at 23-24. The skills gap, of course, is 
also narrowing. South Korea, for example, has a higher proportion of 20-24 year-olds in education than most 
European countries. See id. at 24. 
312. Hunt & Morgan, supra note 240, at 19. 
313. Broadcast, supra note 253 (describing a corporation which is both a global company, which gives the 
company access to globally-sourced technology, and a "national local company," which gives the company local 
community ties). According to Mr. Percy Barnevik, CEO of Asea Brown Boveri, "in each country, you're a 
national citizen .... [Y]ou have many home countries, not just one. I happen to have 25." !d. See also Those 
Educated Asians, ECONOMIST, Sept 21, 1996, at 33, 33 (The economic success of some countries in East Asia 
can be traced to "their emphasis on raising the educational standards of the whole population rather than an 
elite." Singapore and Taiwan were rated first and third in a 1995 report on "the ability of their educational 
systems to meet 'the needs of a competitive economy."' 
314. Hunt& Morgan, supra note 240, at 19. 
315. HalfofXerox's 110,000 employees are outside the United States. Less than half of Sony's employees 
are Japanese. More than 50% of Digital Equipment's revenues derive from overseas operations. IBM's thirty 
research divisions are located worldwide. See Weindenbaum, supra note 239, at 173; see also Solomon, supra 
note 230, at 78. The global mindset means that corporations are "nationality-blind," according to Patrick 
Morgan, human resources manager for special projects at Bechtel, an engineering-construction firm with 
operations in more than seventy countries. To Morgan, "[a] person's passport is about as meaningful to us as the 
name of the bank on their savings-account passbooks." /d. 
316. See Boundaries of Business, supra note 298, at 128 (advocating public investment in human capital). 
"In a borderless world, only a well-educated population can be economically strong," especially because "the 
real value-added comes in knowledge-intensive industries, industries that need the education- and skill-rich 
environment of the advanced economies." /d. at 129. Although South Korea and Singapore have relatively poor 
natural resources, both "created comparative advantage by investing in education." David E. Austin, The 
Developing-Country Difference, in Boundaries of Business, supra note 298, at 135. South Korea spends one-
fifth ofits national budget on education, and businesses routinely invest in worker training. !d. 
317. While low wages serve as a significant comparative advantage available for many developing 
countries, it is also important not to overstate the wage-gap advantage. A company which relocates to lower-cost 
jurisdictions solely as a "stop-gap response" to ''immediate competitive threats" will not tend to be able to 
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competitiveness might require the skill levels needed to undertake routine data processing 
or keypunch operationl18 or even computer programming;319 for others, especially in the 
more economically advanced nations, comparative advantage lies less in routine, high-
volume production of goods than in the high-value production of ideas and intellectual 
property. 
In the long run, because the shift from high-volume to high-value production means 
that "knowledge, ... -instead of bricks and mortar-has become the center of capital 
investment" and society's chief resource,320 the most critical challenge for the purpose of 
economic development is to move from a low-wage comparative advantage to a high-skill 
comparative advantage through the creation of an educated workforce. The challenge for 
poor countries in particular, but for all countries in general, lies in integrating the national 
market with the international market by linking the skills of their work force with the needs 
of the global economy?21 
Rather than oppose, directly or indirectly, the current configuration of the 
international economic map, a different sensibility keeping with the new international 
economic order would utilize the openings provided by the global diffusion of economic 
activities to bridge the gap between the national and the international market. 
One basic question remains. To the extent that the nationaVinternational market 
dichotomy should be bridged rather than expanded, should it be done by resorting to the 
logic of public or private international law? Even in their reform efforts, both models of 
development work toward an entrenchment, rather than relaxation of the public/private 
dichotomy. The radical model aims to entrench the public/private international law 
dichotomy by directing its reform efforts toward creating a supersovereign with sufficient 
power to alter the relationship between the national and the international market. By 
contrast, the classical liberal model aims to entrench the public/private international law 
dichotomy by constructing a private order supposedly unimpeded by "the potential for 
politics outside the traditional discourses of public authority."322 
maintain its lower-cost competitive edge. Andrew Bartmess & Keith Cerny, Building Competitive Advantage 
through a Global Network of Capabilities, CAL. MANAGEMENT REv., Winter 1993, at 78, 87. Such a "move 
[would] not enhance [the company's] capability in low-cost manufacturing, but rather only gave it access to 
lower labor costs (which were also instantly available to any other company who moved overseas)." /d. at 88. 
See also Austin, supra note 316, at 136. Cheaper labor presents only a temporary comparative advantage, which 
"erodes as a country develops and wages rise" whereas the skill and education level of a country's workforce is a 
better source of"sustainable competitive advantage." See id. See also Kent Chen & Ray Heath, Getting a Jump 
on the 21st Century, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Sept. 2, 1993, at 4; see generally Markides & Berg, supra note 
233 (noting that the extra costs relating to transportation, communication, paperwork may offset lower labor 
costs, especially iflabor is but a small component of the total costs). 
318. See John Maxwell Hamilton, A Bit Player Buys Into the Computer Age, N.Y. TIMES BUS. WORLD 
MAG., Dec. 3, 1989, at 22, 22. Workers in Manila, for example, have contracted with United States firms to 
perform routine data processing services. 
319. See Udayan Gupta, U.S.-Jndia Satellite Link Stands to Cut Software Costs, WALL ST. J., Mar. 6, 1989, 
at B2. Bangalore, India, for example, has become a significant software development center, with increasing 
linkages to companies such as Texas Instruments headquartered in Texas. 
320. See Drucker, supra note 251, at 67. 
321. The argument has been even more emphatically stated. According to Peter Drucker, "because of 
automation information and advanced technology ... [and] because of the demand for trained people in all areas 
of management, development requires a knowledge base that few developing countries possess or can afford." 
See id. at 71. Thus, if developing countries were to embark on development based on a nineteenth century model 
focusing first on industries and production, they may be able to catch up but not surpass the currently developed 
nations. See also Those Educated Asians, ECONOMIST, Sept. 21, 1996, at 33 (The economic success of East Asia 
can be traced to "their emphasis on raising the educational standards of the whole population rather than an 
elite." Singapore and Taiwan were rated first and third in a 1995 report on "the ability of their educational 
systems to meet 'the needs of a competitive economy."'). 
322. David Kennedy, The International Style in Postwar Law and Policy, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 7, 11. 
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Neither sensibility is effective or accurate. The compartmentalization of the "public" 
from the "private" and vice versa has resulted, first, in the artificial submersion of 
international political considerations from the market-oriented sensibility of the classical 
liberal model and second, in an exaggerated and ahistorical antimarket, statist orientation of 
the radical model. The alternative posture I advocate would combine a market and 
~fficiency focus of private ~ternationallaw with a regulatory regime capable of facilitating 
.the activities of the global econpmy in a manner beneficial to the public interest. This 
regulatory regime, however, would work with, rather than against, the global logic and the 
market-based norms that define the current international economic order. Equally 
significant, national/international market integration would be accomplished by exploiting 
the already existing fact of global economic integration rather than resorting to the top-
down, state-centered approach used in public international law to construct a post-war 
community of nations. 
Because the radical model places its hope for economic development in the more 
nationalistic sensibility of the sovereign state, it is implicitly devoted to the continuation of 
the public/private split. Efforts aimed at creating a different contextual fabric for 
international law have been directed primarily toward reinvigorating the public sphere. The 
radical model has emphasized the institution of a more effective UN system or for the 
·establishment of some supersovereign entity.323 Working from the premise that the 
evolution of public international law has been unduly restricted by a dedication to national 
sovereignty, public international lawyers' efforts to renew the field have replicated 
traditional constructs of authority and order by projecting sovereignty from the national to 
the international plane. 
Termed "metropolitan" by Professor David Kennedy/24 this sensibility is 
characterized by a desire for and awareness of "triggers, conditions, and opportunities for 
intervention in the national."325 The very concept of sovereignty it finds wanting, however, 
restricts the reform effort aimed at achieving an integrated community of states. The 
paradox has been noted as early as 1948. A horizontal system characterized by "rugged 
individualism of territorial and heterogeneous states, balance of power, equality of states 
and toleration . . . ill accommodates itself to the international rule of law reinforced by 
• • • ,326 
necessary mst1tut10ns. 
More significantly, prior attempts to create an overarching international order have 
been aimed at the establishment of an authoritative sovereign enforcer with the power to 
issue commands in the vertical Austinian sense. Such attempts have created an uneasy 
dynamic, particularly in the economic realm, because the presuppositions underlying such 
efforts contradict the essentially horizontal basis of the international order itself?27 The 
predominant perspective rooted in both "public" and "private" international law is one 
founded on restraint.328 In the public international law order, for example, the command 
323. These efforts tend toward proposal to "rejuvenate public order and eradicate sovereign fonn." Id. 
324. Professor Kennedy's "metropolitan" sensibility is slightly different from what I have tenned the 
"public" international sensibility derived from the public/private split in international law. Although the 
"metropolitan" sensibility is similar to the sensibility I associate with "public" international law, in the sense that 
both can be located in the universe of the UN and its constituent bodies, it does not capture one of the main 
characteristics-politicization-which I associate with the "public" fragment of the public-private split. 
325. Kennedy, supra note 322, at 13; see also Lewis & Harris, supra note 253 (contrasting top-down 
measures with the process of globalization which "is not the result of a fitful lunge by government or military 
power toward ever larger geopolitical entities. Nor is it the product of some growing ideological confonnity on 
how we should live."). 
326. Leo Gross, The Peace of Westphalia, 1648-1948, 42 AM. J. INT'L L. 20, 40-41 (1948). 
327. The international system is theoretically composed of sovereign and equal states. See U.N. CHARTER 
art. 2(1). 
328. At the same time that austere principles of sovereignty and restraint define the UN order, the Charter is 
also infused with a wholly different logic and charged with the sweeping task of"solving international problems 
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against force enshrined in Article 2(4)329 -modified only by the self-defense exception of 
Article 51330-along with the principle of nonintervention,331 is premised on an overall 
negative duty to refrain from acts that threaten international peace. Similarly, in the private 
international law order, the underlying perspective that governs the Bretton Woods regime 
in general and GATI in particular is one that favors market normality as opposed to public 
intervention in the market. 
Efforts to transform predominantly horizontal into predominantly vertical norms have 
encountered significant resistance. Designed to circumvent the essentially 
noninterventionist logic of the international order, the UN has declared new norms of 
"intergovernmental interventions, cultural representations, and universal rights"332 in order 
to create a more sweeping affirmative ethos deemed more conducive to the economic needs 
of the developing world. The adoption ofthe International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights,333 the declarations to establish a new international economic order334 
and a right to development,335 as well as other major interrelated efforts have placed 
international economic development at the forefront of the international agenda. The first 
attempts to impose an obligation on the state to meet certain economic obligations to its 
own citizens. The second and the third attempt to impose economic obligations on the part 
of the rich states toward the poor states. Although both categories of economic rights have 
been declared a formal right,336 their expressions have been stunted by an international 
order dominated by an overall regime of restraint. 
Given the failure of this public international law sensibility to create, through the 
auspices of the UN General Assembly, legally enforceable economic rights that would 
entail a global redistribution of resource, the reality remains stark but true: rich states are 
capital and technology exporting states and, to the extent that poor states are capital and 
technology importing states, the success of economic development requires the ability to 
harness market forces to attract the capital and technology needed to establish and sustain a 
regime of economic development. One of the main arguments of this Article is that where 
global economic integration is capable of transcending the narrow constructs of national 
of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character." U.N. CHARTER art. 1(3). This affirmative agenda, 
however, is generally considered to be aspirational rather than legally obligatory. 
329. "All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the 
territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes 
of the United Nations." ld. art. 2(4). 
330. "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence 
if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures 
necessary to maintain international peace and security." Id. art. 51. 
331. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14 ~ 202 (citations omitted). 
"The principle of non-intervention involves the right of every sovereign State to conduct its affairs without 
outside interference; though examples of trespass against this principle are not infrequent, the Court considers 
that it is part and parcel of customary international law." !d. at 106. 
332. Kennedy, supra note 322, at 14. 
333. Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3. 
334. See Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Order, supra note 213, at 3. 
335. See Declaration on the Right to Development, G.A. Res. 41/128 U.N. GAOR, 41st Sess., Supp. No. 
53, at 186, U.N. Doc. A/41/53 (1986). The Declaration on the Right to Development is a General Assembly 
declaration, not a treaty or convention, and the degree to which it is legally binding is uncertain. See generally 
OSCAR SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 84-91 (1995). 
336. Economic rights have also caused conceptual difficulties. First, "[a]s used in the Charter, 'human 
rights' doubtless referred to those rights trampled by Hitler, the rights identified with the liberal state, the 
freedoms and immunities now known as 'civil and political rights."' HENKIN, supra note 14, at 190. Second, 
economic rights by their very definition require certain preconditions for their fulfillment. Third, "[i]t is not 
always certain that designating a social end as a 'right' makes its achievement more likely." SCHACHTER, supra 
note 335, at 334. 
Economic rights have been particularly problematic for the developed world, which feared that recognition 
of such rights "would ·give weight to demands for foreign aid and for a new economic order to enable poor states 
to realize the economic-social-cultural rights of their inhabitants." HENKIN, supra note 14, at 191. 
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self-interest and national sovereignty, it presents a more plausible strategy and offers more 
realistic hopes for international economic development than vertically based approaches 
designed to declare new rights or implement "overarching political strategy."337 
While I reject the vertical command structure constructed by public international law 
and the statist orientation of the radical model as ineffective, I also reject the essentially 
laissez-faire approach favored by private international law and the classical liberal model. 
Although in a much less conspicuous manner, the classical liberal model has also been 
similarly committed to the separation of the public and the private. While the radical model 
preserves the public/private dichotomy by creating a public space governed by the 
sensibility of the state and the UN, the classical liberal model preserves the public/private 
dichotomy by constructing an autonomous and atomized market (both at the national and 
the international level through which the public sphere could be segregated from the private 
sphere). In a reversal of the radical model's basic premise, this private sensibility 
constitutes a countervailing force or a buffer zone, which insulates the normal market from 
the abnormal forces of international politics and "reduces the transaction costs that would 
be required by continuous politics .... "338 
Despite its flaws, the classical liberal model is more capable of flowing with the 
global logic. My argument here is based on a basic assumption that without institutional 
discipline, nationalism and sovereignty present barriers generally incompatible with 
international integration, cooperation, and economic development.339 By contrast, the 
global web of interlocking economic interests, in the form of capital, investment, and 
production, resulting in an inability of the state to control the activities and movements of 
economic actors beyond their territories, has created a de facto regime of economic 
integration and interdependence that is either absent from or much more diluted in the 
public international law realm.340 
For the purpose of international economic development, global economic integration, 
under the auspices of the World Trade Organization, and regional economic integration 
such as the European Union, represent a potentially positive step toward the integration of 
economically poor nations. The institutional apparatus that would most facilitate and 
further economic development would consist of a balance of incentives and regulation 
designed to attract the energy of the global economy and at the same time control it in a 
manner compatible with the developmental requirements of particular states.341 
337. See Joel P. Trachtman, L'Etat, C'est Nous: Sovereignty, Economic Integration and Subsidiarity, 33 
HARV. INT'L L. J. 459, 459 (1992). 
338. /d. at 461. 
339. See Nathaniel Berman, Economic Consequences, Nationalist Passions: Keynes, Crisis, Culture, and 
Policy, 10 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 619, 623 (1995) (describing how one interwar economist, John Maynard 
Keynes, viewed the relationship between economics and nationalism, in which "he first sought to exclude 
nationalism as incompatible with economic reconstruction, then to enlist it as an ally, or even an agent, of 
economic planning, and finally, to subject it, as a 'cultural' force, to international discipline, along with 
'economic' forces."). 
340. See Trachtman, supra note 337, at 465. "State-centered public international law discourse in the world 
at large has been far Jess successful than the EC in enhancing peace and prosperity. The EC has used a different 
method: regional economic integration through functionalism." /d. The economic integration of the European 
Union has fulfilled one of the original objectives of the union, to ensure that the community integration of coal 
and steel production would make it economically infeasible for France and Germany to wage war. See also 
Lewis & Harris, supra note 253, at 114. Globalization is "the organic result of [a] virtuous cycle ..• by which 
economic convergence and the diffusion of innovation raise standards of living over time . . . . [T]he operation 
of the cycle multiplies the economic, political, and cultural connections and interdependencies .... 
[C]onvergence leading to innovation transfer, leading to both integration and more convergence .... " /d. 
341. The desire to attract and control the movement of the international market is not a new one. Even 
before the market became as global as it currently is, John Maynard Keynes had struggled during the interwar 
years with "the emergence of an autonomous business 'libido,' uncommitted to particular investments, the 
productive economy generally, or national borders." Berman, supra note 339, at 638, quoting JOHN MAYNARD 
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While the "private" global market constitutes the most effective vehicle342 through 
which to increase economic productivity and maximize wealth, national economic 
development policies should remain "public," in the sense that attracting as well as 
controlling global economic entities require state expenditures of public resources.343 
Public spending to ensure that the national citizenry possess the education and skills 
capable of attracting global webs of capital, technology, and investment may generate 
additional benefits for the workforce in the form of on-site training344 and on-site or local 
• 345 
sourcmg. 
Developing countries could also institute regulations that encourage private, 
particularly foreign, investors to comply with a range of "performance requirements." To 
ensure that its nationals would be included among the managerial ranks, China, for 
example, stipulated "shadow" management provisions whereby foreign managers in joint 
ventures must be shadowed by Chinese nationals to ensure that managerial know-how 
would be passed from the foreign to the Chinese "trainee."346 Pursuant to the purchase 
agreement, the new owners of the recently privatized Telefonos de Mexico ("Telmex"), for 
example, must comply with the terms of the concession agreement. The agreement 
requires Telmex to upgrade its telephone network347 by improving the number of lines by a 
specified percentage annually, expanding telephone service to rural areas, and reducing the 
wait involved in connecting telephone service to a certain threshold.348 Rather than wait 
until the benefits of economic development "trickle down" to the domestic citizenry, some 
developing countries have formulated an institutional framework with built-in control to 
ensure that the infusion of capital, technology, and know-how will confer immediate 
corresponding benefits to the local population. Vietnam, for example, requires that foreign 
joint ventures set aside a certain percentage of joint venture profits for contribution into a 
number of reserve funds for the benefit of workers?49 
These types of "performance requirements" imposed by the public sector or through 
regional organizations350 are precisely the sort that are necessary to prevent a backlash 
KEYNES, CLISSOLD (1927), reprinted in IX THE COLLECTED WRITINGS OF JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES 315, 320 
(Donald Moggridge ed., 2d ed. 1973). As Keynes recognized, national anxieties with international capital were 
often accompanied by a virulent strain of anti-Semitism. See id. at 646. Keynes concluded that such erratic, 
unconstrained business energy must be tamed by "nationalist temperament" so that "internationalism must again 
defer to existing state frontiers." ld. at 651. 
342. As a result of the information revolution, technological innovations can be quickly diffused. By 
contrast, in pre-industrial economies, "the spread of innovations across continents often took centuries. Potatoes 
were cultivated for 4,000 years in the Andes before diffusing to Europe in the 16th century ..•. " See Lewis & 
Harris, supra note 253, at 114. 
343. Sylvia Ann Hewlett, The Human Resource Deficit, in Boundaries of Business, supra note 298, at 133. 
344. See Lewis & Harris, supra note 253, at 114 (describing the "virtuous, upward-ratcheting cycle of 
economic convergence and technology transfer, driven in large measure by the actions of transnational 
corporations and the expectations of well-informed consumers .... "). 
345. For reasons related to 'lower transportation costs, convenience, proximity, tariffs or lack thereof, 
foreign manufacturers tend to develop relationships with lpcal component suppliers so they can source locally, 
which benefit local manufacturers. Developing-country sourcing "is generally suitable for manufacturing 
standardized products, low in technology or past the maturity stage in the life cycle." See Swamidass & Kotabe, 
supra note 236, at 86. 
346. See PEARSON, supra note 306, at 169. 
347. See generally First Draft, Prospectus of Telefonos de Mexico, S.A. de C.V. (June 17, 1991) at •24, 
available in LEXIS, Company Library, Prosp file (cited in prospectus of an international mutual fund which 
maintained Telefonos de Mexico stock in its portfolio). 
348. See id. 
349. See Law on Foreign Investment in Vietnam, art. 30 (1987), reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 930, 937 (1991). 
Similarly, China requires that before profits could be distributed, allocations must be made to expansion funds, 
reserve funds and bonus and welfare funds for workers, which usually constitute 10-15% of a joint venture's 
after tax profits. See PEARSON, supra note 306, at 142. 
350. Regional integration and regional harmonization of minimum environmental or labor standards could 
also act as a "brake" to the "race to the bottom," as developing countries vie to attract foreign capital. 
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against what could be deemed excessive intrusion of the global economy into the national 
sphere. At the same time, these regulatory mechanisms are palatable to most foreign 
investors because they do not represent attempts at control by measures such as 
nationalization or limits on profit repatriation. Of course, where the market is unable to 
provide an adequate framework for correcting either market or nonmarket difficulties, 
additional adjustments may be instituted and, if they do not propose to alter the 
fundamentals of the international economic system, are less likely to be opposed by the rich 
states?51 
For the reasons discussed above, a new sensibility for international economic 
development would allow for a cross-fertilization of"public" and "private" norms designed 
to synthesize and reconcile the nationaVinternational market dichotomy with the global, 
post-sovereign sentiment of the "private" international economic system. Instead of 
establishing vertically-based rights to impose certain obligations on the part of the 
international toward the national, the focus should be on "harnessing public and private 
actors to the management of complex forces-public, private, governmental, and 
commercial-which constitute the international market."352 From this perspective, the 
nation-state is less a source of economic authority, sovereignty less a protector of economic 
wealth, and the UN at the supersovereign level -is less capable of enunciating legally 
binding economic rights. The new logic, therefore, recognizes the Bretton Woods 
commitment to the market and international resistance to economic rights. Its commitment, 
as stated above, is not toward a heightened economic order of vertically delineated 
economic obligations but toward the effective management and harnessing of a diffused 
and globalized international market. My argument is that by not directly confronting or 
opposing the noninterventionist logic of international economic law, the new sensibility is 
more likely to achieve the goal of economic development than the vertically based 
approach associated with the public international law sensibility. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
I have argued in this Article that the two currently dominant models of international 
economic development have been distorted by a set of dichotomous premises concerning 
the national versus the international market and public versus private international law. 
First, the national market has been viewed as a separate sphere composed. of distinctly 
identifiable national economic interests to be protected from or balanced against the 
international market. Compared to the international market, the national market, or the 
"home" market, is deemed to be a "private" realm of economic activities performed by 
"our'' economic players intimately linked to our sense of"national sovereignty." Both U.S. 
and international trade laws assume that a dichotomy exists between the national and the 
international market, and the laws aim simply to negotiate between the two. 
Intertwined with the nationaVinternational market dichotomy is yet a second 
dichotomy between public and private international law. While a divide exists between the 
351. For example, although the demand for debt forgiveness has not been agreed to, negotiations for debt-
reducing schemes such as "debt-for-nature" swaps have been relatively successful. Under such schemes, a 
creditor state may forgive or reduce the debt of a debtor state if the debtor state agrees to assume certain 
environmental obligations. The United States Congress, for example, adopted a law in 1992 which allowed nine 
debtor states to reduce part of their debt to the Agriculture Department if they consented to various domestic 
environmental projects. See Enterprise for the Americas Initiative Act of 1992, Pub. L. 102-532, 106 Stat 3509 
(codified in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C.). Another version of "debt-for-nature" swaps would allow an 
environmental nongovernmental organization to purchase from the creditor the debts of a developing country at 
below-market value. The nongovernmental organization would then enter into a contract with the debtor state to 
retire the debt in exchange for the adoption, by the debtor state, of certain environmental commitments. 
352. Kennedy, supra note 322, at 13. 
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national and the international market, both national and international markets are deemed 
part of "private," rather than "public" international law. The public/private international 
law dichotomy has resulted both in the association of "public" international law with 
international politics and state sovereignty not easily susceptible to judicial determination 
and in the concomitant association of "private" international law with "apolitical" 
commercial activities considered to be eminently justiciable. 
The existence of these two intersecting dichotomies has been overlooked in the debate 
on international economic development. The effect that these dichotomies have on the 
ideological and conceptual premises which underlie both the classical liberal and the radical 
models of economic development has also been overlooked. While both models appear 
diametrically opposed, both are in fact quite similar. Both models uncritically accept the 
dichotomy between the national and international market. Their difference lies in the fact 
that the classical liberal model uses the conceptual tools of "private" international law, 
while the radical model uses the conceptual tools of "public" international law to navigate 
the national/international market divide. Neither model has attempted to nor is capable of 
resolving the deep tensions posed by, on the one hand, the national versus the international, 
and on the other hand, the statist preoccupation of public international law versus the 
nonstate orientation of private international law. 
My proposal to eradicate the national/international market dichotomy would have 
more than theoretical appeal. On one level, the eradication of barriers between the national 
and the international market would make practical sense: the global logic that characterizes 
the international economic order means that products and corporations are now more likely 
to have global identities. The assumption that the home market is linked to or defined by 
its home corporations and home products is no longer apposite. On another level, this shift 
would also transform the very basic, normative framework in which the discourse in 
international· economic development has been conducted-from one devoted to a 
precarious balancing of the national/international market divide to one devoted to the 
integration of the two. Rather than "balance" the national against the international market, 
or protect home industry and home products from international competition, the aim would 
be to bring in the international market to aid in the development of and investment in 
human capital. Eradicating the national/international dichotomy from the discourse on 
economic development would alter the terms of the debate from one premised upon the link 
between a home market, its corporations, and its products to one premised upon the link 
between a home market and its labor force. 
Although market solutions are more in keeping with the globalizing tendency of the 
international economic order, they cannot be seen as simply "private" commercial activities 
insulated from the concerns of "public" international law. Ultimately, this Article argues 
that market and state are both formidable forces that cannot be ideologically 
compartmentalized according to a "public" or "private" line. My proposal to integrate the 
national and the international market is based on a similar proposal to reconceive the 
relationship between "private" and "public" international law. The challenge is to enact an 
institutional framework capable of simultaneously attracting and regulating the global 
market and, in the process, further the development of an interdependent and integrated 
international economic order. 
